Property Owners, Residents, and/or Taxpayers of Pleasant Valley School Dist. v. Pleasant Valley School Dist.

Decision Date15 September 1986
CourtPennsylvania Commonwealth Court
Parties, 35 Ed. Law Rep. 438 PROPERTY OWNERS, RESIDENTS, AND/OR TAXPAYERS OF the PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioners, v. PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Community Affairs, Respondents.

Michael Vianello, Brodheadsville, for petitioners.

Jan P. Paden, Rhoads & Sinon, Harrisburg, for Pleasant Valley School Dist.

Before CRAIG and PALLADINO, JJ., and BARBIERI, Senior Judge.

PALLADINO, Judge.

Property owners, residents and/or taxpayers of Pleasant Valley School District (petitioners) 1, appeal the dismissal of their complaint by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The complaint, filed with DCA pursuant to Section 901 of the Local Government Unit Debt Act 2 (Debt Act), challenged the regularity of proceedings by the Pleasant Valley School District (school district) with respect to the issuance of $6,955,000 in general obligation bonds. The purpose of these bonds was to finance a capital project consisting of the construction of additions, alterations and modifications to the Pleasant Valley Junior-Senior High School. In addition, Petitioners challenge DCA's approval of the bond issue. 3

In 1982, the Pleasant Valley School Board determined that alterations and additions to its Junior-Senior High School were necessary in order to relieve an overcrowding problem in the district. After receiving project approval from the Department of Education, school district, on June 21, 1984, adopted an amended resolution authorizing and awarding a series of general obligation bonds in the aggregate amount of $6,955,000. Thereafter, on June 29, 1984, school district filed an "Application For Approval To Deliver Bonds Under Provisions of Section 411(a) of the Local Government Unit Debt Act" with DCA. 4

On July 9, 1984, Mike Vianello and numerous other residents of school district 5 filed a complaint with DCA challenging the proceedings which led to the adoption of a resolution authorizing the bond issue. On July 11, 13, and 23, 1984, additional taxpayers signed the complaint. In all, 154 taxpayers joined the complaint.

On July 23, 1984, an Answer and Motion to Dismiss were filed on behalf of school district. Argument was heard on the motion to dismiss on July 27, 1984, and, on that date, the Complaint was dismissed and the increase of bonded indebtedness of the school district was approved by DCA. Thereafter, petitioners appealed the dismissal of their complaint to this Court.

The instant case is one of first impression in our Courts, presenting for the first time a question of the appropriate standard of review under the Debt Act. 6 This Act provides for a quasi-judicial determination, by DCA, of compliance with the requirements of the statute based upon the submission of specified materials. These materials become the evidentiary basis upon which the decision of DCA can be reviewed.

The Debt Act provides a means by which taxpayers of the local government unit, and other "interested parties", may challenge the validity of the proceedings through the filing of a complaint with DCA. 53 P.S. § 6780-401(a). However, this action is very narrowly prescribed, restricting inquiry into procedural and substantive matters of the local government unit, taken pursuant to this act, involving only: 1) the regularity of the proceedings, 2) the validity of the bonds, and 3) the legality of the purpose for which such obligations are to be issued. 53 P.S. § 6780-401(b).

Section 902 of the Debt Act provides for appellate review by the Commonwealth Court "of the determination of the department asserting the validity or invalidity of the local government unit proceedings or any part thereof or the error or errors of the department in respect of such proceedings." 7

Therefore, in an appeal by a complainant from an action of the Department of Community Affairs under the Debt Act, review by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania of an order of the DCA is restricted to whether constitutional rights were violated, an error of law was committed, or whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence as set out in Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.

Petitioners allege numerous grounds for appeal, the major thrust of which stem from their perception that the complaint was dismissed by DCA because of the procedural irregularities of that pleading and its filing. This perception is clearly erroneous.

While the opinion of the Department does make note of the existence of "many deficiencies or irregularities under the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure", it is clear that DCA dismissed petitioner's complaint and approved school district's bond issue because it specifically found that school district had complied with the requirements of the Debt Act. Therefore, we will address the merits of Petitioner's appeal recognizing that DCA did not base its decision on alleged procedural deficiencies and will review DCA's adjudication of the complaint.

