50 Waterville St. Tr. v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-00368 (KAD) |
| Parties | 50 WATERVILLE STREET TRUST, LLC Plaintiff, v. VERMONT MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
On an unknown date (though likely in 2019), Plaintiff 50 Waterville Street Trust, LLC's property suffered damage of an unknown nature (though likely water damage) as a result of an unknown event or cause. Thereafter, Plaintiff-an insured under a business owner's insurance policy issued by Defendant Vermont Mutual Insurance Company-commenced this breach of contract action when Defendant declined to cover the property damage under the policy. Plaintiff also asserts a claim for Defendant's alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Both parties seek summary judgment. Defendant argues that it has no obligation to Plaintiff under the policy because Plaintiff failed to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage- namely, the timely provision of a signed and sworn proof of loss as required by the policy. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 31, is DENIED, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 30, is GRANTED.
The standard under which courts review motions for summary judgment is well established. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” while a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Significantly, the inquiry conducted by the Court when reviewing a motion for summary judgment focuses on “whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. As a result, the moving party satisfies its burden under Rule 56 “by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case” at trial. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the movant meets its burden, the nonmoving party “must set forth ‘specific facts' demonstrating that there is ‘a genuine issue for trial.'” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “[T]he party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading” to establish the existence of a disputed fact. Id.; accord Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). “[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts” will not suffice. Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor will wholly implausible claims or bald assertions that are unsupported by evidence. See Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991); Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court's function is not to weigh the evidence or resolve issues of fact; it is confined to deciding whether a rational juror could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002). Where, however, the case turns on a question of law, as to which the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY[1]
Plaintiff, a Connecticut limited liability company, owns a one-family dwelling unit (“the property”) located at 50 Waterville Street in Waterbury, Connecticut. Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 1-2. The property was covered by a businessowners insurance policy issued to Plaintiff by Defendant for the period of May 24, 2019 to May 24, 2020. Def.'s SMF ¶ 4. The policy provides that Defendant “will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property . . . caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.” Def.'s Ex. A (“Policy”) at 1 ¶ A(1), ECF No. 30-6. “Covered Cause of Loss” is defined under the policy as “Risks Of Direct Physical Loss unless the loss is” excluded or limited by the policy. Id. at 2 ¶ A(3). Among other things, the policy excludes losses or damages resulting from frozen plumbing and vacancy unless certain conditions are met. Id. at 11 ¶ B(2)(e), 18 ¶ E(9).
In a section entitled “Property Loss Conditions,” the policy listed Plaintiff's duties in the event of a loss, providing, in relevant part:
3. Duties In The Event Of Loss Or Damage
Id. at 14 ¶ E(3). The policy also provides:
4. Legal Action Against Us
For over five years, until October 2019, Plaintiff rented the property to a long-term tenant. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 7. In the spring of 2019, while the tenant was still occupying the dwelling, Plaintiff's sole member Michael Festa received a phone call from the Waterbury Bureau of Water informing him of excessive water use at the property. Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Festa contacted the tenant about the high water usage, and the tenant told him that the washer and water meter were broken, but that there was otherwise no damage to the property. Id. ¶ 10. A few months later, in the summer of 2019, Plaintiff received a bill from the Waterbury Bureau of Water for over $9,000 worth of water. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff did not, however, inspect the inside of the dwelling until October 2019. Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 11, 13.[2]
Plaintiff evicted the tenant in October 2019, and the tenant moved out on October 22, 2019. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 8. The next day, Plaintiff inspected the property and noticed that walls had been repaired and plumbing work had been done. Def.'s SMF ¶ 15. Mr. Festa stated that it was during this inspection that Plaintiff became aware of any damage to the property. Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 14, 16.
Plaintiff filed an insurance claim for water damage with Defendant in November 2019, describing the loss as Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 16-17. As part of its investigation of the claim, Defendant examined Mr. Festa under oath. Id. ¶ 18. During that examination, Mr. Festa stated that he believed that frozen pipes had caused the damage to the property, but he was unable to identify the location of the frozen pipes and stated that no broken pipes were visible on the property. Id. ¶ 19. He also was unable to provide any estimates or appraisals of the loss that was being claimed. Id. ¶ 24.
On May 11, 2020, pursuant to the policy, Defendant requested that Plaintiff provide it with a signed, sworn proof of loss within sixty days identifying the damages that Plaintiff was claiming under the policy. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. Defendant provided Plaintiff blank copies of a proof of loss form to complete, entitled “Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss.” See Def.'s Ex. B, ECF No. 30-6. The form inquired into, among other things, the time (including the hour, day, month, and year), cause and origin, and cash value of Plaintiff's claimed loss, and required signatures from both Plaintiff and a Notary Public. Id.
Despite repeated reminders and extensions of the sixty-day deadline by Defendant, Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with a proof of loss. Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 28-31. Therefore, on August 18, 2020, Defendant's counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff's counsel advising them that a failure to submit the proof in a timely fashion may result in a forfeiture of coverage. Id. at ¶ 31.
On September 3, 2020, Plaintiff's counsel sent Defendant's counsel an assessment of damage (the “Assessment”), which was prepared by a representative of ClaimPro Public Insurance Adjusters. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 18; Def.'s Ex. 6 (“Assessment”), ECF No. 30-8. The Assessment estimates the total cost of building damage, water bills, and loss of rents as a result of the claimed damage to the property. See Assessment at 2. It also provides a detailed breakdown of the repairs allegedly needed in each room of the property and the cost of each repair. See id. at 5-18. Plaintiff did not, however, provide Defendant with a completed proof of loss form at any...
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