Thomas v. Sheahan

• Decision Date: 21 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04 C 3563.,04 C 3563.
• Citation: 514 F.Supp.2d 1083
• Parties: Marlita THOMAS, as Mother, Next Friend, and Special Administrator of Norman L. Smith, Jr., deceased, Plaintiff, v. Cook County Sheriff, Michael F. SHEAHAN; Cook County; John Stroger, Jr.; Sgt. Monczynski, Star 831; Sgt; Hernandez, Star 1010; Sgt. Stroner, Star 944; Sgt. Dew, Star 1020; Lt. Krzyzowski, Star 130; Ofr. Sanchez, Star 8131; Ofr. Davis, Star 7153; Ofr. Facundo, Star 4254; Ofr. Houston; Ofr. Johnson, Star 6273; Ofr. Thiemecke, Star 8136; Ofr. Toomey, Star 7463; P. Westbrook, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

514 F.Supp.2d 1083

Marlita THOMAS, as Mother, Next Friend, and Special Administrator of Norman L. Smith, Jr., deceased, Plaintiff, v. Cook County Sheriff, Michael F. SHEAHAN; Cook County; John Stroger, Jr.; Sgt. Monczynski, Star 831; Sgt; Hernandez, Star 1010; Sgt. Stroner, Star 944; Sgt. Dew, Star 1020; Lt. Krzyzowski, Star 130; Ofr. Sanchez, Star 8131; Ofr. Davis, Star 7153; Ofr. Facundo, Star 4254; Ofr. Houston; Ofr. Johnson, Star 6273; Ofr. Thiemecke, Star 8136; Ofr. Toomey, Star 7463; P. Westbrook, Defendants.

No. 04 C 3563.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

September 21, 2007.

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Daniel S. Alexander, Law Offices of Daniel S. Alexander, Christopher Rudolf Smith, Jared Samuel Kosoglad, Law Office of Christopher R. Smith, Phillip Lindsley Coffey, The Law Offices of Smith & Coffey, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Daniel Francis Gallagher, Dominick L. Lanzito, Lawrence S. Kowalczyk, Terrence Franklin Guolee, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Donald J. Pechous, John A. Ouska, Cook County State's Attorney, Andrew Joseph Creighton, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago, IL, Dana

L. Kurtz, Kurtz Law Offices, LLC, Lockport, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.

On August 15, 2007, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order resolving Defendants' motions for summary judgment, as well as certain motions in limine. We ordered briefing on the remaining motions in limine: R. 259, 269, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 300, 301, 307, and 312.¹ Briefing is now completed, and Defendants Cook County and Peggy Westbrook have adopted the other Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs motions in limine. (R. 398, Notice of Adoption.) The Court rules on the parties' motions in limine as follows.

ANALYSIS

District court judges have broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary questions presented before trial on motions in limine. Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir.2002). The district court's power to exclude evidence in limine derives from our authority to manage trials. United States v. Caputo, 313 F.Supp.2d 764, 767-68 (N.D.Ill.2004) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984)); see also Charles v. Cotter, 867 F.Supp. 648, 655 (N.D.Ill.1994). A motion in limine' should only be granted where the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose. Caputo, 313 F.Supp.2d at 768. "Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context." Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D.Ill.1993),

This Court's rulings on the parties' motions in limine are conditional. See Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir.1999) (suggesting district courts specify whether rulings on motions in limine are conditional or definitive). As the district court aptly explained in Hawthorne Partners:

Denial of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial. Denial merely means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether the evidence in question should be excluded. The court will entertain objections on individual proffers as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls within the scope of a denied motion in limine.

831 F.Supp. at 1401 (internal citations omitted); see also Noble v. Sheahan, 116 F.Supp.2d 966, 969 (N.D.Ill.2000). Accordingly, the Court may, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, amend an in limine ruling if warranted. Caputo, 313 F.Supp.2d at 768 (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42, 105 S.Ct. 460). With these guidelines in mind, we turn to the motions before the Court.

