Jordan v. Pugh, Civil Action No. 02-CV-01239-MSK-PAC.

• Decision Date: 02 May 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 02-CV-01239-MSK-PAC.
• Citation: 484 F.Supp.2d 1185
• Parties: Mark JORDAN, Plaintiff, v. Michael V. PUGH, J. York, R.E. Derr, B. Sellers, and Stanley Rowlett, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

484 F.Supp.2d 1185

Mark JORDAN, Plaintiff, v. Michael V. PUGH, J. York, R.E. Derr, B. Sellers, and Stanley Rowlett, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 02-CV-01239-MSK-PAC.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

May 2, 2007.

Laura Lee Rovner, Nantiya Ruan, Student Law Office, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff. Michael Conrad Johnson, Kevin Thomas Traskos, U.S. Attorney's Office, Denver, CO, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS

KRIEGER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on two motions filed by the Plaintiff: (1) a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum (# 313), to which the Defendants responded (# 317) and the Plaintiff replied (# 318); and (2) a Motion for Leave to Present Testimony of Theodore Kaczynski and Thomas Silverstein at Trial (# 320), to which the Defendants responded (# 322) and the Plaintiff (# 323). Having considered the same, the Court

FINDS and CONCLUDES that:

I. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Trial in this matter was previously set to commence at the end of October 2006. Shortly before that trial setting, the Court issued an Order granting the Plaintiff's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and authorized him to appear at the trial in person. The trial was subsequently vacated and reset to May 29, 2007.

The Plaintiff now moves for permission to attend the May 29, 2007 trial in person. He contends that his "issues and contentions ... as analyzed by the Court in granting the first writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum" have not changed. He makes no additional arguments in his motion.

The Defendants oppose the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum at this juncture. As they did previously, they argue that the Plaintiff is a dangerous individual who has been convicted of murdering another inmate and who is housed in the administrative maximum federal prison in Florence, Colorado, in its restrictive Control Unit. They also argue that transporting the Plaintiff will require multiple escorts and will present an opportunity for the Plaintiff to harm others or escape from custody, and that housing the Plaintiff at FCI-Englewood during the trial will present additional risks. They further state that the Plaintiff be permitted to consult with his attorneys by telephone during breaks and at the beginning and end of the trial day in a room which is 15 to 20 feet away from the ADX courtroom where the video communication equipment is located. The Defendants also contend that circumstances have changed since last October. In specific, they assert that the Plaintiff has been represented by counsel for almost an entire year, and counsel can no longer contend that they are unequipped to handle any surprises which may arise during the trial.

The Plaintiff's reply raises additional issues not set forth in his motion. He contends that his physical presence at trial is required because he has had difficulty arranging meetings with his counsel, and he might be required to miss a portion of the trial due to a mandatory count which takes place every afternoon after 3:45 p.m. He also fears that because of prison understaffing, there might be logistical problems in him appearing by video.

When the Court first ordered that the Plaintiff could appear at the October 2006 trial in person, it was upon consideration of a variety of factors. First, the Court noted that although a prisoner has no absolute right to attend the trial of his civil action, the Plaintiff's in-person appearance at the trial was favored in light of the then existing circumstances. The Court considered four factors outlined by the Fourth Circuit in Muhammad v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail, 849 F.2d 107, 111-12 (4th Cir.1988):(1) the expense of facilitating the Plaintiffs presence; (2) security concerns; (3) logistical issues; and (4) the Court's control over its docket. Against these factors, the Court considered whether the Plaintiff's physical presence in the courtroom would substantially further the resolution of the case, and whether the suit could be stayed until the Plaintiff completed his sentence. At that juncture, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff should appear at the trial in person because his counsel were newly appointed and were law students working with a faculty advisor pursuant to General Order 2005-3 (Order Adopting Student Practice Rule). Of primary concern was that issues could arise during the trial which the Plaintiff was better equipped to handle than his counsel due to the recency of their appointment, and that the telephone option might not be adequate.

This is no longer the case. The Plaintiff been ably represented by counsel for more than one year. In addition, trial in this matter is to the bench, which allows for flexibility not only in the order and presentation of evidence, but in the scheduling of recesses.

In addition, there are significant security concerns associated with Plaintiffs presence in the courtroom during trial. While incarcerated, the Plaintiff convicted of the second degree murder of another inmate and various assault charges. For such offenses, he was sentenced to a total term of 420 months imprisonment to run consecutively to his earlier term of imprisonment imposed in another case. He is currently confined at ADX, the most secure prison in...