Anderson v. Morris
| Decision Date | 19 November 1980 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. Y-80-1632. |
| Citation | 500 F. Supp. 1095 |
| Parties | John B. ANDERSON; D. A. Bert Booth; Kevin P. McCleaf; Gerald M. Eisenstat v. Willard A. MORRIS, State Administrator of the Election Laws; Theodore N. Clark, Chairman of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; James W. Johnson, Vice-Chairman of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; Reginald A. Asplen, Member of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; Karen Lancaster, Member of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; Sylvia Raphael, Member of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; State Administrative Board of Election Laws. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Henry R. Lord, Michael C. Powell and Thomas J. Gisriel, Baltimore, Md., and Mitchell Rogovin, George T. Frampton, Jr., and Ellen S. Semonoff, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., George A. Nilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Diana G. Motz, and Robert A. Zarnoch, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for defendants.
John B. Anderson, Independent candidate for President of the United States, has filed suit against Maryland election officials challenging the constitutionality of state laws which prevent him from being on the general election ballot. Joining him as plaintiffs are D. A. Bert Booth, a registered voter in Maryland who wishes to vote for Anderson, Kevin P. McCleaf, a Maryland registered voter and elector pledged to Anderson, and Gerald M. Eisenstat, a registered voter in the State of New Jersey who intends to vote for Anderson. Cross motions for summary judgment have been filed based on a joint stipulation of facts submitted by the parties. For reasons stated below, judgment will be entered for the plaintiffs. Because the Court finds the burdens on plaintiff Anderson's rights to be an adequate basis for its decision, no separate consideration has been given to the claims by the other plaintiffs.
On June 8, 1979, plaintiff Anderson declared his candidacy for the Republican Party nomination for President. By letter of March 4, 1980, Maryland Secretary of State Fred L. Wineland notified the plaintiff that, pursuant to Ann.Code of Maryland, Article 33, § 12-2(a)(1), Anderson's name would be placed on the Republican primary ballot in Maryland unless prior to March 21 the plaintiff filed an affidavit stating he was not a candidate for the nomination.1
On April 24, 1980, the plaintiff publicly announced that he would pursue his candidacy for the presidency as an Independent. At the same time, he renounced his previously declared intention to seek the Republican Party's nomination for that office, although stating that he would remain a member of the Republican Party. He also notified Maryland Secretary of State Wineland of his withdrawal. On April 28, Secretary of State Wineland informed Anderson that his name would remain on the ballot, because the plaintiff had not withdrawn from the race before the deadline specified by law (March 21). Article 33, § 12-2(a)(4).
Following Anderson's announcement, a group of his supporters in Maryland began efforts to secure the necessary signatures of registered voters to place his name on the general election ballot as an Independent candidate for President. Between May 19 and July 7, 1980, Anderson supporters gathered approximately 89,019 signatures of persons purporting to be Maryland registered voters and submitted them to local boards on July 8, 1980. Under Maryland law, 55,517 valid signatures must be submitted (three percent of all registered voters in the state); one third must be submitted by March 3, 1980, while the remainder are due August 4.2 Article 33, § 7-1. Maryland law also requires that an Independent's certificate of candidacy be filed by March 3-the date most candidates for primary elections must file.3 Article 33, § 4A-3.
The defendants, who are responsible for administering Maryland's election laws, will not place plaintiff Anderson's name on the general election ballot on the grounds that a certificate of candidacy and a sufficient number of signatures were not filed timely by the March 3 deadline, as required by Article 33, § 7-1. It is conceded, however, that Anderson is qualified as a person who "may be nominated by petition" pursuant to Article 33, § 7-1(a). It is further conceded that the so-called "sore loser" provision, which keeps primary election losers off the general election ballot, does not apply to presidential elections.4
The stipulated facts relating to the standing of candidate Anderson in the national political polls and relating to his campaign efforts make it clear that the plaintiff is a non-frivolous candidate for the presidency with a chance of influencing the outcome of the election.
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment argues both that Maryland's requirements discriminate unconstitutionally against independent candidates, and that freedom of association is restricted unconstitutionally.
Federal courts in other states have struck down early filing deadlines upon challenges by plaintiff Anderson. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F.Supp. 121 (S.D.Ohio 1980), the court found that a March 20 deadline affected fundamental rights and was not justified by any compelling state interest. Likewise, the court in Anderson v. Hooper, No. 80 432-M Civil (D.N.M., July 8, 1980), found that a March 4 deadline discriminated against Independent candidates. Both states had "sore loser" statutes, but, for different reasons, the statutes did not apply to Anderson under the circumstances.
It has been held that the right to associate for political beliefs, and the right to cast one's vote effectively "rank among our most precious freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). It is clear that such rights are at stake in this case, since Maryland law prevents a candidate from appearing on the ballot, and prevents voters from effectively voting for that candidate.5 It is also clear that Maryland treats Independents differently than it treats party candidates with respect to these rights. State law requires petitions with the requisite number of signatures for an Independent candidacy, while no petitions are required for a party nominee. Article 33, § 7-1. The law discriminates further with respect to presidential candidates in that an Independent seeking to be placed on Maryland's general election ballot must file his certificate of candidacy in early March, Article 33, §§ 7-1 and 4A-3, although in theory a party nominee could be placed on the ballot without having been a candidate at that time. Maryland law does not require the State Administrative Board of Election Laws to certify party nominees to the local boards until late August. Article 33, § 8-4. "Based upon past experience, the names of the Democratic and Republican nominees are generally transmitted to the State Board a week after the respective National Conventions." Stipulation 40. Thus, a party candidate might not have to join the race until his party's convention, less than three months from the general election, while an Independent must do so eight months ahead. The defendants argue strongly that in the current primary system, as a practical matter, a party candidate must join the race at least a year in advance. While this has certainly been the general practice, it is not required by Maryland law, and it is the requirements of Maryland law which are before the Court at the present.
It has been stated by the Supreme Court that:
In determining whether the State has power to place such unequal burdens on minority groups where rights of this kind are at stake, the decisions of this Court have consistently held that "only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963).
Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 31, 89 S.Ct. at 11. Furthermore, even where there is a compelling state interest involved, it has been required "that States adopt the least drastic means to achieve their ends." Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185, 99 S.Ct. 983, 991, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979). Accordingly, the Court will apply a two-part analysis to the restrictions involved here: First, is there a compelling state interest which justifies that kind of restriction? Second, is the restriction the least drastic means available to achieve that interest?
The defendants here, as the defendants in the Ohio case, argue that Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), and Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 97 S.Ct. 2238, 53 L.Ed.2d 199 (1977), have changed the law on equal protection analysis. The Court recognizes that language in both cases, taken out of context, creates some confusion. The Supreme Court in Storer made the following comments which might be interpreted as requiring a balancing test as the first step of the analysis:
. . . the rule fashioned by the Court to pass on constitutional challenges to specific provisions of election laws provides no litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal Protection Clause. The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a "matter of degree," Dunn v. Blumstein, supra 405 U.S., at 348 92 S.Ct. 995, at 1006, 31 L.Ed.2d 274, very much a matter of "considering the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification." Williams v. Rhodes, supra 393 U.S., at 30 89 S.Ct. at 10; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,...
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