Pratt v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 16 April 1878
• Parties: WILLIAM L. PRATT ET AL., Appellants, v. SARAH PRATT ET AL., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

5 Mo.App. 539

WILLIAM L. PRATT ET AL., Appellants,

v.SARAH PRATT ET AL., Respondents.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Apr. 16, 1878.

Prior to the revision of 1865, the statute had declared that the issue of all marriages “deemed” null in law should be legitimate, but in the revision of 1865, the word “decreed” was substituted for “deemed” in the statute. Held, that this change bastardized no one who was legitimate when the change was made, and a son who had inheritable capacity in 1864, and whose father was then alive, could, upon his father's death subsequent to 1865, be capable of inheriting the estate, though issue of a marriage “deemed,” but never “““decreed,” null in law.

APPEAL from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Affirmed.

W. H. POGUE, for appellants, cited: Scribner on Dower, 5, 8; Lawrence v. Miller, 1 Sandf. 539; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; White v. White, 5 Barb. 474; Vartie v. Underwood, 18 Barb. 561.

GLOVER & SHEPLEY, for respondents, cited: Lincecum v. Lincecum, 3 Mo. 441; Buchanan v. Harvey, 35 Mo. 281; Eubanks v. Banks, 34 Ga. 416; Cooley's Const. Lim. 263, 370.

LEWIS, P. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Thomas Pratt was married in England, in the year 1821, to defendant Sarah Pratt, by whom he had issue, William Pratt, now deceased, and the defendants Rebecca Stout and Maria Powell. Plaintiffs are the children of William Pratt, deceased. In 1834, Thomas Pratt came alone to the United States, and in 1835 was formally married in New York to Harriet Van Pelt, one of the present defendants, now known as Mrs. Harriet Pratt. She was ignorant, until three years after the ceremony, of the fact that his first wife was still living. The couple moved to Missouri in 1847; and in 1849, a son, the defendant Charles R. Pratt, was born to them. Up to his death, in 1874, Thomas Pratt continually represented and treated the defendants Harriet and Charles as his wife and son. His last will was probated in St. Louis, Dec. 30, 1874. By this, he devised all his estate to his “beloved wife, Harriet Pratt,” for life, with remainder to his son Charles R. Pratt, and appointed Harriet his executrix.

The petition sets forth the foregoing facts, and, averring that the defendant Charles R. Pratt is an illegitimate child, that neither he nor his mother is entitled to any distributive share in the estate, and that decedent must be held to have died intestate as to the persons really entitled to distribution, prays that the alleged last will of Thomas Pratt be declared null and void.

Upon a hearing of the cause, the Circuit Court found that defendant Charles R. Pratt and the other descendants named were lawful descendants and heirs of Thomas Pratt, deceased. The decree proceeds as follows: “And the said court finds that said instrument as proved in the St. Louis Probate Court on the 30th day of December, 1874, was executed by said Thomas Pratt on the 10th day of April, 1872, and is the last will and testament of Thomas Pratt, deceased; and it appearing by said will that said Charles R. Pratt is named and provided for in said will, and that the said plaintiffs, William L. Pratt and Emma R. Pratt, as the descendants of said William Pratt, and the said defendants Rebecca Stout and said Maria Powell were not named or provided for by the will of said testator, Thomas Pratt, thereupon the said court doth consider, adjudge, and decree, that the said William L. Pratt, Emma R. Pratt, Rebecca Stout, and Maria Powell are each entitled to such proportion of the estate of Thomas Pratt, real and personal, as if he had died intestate, and that the said Thomas Pratt left no other children or descendants of children than is herein designated and adjudged, and that the same ought to be and shall be assigned to them by said Charles R. Pratt and by the St. Louis Probate Court. This decree is made without any prejudice to the rights of Sarah Pratt and of Harriet Pratt as to dower in said estate of said Thomas Pratt; and the court doth further adjudge, that said plaintiffs do recover of said defendants Harriet Pratt and Charles R. Pratt their costs in this behalf expended.” Plaintiffs appealed.

From the year 1825 until 1865, the statutes of Missouri, in successive revisions, declared that “the issue of all marriages deemed null in law” should be legitimate. The printed revision of 1865 substitutes the word “decreed” for the word “deemed,” in the same place. Under the first provision, Charles R. Pratt would be a legitimate son, notwithstanding the invalidity of his mother's marriage. Under the second, he would be a bastard, for want of a decree annulling the marriage. The question to be determined is, By which law must his rights be ascertained?

The first statute was in force when Charles was born, and continued so to be for sixteen years afterwards. When Thomas Pratt died, the new provision had become the law of the land. It is argued for the plaintiffs that, as it is competent for the Legislature at any time to alter the law of descents, and as no right of inheritance can accrue until the death of the ancestor, the change in the statute operated prospectively upon the rights of Charles R. Pratt. He could acquire no right until his father's death, and therefore took nothing under the law as it stood at the date of that event.

The argument would be more satisfactory if the statute, in either form, provided that the issue of the defined marriage should, upon the death of the father, be capable of inheriting his estate. There would then be nothing for the law to operate upon until the happening of the death, and the law then in force would necessarily be the law of the case. But a fundamental error lies in treating legitimacy and inheritable capacity as convertible terms. It seems to be forgotten that legitimacy is a status, or social condition, and that the capacity to inherit is only one of its incidents. A legitimate child has, from the moment of its birth until the day of its legal majority, a common-law right to a support from the father. It is entitled to bear his name, even though never acquired by common reputation. If designated in a grant or devise as the child of a...