51 F. 798 (1st Cir. 1892), United States v. Hopewell
|Citation:||51 F. 798|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES v. HOPEWELL et al.|
|Case Date:||September 15, 1892|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the First Circuit|
Frank D. Allen, U.S. Atty., and Henry A. Wyman, Asst. U.S. Atty.
Josiah P. Tucker, for appellees.
Before GRAY, Circuit Justice, PUTNAM, Circuit Judge, and NELSON, District Judge.
GRAY, Circuit Justice.
This was a petition to the circuit court by John Hopewell, Jr., Olindus F. Kendall, and Frank Hopewell, representing that they were 'partners in trade, doing business in Boston under the firm name of L. C. Chase & Co.,' and signed, 'L. C. Chase & Co., Petitioners, by J. P. Tucker, Attorney,' praying for a review, under the act of June 10, 1890, c. 407, Sec. 15, of a decision of the board of general appraisers, affirming a decision of the collector of the port of Boston and Charlestown, assessing on two bales of goat's hair, imported by the petitioners, a duty at the rate of 12 cents a pound, under paragraphs 377 and 384 of Schedule K of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, c. 1244, imposing such a duty on 'hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, and other like animals. ' The petitioners, having duly protested against the assessment, contended that their goods should have been
admitted free, under paragraph 604 of the free list, as 'hair of horse, cattle, or other animals, ' 'not specially provided for in this act.'
The board of general appraisers, pursuant to an order of the court, made a return of the record and evidence, together with a certified statement of facts involved, and of their decision thereon, by which it appeared that the appraisers found 'that the article in question is common goat hair, and that it is unfit for combing purposes,' and that their decision that it was duly assessed was based on their former decision in a like case. General Appraisers' Decisions, Nos. 280, 691. Under another order of the court, referring the case to one of those appraisers to take and return such further evidence as might be offered by the petitioners or by the collector, he returned that the only evidence offered by either party was a stipulation, which was signed by counsel, and was as follows:
'If material, it is agreed that wool known as Leicester, Cotswold, Lincolnshire, Down combing wools, Canada long wools, and hair of the camel and alpaca, are all fit, adapted, and used for combing purposes; that there are kinds or breeds of goat, like the Cashmere and Angora, which produce hair fit and adapted for combing purposes; that the goat hair in this case is similar in its use and adaptability to use to the hair of horses and cattle.'
The circuit court, for the reason stated in the opinion of COLT, J., printed in 48 F. 630, adjudged that the decision of the board of general appraisers be reversed, and that the sums paid by the petitioners for duties be refunded. Within 30 days after that judgment the United States, 'by the collector of the port of Boston and Charlestown,' appealed to this court; and the petition to the circuit court for the allowance of the appeal, as well as the assignment of errors, was signed by the district attorney of the United States, as 'attorney for the collector.' The circuit court thereupon allowed the appeal, and issued a citation to 'L. C. Chase & Co., a firm doing business in Boston, in the state and district of Massachusetts, in which firm John Hopewell, Jr., O. F. Kendall, and Frank Hopewell are the partners;' and sufficient service of this citation was acknowledged by the attorney for the appellees.
By sections 14 and 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, c. 407, entitled 'An act to simplify the laws in relation to the collection of the revenues,' the question of the rate and amount of duties chargeable on imported goods, which might previously have been tried by suit against the collector, is to be tried by appeal from his decision to the board of general appraisers constituted by that act; the decision of that board may be reviewed by the circuit court on application of either party; and that court, when it is of opinion that the...
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