City of St. Louis v. Manufacturers' Sav. Bank

• Decision Date: 31 March 1872
• Citation: 49 Mo. 574
• Parties: THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent, v. MANUFACTURERS' SAVINGS BANK, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

49 Mo. 574

THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent,

v.MANUFACTURERS' SAVINGS BANK, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1872.

Appeal from St. Louis Criminal Court.

James Taussig, with Krum & Decker, for appellant.

I. By the charter from the State the appellant, among other franchises, obtained the right to transact its business of banking in the city of St. Louis, and has thus a license from the State for that purpose. The city of St. Louis cannot exact a license fee or prevent the transaction of the business of the corporation without impairing the obligation of the contract made by the State.

1. The charter granted by the State to the Accommodation Bank is a contract which is inviolable, and which requires no money consideration to support it. (Home of the Friendless v. Rowse, 8 Wall. 436.)

2. But in the case at bar an express money consideration is reserved for the franchises granted. (Sess. Acts 1863, p. 154.)

3. The contract thus made by the State gives the appellant the right to transact its business in St. Louis. The charter is a license from the State. (Chilvers v. The People, 11 Mich. 49, 50; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 470.)

4. The right and privilege thus acquired by the corporation from the State cannot be impaired by or burdened with a tax or license by a municipal corporation which is created by the State. (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How., U. S., 150.)

5. The State subjects all the property of the appellant to taxation under the general revenue law; the city also exacts from the appellant a tax on all its property; the State also exacts from the appellant a separate license tax of one per cent. of its net earnings, and thus all species of property and rights owned and enjoyed by the corporation are fully taxed. The license now sought to be exacted would therefore be a double tax. (See Rev. Ord. of St. Louis, 1871, City Charter, art. III, § 1, pp. 69-70; art. VI, p. 87.)

6. If the city has a right to exact a license fee of $200 it may exact a license fee of $10,000, and may thus, in the shape of the exaction of a license fee, prohibit and prevent the exercise of the franchise and privilege granted by the charter. (Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 439.)

7. The power to demand a license is always strictly construed against the municipality. (Chess v. Birmingham, 1 Grant, 438; Bennett v. Borrough, 7 Casey, 15; Philips v. Allen, 6 Wright, 481.)

II. If the license sought to be exacted in this case is claimed by the city to be “a tax for revenue” and not a “police regulation,” or a “fee for the exercise of the franchise,” then the case presents this feature, that under the provisions of the city charter and ordinances the city levies “a tax for revenue” of one and a half per cent. on all the property of the appellant, and under the provisions of the ordinance relied on in this case the city levies ““another tax for revenue” in the shape of a license fee of $200. We submit, as an axiomatical proposition, that the city cannot tax the same property twice or in two different shapes.

E. P. McCarty, for respondent.

“A law which seeks to deprive the Legislature of the power to tax must be so clear, explicit and determinate that there can be neither doubt nor controversy about its terms or the consideration which renders it binding. Every presumption will be made against its surrender, as the power was committed by the people to be exercised and not alienated.” (City of St. Louis v. Boatmen's Ins. and Trust Co., 47 Mo. 156; Washington University v. Rowse, 42 Mo. 308; see also Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, U. S., 436; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 547; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561.)

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

In pursuance of authority granted to it in its charter, the city of St. Louis passed an ordinance providing that no person or association, corporation, or savings institution, should carry on the business of dealing in, buying or selling or discounting any kind of bills of exchange, checks, drafts, bank or promissory notes, etc., without a license for that purpose continuing in force.

The license required by the ordinance was to be issued to any person applying for the same, at the rate of $200 per year, and for every violation of the ordinance the party guilty was subjected to a fine of $200. The appellant continued to prosecute the business without taking out a license, and was proceeded against and found guilty, and fined accordingly. It is insisted...