Danley v. Allyn
| Decision Date | 24 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 06-J-0680-NW. |
| Citation | 485 F.Supp.2d 1260 |
| Parties | Kevin DANLEY, Plaintiff, v. Ruby ALLYN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Henry F. Sherrod, III, Henry F. Sherrod III PC, Florence, AL, for Plaintiff.
Daryl L. Masters, Webb & Eley PC, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.
In the second amended complaint filed by plaintiff, Kevin Danley ("Danley"), he invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks damages from five jail personnel who he claims violated his constitutional rights while, he was a pretrial detainee and while they were acting under color of state law. All defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), claiming that they are entitled to qualified immunity. This court denied defendants' said motions without opinion, as this court, and other courts, had long done where a plaintiffs allegations of egregious law enforcement misconduct must be taken as true. The court believed that the second amended complaint clearly showed on its face that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. In a sharply worded opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case with instructions to this court to "consider the case in full and to enter reasoned orders which discuss the facts alleged in the second amended complaint and detail the legal analysis used by the district court to reach its conclusions regarding the motions to dismiss." Danley v. Allen [sic], 480 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 2007).
This court assumes that the mandate permits the court to grant some or all of defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions. In fact, the court detects from a between-the-lines reading of the appellate opinion that the granting of defendants' motions might be this court's safest course of action. The Court of Appeals had before it the same twice amended complaint that this court considered; and it perfectly summarized that complaint as a contention by Danley "that [Danley] was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when, as a pretrial detainee, detention officers sprayed him with pepper spray." Id.
This court starts with the premise that if a state actor is qualifiedly immune from a suit brought under § 1983, his immunity should be judicially recognized at the earliest practicable moment. This is the rationale that justifies an immediate appeal from a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on qualified immunity. In cases where it is apparent from the face of the complaint not only that a defendant was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority during the incident complained of, but that he had no well recognized reason to believe that his conduct violated a protected constitutional right, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), provides him a remedy, that is, if the trial court has failed, as this court may have done, to see the obvious. In fact, a defendant arguably has nothing to lose by taking his virtually pre-ordained interim appeal, even if the complaint undeniably alleges that he has committed an act of sadistic, unprovoked violence against the plaintiff. But, does the early appeal encouraged by Mitchell necessarily accomplish its purpose? In some cases, an unfounded interlocutory appeal has the opposite effect. It prolongs the specter of ultimate liability and imposes upon the appealing defendant the substantial legal expense of the appeal. If the defendant loses a costly and time consuming appeal, he can, and probably will, file a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. If his Rule 56 motion is also denied, he will probably take a second (or a third?) interlocutory appeal, although this time upon a record that will contain evidentiary material developed during discovery and thus that goes well beyond the bare allegations of the complaint. It appears, then, that a defendant who is willing to forego an appeal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, may escape from the litigation thicket quicker by waiting until his Rule 56 opportunity, at which time the facts upon which his qualified immunity defense is based will be clearer and more telling. In the case here being considered, when the Rule 12(b)(6) motions are again denied, as they will be for the reasons that follow, the defendants will probably exercise their second right to appeal. They, of course, have the right to do so.
The foregoing musings about the advantages and disadvantages inherent in Mitchell do not alter this court's clear obligation to follow the mandate of the Court of Appeals, which, as the court reads it, requires a detailed examination of the facts as alleged. The only sure way to do this is to repeat in haec verba the allegations of the second amended complaint, all of which are deemed true for the purpose of pursuing the required qualified immunity analysis. After the amended complaint, in the early paragraphs, introduces three defendants, Ruby Allyn ("Allyn"), Jeff Wood ("Wood") and Steve Woods ("Woods"), as Danley's jailers at the Lauderdale County Detention Center, introduces defendant, Jackie Rikard ("Rikard"), as the jail administrator, and introduces defendant, Ronnie Willis ("Willis"), as the Sheriff of Lauderdale County, Danley alleges in paragraphs 7 through 70 as follows:
7. On or about July 11, 2004, plaintiff was arrested on a DUI charge and placed in custody at the Lauderdale County Detention Center.