The grounds advanced in the complaint are threefold: 1) the people of the community are opposed to the project, 2) numerous objections which pertain to the Open Meeting Law, and 3) objections properly brought under the Debt Act. DCA concluded that it had no jurisdiction over grounds 1 and 2 and found no merit in ground 3. We will consider these issues in order.

THE PEOPLE OF THE COMMUNITY ARE OPPOSED TO THE PROJECT

DCA concluded in its decision that "[t]he wisdom of the decisions of the local government unit or school board in making a determination to proceed with a project is not a matter subject to review by the Department. That determination is to be made by the local government." We agree.

Article 9 § 10 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provides that "the General Assembly shall prescribe the debt limits of all units of local government including municipalities and school districts." The Debt Act carries out this mandate by limiting the amount of debt a local government unit may incur and providing the means for incurring, evidencing, securing and collecting this debt.

It is axiomatic that administrative agencies are creatures of the legislature and can only exercise those powers which have been specifically conferred upon them, by the legislature, in clear and unmistakable language. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Transit Casualty Insurance Co., 478 Pa. 430, 387 A.2d 58 (1978); Western Pennsylvania Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 471 Pa. 347, 370 A.2d 337 (1977).

The Debt Act is concerned exclusively with compliance by the local government unit with the procedures mandated therein. Consideration of the opinions of petitioners, with respect to whether or not a specific project is necessary or wise, is beyond the authority granted to DCA. We discern no error of law, violation of Constitutional rights nor abuse of discretion in DCA's refusal to consider this allegation.

MATTERS RAISED UNDER THE OPEN MEETING LAW

Petitioners assert that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to DCA to hear and determine "all procedural and substantive matters arising from the proceedings of a local government unit taken pursuant to this act, including without limitation the regularity of the proceedings....", 53 P.S. 6780-401, confers jurisdiction upon DCA to adjudicate violations of the Open Meeting Law. 8 Section 269 of the Open Meeting Law specifically grants original jurisdiction of actions involving "other agencies" 9 to the courts of common pleas to render declaratory judgments or to enforce the act, by injunction or other remedy deemed appropriate by the court.

In their brief, petitioners note that normally jurisdiction to attack a violation of the Open Meeting Law is vested in the "common pleas court or Commonwealth Court." However, they assert that:

the language of 53 P.S. § 6780-401(b) conferring exclusive (original) jurisdiction of matters involving proceedings taken under the Debt Act on [sic] the Department is a specific statutory exception to the jurisdiction conferred on the common pleas and Commonwealth Courts [sic] under 65 P.S. § 267 to enforce the Open Meeting Law. But that exception would only apply to "procedural and substantive matters arising from the proceedings of a local government unit taken pursuant to" [the Debt Act (53 P.S. § 6780-401(b) ] (emphasis added).

We simply cannot agree. If the legislature had intended a "specific statutory exception" to the jurisdictional mandate of the Open Meeting Law it would have so stated in definite terms. See Department of Environmental Resources v. Steward, 24 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 493, 357 A.2d 255 (1976) (upholding the Environmental Hearing Board's dismissal of petitioner's Sunshine Law contentions on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction).

Nor can we be persuaded that the legislature meant to imply any such statutory exception. Petitioners would interpret the word "proceedings" as used in the Debt Act to be the equivalent of "meetings" as that term is defined under the Open Meeting Law, 65 P.S. § 262. The Debt Act, in very specific terms, prescribes the steps necessary to gain approval of a bond issue. 53 P.S. §§ 6780-161 and 6780-354. These are the "proceedings" spoken of in Section 901(b). 53 P.S. § 6780-401(b). Proceedings does not apply, as petitioner would have us hold, to every step of school district's decision making process in deciding to expand and alter its Junior-Senior High School. Rather, the Debt Act applies only to the legality and constitutionality of the resolution of the school board deciding to issue such bonds and the procedures for the issuance and sale of these bonds. See 53 P.S. §§ 6780-161 and 6780-354. Therefore, DCA has no jurisdiction over alleged violations of the Open Meeting Law.

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