Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 05 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. S98A0910.,S98A0910.
• Citation: 505 S.E.2d 749,270 Ga. 25
• Parties: JONES v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

505 S.E.2d 749

270 Ga. 25

JONES v. The STATE.

No. S98A0910.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

October 5, 1998.

Reconsideration Denied October 23, 1998.

Caesar Jackson Burch, Savannah, for Gerrod O. Jones.

Spencer Lawton, Jr., Dist. Atty., Michael K. Dennard, Asst. Dist. Atty., Savannah, Hon. Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., H. Maddox Kilgore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State. BENHAM, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from Gerrod Oscar Jones's convictions of felony murder, possession of a firearm during commission of a crime, concealing the death of another, two counts of first degree forgery, and four counts of theft by taking.¹ The evidence presented at trial by the State showed that appellant Gerrod Jones and Teco Jones, appellant's girlfriend's cousin, were with the victim in the victim's car when Gerrod Jones, from the backseat, shot the victim twice, the second shot to the victim's head. Appellant and Teco Jones wrapped the victim in a blanket and dumped his body in woods where his skeletal remains were later recovered. Filling out and using withdrawal slips from the victim's car, they made two withdrawals from the victim's bank account after his death, used his car, and then took the stereo and items of personal property from his car. At trial, the State introduced a statement in which Gerrod Jones claimed that the first shot was accidental, but admitted that the shot to the victim's head was intentional. Teco Jones testified for the State, implicating Gerrod Jones, who testified in turn that it was Teco Jones who did the shooting and that his earlier confession was the product of coercion by Teco Jones's aunt (appellant's girlfriend's mother).

1. The evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Jones guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Sheppard v. State, 267 Ga. 276(1), 476 S.E.2d 760 (1996); Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 482 S.E.2d 299 (1997); Kaple v. State, 265 Ga. 772, 462 S.E.2d 134 (1995); Huewitt v. State, 218 Ga.App. 566, 462 S.E.2d 463 (1995).

2. Pursuant to a challenge by the State, the trial court disallowed one of Jones's peremptory strikes and placed the stricken juror back on the jury. Jones complains on appeal that the trial court did not follow the correct procedure and incorrectly determined that the race-neutral reasons given for the challenged strike were pretextual.

The procedure to be followed by trial courts when such a challenge is made was set forth by this Court in Chandler v. State, 266 Ga. 509(2), 467 S.E.2d 562 (1996):

The opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to give a race-neutral reason for the strike; the trial court then decides whether the opponent of the strike has proven discriminatory intent. The "ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." [Cit.]

Contrary to Jones's contention, our review of the record shows that the trial court did follow the proper steps in considering the challenges. Following the State's challenge of two of the strikes, the trial court specifically noted that the pattern of the peremptory strikes used by the defense (using eight strikes to remove seven white males and one Asian male from the jury) established a prima facie case of discrimination. After the defense offered reasons for the challenged strikes, the trial court considered them, held that they were race-neutral, noted that the opponent of the strike had the burden of showing them to be pretextual, and asked the State to comment on the issue. After the State argued that the reasons were pretextual, the trial court rejected one of the State's challenges, but ruled that the other challenge was valid, finding specifically that the reason given for that strike was pretextual. Thus, since the trial court faithfully followed the procedure as outlined in Chandler, supra, we find no merit in Jones's argument based on procedure.

Jones also challenges the trial court's finding that the reason given for striking one juror was pretextual. The trial court's finding of fact that the strike was exercised in a purposefully discriminatory manner must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Minor v. State, 264 Ga. 195(5), 442 S.E.2d 754 (1994). Here, the trial court stated that it had considered the record as a whole and had specifically considered defense counsel's explanation for the strike. In finding the reason for one strike to be pretextual, the trial court noted that one of the race-neutral reasons for exercising the successfully challenged strike was applied inconsistently by defense counsel, used as a basis for striking that juror, but not used to strike other similarly situated jurors. The trial court also took specific note that defense counsel, in justifying the use of the strike which was disallowed, explained that he had made that choice because he assumed the State would make the next strike based on race, an assumption which proved unfounded. In light of counsel's admission that race played a role in that strike, we cannot say that the trial court's finding of purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's upholding of the State's challenge of one peremptory strike by the defense. Id.

3. Jones enumerates as error the trial court's refusal to permit him to impeach a defense witness by the use of misdemeanor convictions. Although the trial court permitted Jones to introduce felony convictions into evidence, it refused to permit the introduction of misdemeanor convictions. Even assuming for the purpose of argument that use of that method of impeachment against one's own witness would be permissible (but see Paradise v. State, 212 Ga.App. 166(3), 441 S.E.2d 497 (1994) ("OCGA § 24-9-81 provides that the exclusive method by which a party may impeach his own witness is by proof of a `previous contradictory statement.' ")), the trial court did not err in this case because Jones did not demonstrate that the witness was subject to impeachment. "A party may not impeach a witness voluntarily called by him, except where he can show to the court that he has been entrapped by said witness by a previous contradictory statement." OCGA § 24-9-81. Although this court has removed the requirements of surprise and prejudice from the element of entrapment in the statute (Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309(3), 290 S.E.2d 273 (1982); Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975)), the statute's plain language still requires as a threshold matter a showing that the witness made a statement inconsistent with the witness's testimony at trial. Contrary to the statement in the special concurrence, Jones's examination of the witness did not satisfy the requirement for a prior inconsistent statement because the existence of such statement was not shown. Because no such showing was made in this case, Jones was not entitled to impeach the witness at all. The special concurrence's complaint that "relying on the statute's language to require a prior inconsistent statement as a prerequisite is contrary to modern trial practice" amounts to a suggestion that the legislature's pronouncement on the matter should be ignored entirely rather than merely being construed liberally. Until the legislature acts to modify the statute, it still establishes as a prerequisite for impeaching one's own witness a showing that the witness's testimony at trial is inconsistent with a previous statement of the witness. That showing was not made in this case and since Jones was not entitled to impeach the witness at all, there could be no error in limiting impeachment as the trial court did. Indeed, the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of the felony convictions in the absence of the statute's required showing, but that error was both induced by Jones and not harmful to him.

4. Because the State did not rely solely on the testimony of an accomplice, the trial court did not err in failing to charge on the necessity of corroborating the testimony of an accomplice. Jenkins v. State, 268 Ga. 468(9), 491 S.E.2d 54 (1997).

5. Jones's complaint regarding the adequacy of the trial court's instruction on affirmative defenses is foreclosed by the fact that the charge given was exactly as requested by Jones. Simmons v. State, 266 Ga. 223(7a), 466 S.E.2d 205 (1996).

6. During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court a question regarding the consequences of a hung jury. In response, the trial court gave an Allen charge (Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)), instructing the jury to continue deliberation and to examine their differences in a spirit of fairness and candor. When the jury announced the next day that it was deadlocked, the trial court again gave an Allen charge. Jones now contends that giving the charge twice was coercive and requires reversal under McMillan v. State, 253 Ga. 520, 322 S.E.2d 278 (1984). The charges given in this case, however, were not subject to the criticism which required reversal in McMillan: in neither iteration of the Allen charge in the present case did the trial court emphasize the expense to the county of trying the case or suggest that there was enough evidence before the jury to enable it to reach a verdict. Instead, the trial court in this case emphasized to the jurors that they should not give up their opinions in order to get along or just to reach an agreement. Here, as the Court of Appeals did in Tyson v. State, 217 Ga.App. 428(1), 457 S.E.2d 690 (1995), where the trial court gave the Allen charge twice, we find no error in the trial court's...