8. The group jail cell in which plaintiff was initially kept did not have a toilet or any water. Plaintiff requested multiple times to be able to use a toilet. Eventually, plaintiff was taken out of the cell and taken to a small cell (5 × 7) that had a toilet in the corner and no water.
9. The toilet available to plaintiff was not sanitary, and there was, no toilet paper.
10. Plaintiff complained about the unsanitary toilet and the lack of toilet paper.
11. Plaintiff told defendant Allyn he needed toilet paper (in addition to the usual reasons) to clean the "nasty" toilet so he could sit down.
12. Despite the availability of toilet paper and for no legitimate reason, defendant Allyn refused plaintiff toilet paper.
13. After going to the bathroom, plaintiff was removed from the cell so he could be transferred back to the group cell by three jailers, defendants Ruby Allyn, Jeff Wood, and Steve Woods.
14. While up to this point plaintiff had been calm, plaintiff was upset because of the denial of toilet paper and, after coming out of the cell, asked if he could please have some "fucking" or "damn" toilet paper to wipe himself.
15. Apparently because she did not like his cursing or his tone of voice, in response defendant Allyn told plaintiff, among other things, to shut up, to watch his mouth, and to get back in the cell.
16. There was no legitimate reason for defendant Allyn to order plaintiff back into the cell.
17. Defendant Allyn ordered plaintiff back into the cell solely to punish him for complaining about the lack of toilet paper and for being (in her view) disrespectful to her.
18. In response to defendant Allyn's telling him to go back into the cell, plaintiff told defendant Allyn that he was done using the toilet.
19. Instead of having plaintiff returned to the group cell, defendant Allyn told plaintiff to go back in the cell or she was going to spray him.
20. Plaintiff asked defendant Allyn why she was "fucking" with him and what "spray me" meant.
21. In response, for no legitimate security or other reason and solely for the purpose of humiliating and punishing plaintiff, defendant Allyn told one of the two other jailers present, defendant Wood, to spray plaintiff.
22. Defendant Wood sprayed plaintiff.
23. Defendants Allyn and Wood did not perceive plaintiff as a threat.
24. Plaintiff did not say or do anything that these two defendants could reasonably have perceived as a threat or as a justification for any force.
25. Recognizing this fact, defendants Allyn and Wood wrote false reports accusing plaintiff of being violent prior to the spraying in order to justify their actions.
26. Defendant Allyn intentionally tried to provoke plaintiff by denying him toilet paper, telling plaintiff to return to the cell, and then refusing to provide any explanation for her unjustified display of her power over him.
27. While plaintiff did (understandably under the circumstances) question defendant Allyn's sending him back into the cell given that he had finished using the toilet, plaintiff never refused to obey defendant Allyn. He did not say he would not return to the cell. He merely asked questions.
28. Plaintiff, though understandably upset, was surrounded by three jailers, was unarmed, had not been arrested for a violent crime, was only asking reasonable questions, and was not acting in a threatening manner.
29. Though no force was necessary, if defendant Allyn merely wanted plaintiff back in the small cell immediately, having plaintiff sprayed was unnecessary.
30. Plaintiff was standing in the doorway, and defendant Allyn could have just told the other two jailers to push plaintiff back into the cell, which they did after he was sprayed.
31. Contrary to jail policy and procedure and manufacturer instructions, which provide for a one-second burst of spray at a distance of over 3 feet, the jailer sprayed plaintiff at close range and for 3-5 seconds.
32. Defendants Allyn, Wood, and Woods knew plaintiff would be sprayed excessively, as at the jail generally and on this shift in particular it was the formal or informal policy to use pepper spray on non-violent inmates as a means of punishment for not showing proper deference.
33. Moreover, despite an opportunity to intervene to stop or mitigate the effects of the excessive use of pepper spray, all three defendants, as explained below, took steps to exacerbate the excessive spraying by denying plaintiff prompt and adequate ventilation, decontamination, and medical care.
34...
To continue reading
Request your trial