State v. Biggerstaff

• Decision Date: 15 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. SD 34001,SD 34001
• Citation: 496 S.W.3d 513
• Parties: State of Missouri, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Stacy Biggerstaff, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

496 S.W.3d 513

State of Missouri, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Stacy Biggerstaff, Defendant–Appellant.

No. SD 34001

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two .

Filed: Apr. 15, 2016

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied May 10, 2016

Application for Transfer Denied June 28, 2016

Amy M. Bartholow, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.

Anthony M. Brown, and, Thomas F. Kondro, Forsyth, MO, for Respondent.

DON E. BURRELL

, P.J.—OPINION AUTHOR

In the early afternoon on April 17, 2013, Stacy Biggerstaff (“Defendant”) was stopped at a Missouri Highway Patrol (“MHP”) checkpoint, along with all other motorists traveling Taney County's Coon Creek Road at that time. Based on evidence acquired during the stop, Defendant was later found guilty of the class C felony of possession of a controlled substance, see section 195.202 (Count I), the class A misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated, see section 577.010 (Count II), and the unclassified misdemeanor of driving while suspended, see section 302.321 (Count III).¹

Defendant's single point on appeal challenges her Count II conviction on the ground that the evidence acquired at the MHP checkpoint violated her right to be free from unlawful search and seizure because: (1) the “checkpoint location was not chosen based on specific data”; (2) “no written procedures were implemented and provided to field personnel”; and (3) “no signs or other warnings were given to drivers about the checkpoint.”

Because Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous, we affirm.

Standard of Review

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the evidence presented at both the motion hearing and the trial, State v. Goff, 129 S.W.3d 857, 861–62 (Mo. banc 2004)

, and we will uphold the trial court's decision unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Guinn, 453 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Mo.App.S.D.2014). The trial court's ruling must be supported by substantial evidence, and we view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the ruling, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Id.

Analysis

Defendant acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court “has implied that equipment or operator license checkpoints may be constitutional if the checkpoints do not allow the officers to have an unconstrained exercise of discretion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)

.” Defendant and the State both look to State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624 (Mo.App.W.D.1988), for guidelines describing a proper checkpoint. Welch involved a roadblock to check drivers' sobriety, id. at 625, and it did not establish a rigid formula for conducting all checkpoints. Instead, after engaging in a thorough discussion of law in this area, including opinions from the United States Supreme Court and other states, and then analyzing the particular facts surrounding the roadblock at issue, it found that “roadblocks are not unconstitutional per se” and that the specific checkpoint before the court passed constitutional muster. Id. at 626–33. The court held

that under the particular facts and circumstances of the present case the “intrusion” was minimal. In addition, as the facts reveal, this particular roadblock operation was conducted by a designed plan, executed under supervisory personnel, provided more than ample notice to travelers as to what the operation was and provided a system by which delay to travelers was minimized.

Id. at 633

.

Defendant also cites State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352, 353, 354 (Mo.App.E.D.1989)

, in which a roadblock to check for vehicle defects, driver's licenses, and “possibly for any intoxicated drivers” was found to bear “little or no resemblance to those approved in” Welch and two other opinions.² The checkpoint in Canton was conducted at night, and it was conducted without safety measures for drivers, written procedures or adequate officer training, a sufficient number of officers, evidence of agency authority to conduct the checkpoint, and specific data regarding the location used. Id.

The following summary of the evidence concerning the checkpoint in this case is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and it demonstrates that the checkpoint was similar to Welch

and distinguishable from Canton. The primary purpose of the checkpoint was to enforce traffic safety laws, with a focus on driver qualification and the condition of the motor vehicles' safety equipment. The checkpoint was within the territory of MHP Troop D.

A MHP “GENERAL ORDER” and a “SPECIAL ORDER” for Troop D were admitted into evidence. The purpose of the general order was “[t]o provide uniform guidelines relating to the implementation and operation of roadblocks.” Neither order provided specific data about the rates of violations of traffic safety laws, but the special order listed approved locations for daytime checkpoints “selected by zone supervisors for the purpose of reducing property damage, injuries, and deaths caused by unqualified drivers and defective equipment on motor vehicles.” The special order also set forth “procedures to be followed” for conducting the checkpoint.

The checkpoint location was listed in the special order, and it was being overseen by a MHP corporal acting as an assistant zone supervisor because no zone supervisor was on duty. Zone supervisors were granted the authority to implement enforcement checkpoints at locations listed in the special order. From the locations listed in the special order, the actual choice would then be made based upon where the troopers to be used to man the checkpoint were working at that time. The troopers involved in the checkpoint met together briefly before they began stopping motorists, and they went over how it was to be conducted. The trooper who ultimately arrested Defendant testified that the procedures in the special order were followed regarding the checkpoint, with the exception that “each” trooper involved did not complete a data form following the conclusion of the checkpoint. Instead, the practice had become for each trooper to submit their data to their supervisor, who would then submit the data “for the whole checkpoint.”

A minimum of two marked patrol vehicles were set up with their emergency lights activated to alert approaching motorists to the existence of the checkpoint. The officers manning the checkpoint wore their MHP uniforms, plus reflective safety vests, and they were standing in the roadway. The checkpoint was conducted entirely in daylight hours during the afternoon for approximately 60 to 90 minutes, and there were clear sightlines to the checkpoint of 250 to 300 yards in either direction. Every vehicle that approached the checkpoint was stopped, and the motorist was advised of the reason for the checkpoint. Any delay to drivers was minimized by each check consisting of a review of the driver's license plus one piece of vehicle safety equipment (such as a turn signal or brake lights) in a process that could take as little as thirty seconds.³

When Defendant drove up to the checkpoint, she was not wearing her seatbelt, and she told the trooper that she did...