I. Plaintiff's Motions in Limine

Plaintiff filed thirteen motions in limine. (R. 259, Pl.'s Mots. in Limine.) Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs motions in limine nos. 7 (barring paramedics from testifying about the cause of death of Norman Smith), 9 (barring any reference to the circumstances under which the attorneys for Plaintiff were employed, or the fees or the contingent contract under which the attorney has been retained), 10 (barring any closing argument that Plaintiff asked for more money than he expects to be awarded; that Plaintiffs recovery is not subject to income tax; that defense counsel is shocked by Plaintiffs damage request; or that Plaintiffs case would burden the public as a whole, increase taxes, or increase the Cook County budget deficit and the Sheriffs financial difficulties), 11 (barring any reference to collateral source payments for medical bills, or reference to whether the medical or funeral bills have been paid), and 13 (barring any reference to the fact that the motions in limine were filed or allowed). (R. 396, Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Mots. in Limine.) Accordingly, these motions in limine are granted. (R. 259, Pl.'s Mots. in Limine.) Defendants object to Plaintiffs remaining motions in limine.

A. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 to Bar Evidence of Prior Arrests, Criminal Involvement, and Convictions of Norman Smith (R. 259)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that evidence of Smith's prior arrests, criminal involvement, and convictions should be barred. Contrary to Defendants' arguments, this evidence is not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 609, which allows evidence of conviction of a crime for impeachment purposes. Not only is Smith deceased and unable to testify at trial, but Defendants do not show that his prior arrests and convictions meet the requirements of FRE 609(a), that the probative value of the conviction outweighs the prejudicial effect, or that the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or involved an act of dishonesty. This ruling, however, does not preclude Defendants from raising the fact of Smith's 7-day incarceration in Cook County Jail as to the only relevant purpose this Court can foresee: Smith's alleged knowledge of the rules and regulations at the Cook County Jail and the grievance process. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion in limine no. 1 is granted.

B. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine No. 2 to Bar Any Reference to Drug Use by Norman Smith (DOB 11-11-1971) and the Medical Records of a Norman Smith (DOB 4-10-57) (R. 259)

Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs motion to bar the medical records of a different Norman Smith (born April 10, 1957), who is not involved in this case. This part of Plaintiffs motion in limine no. 2 is granted.

Defendants object to the second part of this motion in limine because, they argue, evidence of Smith's drug use is relevant to "demonstrate [] the accuracy and thoroughness of the medical intake records," and may have "played a part in Norman Smith's contraction of meningitis." (R. 396, Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. in Limine No. 2, ¶ 4.) The question of how Smith may have contracted meningitis, however, is not relevant to the issue of whether he received inadequate medical attention during his incarceration in Cook County Jail, and evidence of alleged drug use would likely prejudice the jury. In addition, Smith's alleged drug use (which was not mentioned in his medical intake records) does not speak to the accuracy or thoroughness of the medical intake records. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion in limine no. 2 is granted.

C. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 to Bar References to Criminal Arrests or Convictions of Any of Plaintiff's Witnesses (R. 259)

Plaintiff argues that Defendants should not be allowed to present this evidence at trial because she does not "believe" any of her witnesses' criminal convictions would be properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, and Defendants did not produce any of the witnesses' "rap sheets" in discovery. Despite Plaintiffs "belief," Defendants may use evidence of witnesses' prior convictions — not more than 10 years old — for the purpose of impeachment if it meets the standards set forth in FRE 609: that the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, and the probative value exceeds the prejudicial effect; or the crime involved an act of dishonesty or false statement. Fed.R.Evid. 609(a). Moreover, Defendants did not have an obligation to produce the witnesses'"rap sheets," as they could only be used for impeachment purposes. "In accordance with Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A) & (3), evidence offered `solely for impeachment purposes' does not have to be disclosed prior to trial." Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 869 (7th Cir.2005). Plaintiff's motion in limine no. 3 is thus denied.

D. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 8 to Bar Any Character or Bolstering Evidence on Behalf of Defendant Sheriff and Correctional Officers (R. 259)

The Court agrees' with Defendants that Plaintiff's motion in limine no. 8 is improper. Federal Rules of Evidence 607 and 608 allow for the character or credibility of a witness to be attacked or supported by evidence under certain circumstances. This Court will rule on specific evidentiary issues as they arise at trial. Therefore, Plaintiffs motion in limine no. 8 is denied.

E. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 12 to Bar Any Reference to Medical Treatment Afforded Tier 1-M Inmate George Robotis (R. 259)

Plaintiff argues that any reference to medical treatment given to inmate George Robotis should be barred because: (1) medical treatment afforded Robotis is not relevant; and (2) Defendants did not produce medical records regarding the treatment afforded to Robotis. (R. 259.) As Plaintiff's primary argument is that Tier 1-M inmates are not afforded adequate medical care, any medical care received by Robotis during the relevant time frame is, indeed, relevant. Based on the documents produced in this case, Plaintiff knew that Robotis received medical treatment during the...