Brannum v. Overton County School Bd.

• Citation: 516 F.3d 489
• Decision Date: 20 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-5931.,06-5931.
• Parties: Larry BRANNUM and Necole Brannum, as next friend and guardian for Chelsey Brannum, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. OVERTON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; Edutech, Inc.; Dolphus Dial; Lenard Ledbetter; Michelle Thrasher; John Does, 1-10; John Does, 11-20, Defendants, William Needham; Robert Jolley; Melinda Beatty; David Langford; Joey Smith; Edith Key; Donald Brown; Melody Williams; Tim Coffee, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

516 F.3d 489

Larry BRANNUM and Necole Brannum, as next friend and guardian for Chelsey Brannum, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. OVERTON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; Edutech, Inc.; Dolphus Dial; Lenard Ledbetter; Michelle Thrasher; John Does, 1-10; John Does, 11-20, Defendants, William Needham; Robert Jolley; Melinda Beatty; David Langford; Joey Smith; Edith Key; Donald Brown; Melody Williams; Tim Coffee, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 06-5931.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: April 20, 2007.

Decided and Filed: February 20, 2008.

ARGUED: Michael B. Schwegler, Mills & Cooper, Brentwood, Tennessee, for Appellants. Mark P. Chalos, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael B. Schwegler, Michael P. Mills, Mills & Cooper, Brentwood, Tennessee, for Appellants. Mark P. Chalos, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, Nashville, Tennessee, Jack D. Lowery, Jr., Lowery, Lowery & Cherry, Lebanon, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: RYAN and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.^*

OPINION

RYAN, Circuit Judge.

Thirty-four Tennessee middle school students sued various officials of the Overton County, Tennessee, public school system under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and others, alleging that the defendant school authorities violated the students' constitutional right to privacy by installing and operating video surveillance equipment in the boys' and girls' locker rooms in Livingston Middle School (LMS), and by viewing and retaining the recorded images.

The defendant Overton County school board members, the director of schools, the LMS principal, and the assistant principal, moved for summary judgment claiming qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions and they now appeal.

We conclude that the district court correctly denied summary judgment to the school officials, who are not entitled to claim the defense of qualified immunity, and incorrectly denied summary judgment to the defendant board members and the Director of Schools, who are immune.

I.

In an effort to improve security at LMS, the Overton County School Board approved the installation of video surveillance equipment throughout the school building. The school board engaged the education technology firm, Edutech, Inc., to install cameras and monitoring equipment. The board ordered the Director of Schools, William Needham, to oversee the project. Needham delegated his authority for the, installation of the monitoring equipment to the LMS Principal, Melinda Beatty, who delegated her authority to the Assistant Principal, Robert Jolley. None of the defendants promulgated any guidelines, written or otherwise, determining the number, location, or operation of the surveillance cameras.

After several meetings, Assistant Principal Jolley and an Edutech representative decided to install the cameras throughout the school in areas facing the exterior doors, in hallways leading to exterior doors, and in the boys' and girls' locker rooms. The cameras were installed and were operational by July 2002.

The images captured by the cameras were transmitted to a computer terminal in Jolley's office where they were displayed and were stored on the computer's hard drive. Jolley testified that, in September 2002, he discovered that the locker room cameras were videotaping areas in which students routinely dressed for athletic activities. He said that he immediately notified Principal Beatty of the situation and suggested that the placement of the cameras be changed. But, the cameras were not removed nor were their locations changed for the remainder of the fall semester.

In addition to Jolley receiving the images on his computer, they were also accessible via remote internet connection. Any person with access to the software username, password, and Internet Protocol (IP) address could access the stored images. Neither Jolley nor anyone else had ever changed the system password or username from its default setting. The record indicates that the system was accessed ninety-eight different times between July 12, 2002, and January 10, 2003, including through internet service providers located in Rock Hill, South Carolina; Clarksville, Tennessee; and Gainsboro, Tennessee.

During a girls' basketball game at LMS on January 9, 2003, visiting team members from Allons Elementary School noticed the camera in the girls' locker room and brought this to the attention of their coach, Kathy Carr. Carr questioned Principal Beatty, who assured Carr that the camera was not activated. In fact, the camera was activated and had recorded images of the Allons team members in their undergarments when they changed their clothes. After the game, Carr reported the camera incident to the Allons school principal, who contacted Defendant Needham later that evening. Needham immediately accessed the security system from his home and viewed the recorded images. The following morning, January 10, Needham, Beatty, and two other officials viewed the images in Needham's office by remote access. Needham later stated that in his opinion, the videotapes of the 10 to 14 year old girls contained "nothing more than images of a few bras and panties." School employees removed the locker room cameras later that day.

From July 2002 to January 2003, when the cameras were operational, a number of children from Overton County Schools and schools from the surrounding counties used the LMS locker rooms for athletic events and were videotape recorded while changing their clothes.

II.

The plaintiffs insist at the outset that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the defendants' appeal because denial of summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity does not constitute a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It is true that as a general rule, a denial of summary judgment is not an appealable final judgment. Solomon v. Auburn, Hills Police Dep't, 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir.2004), but there are exceptions, and this case presents one of them.

The law is well-settled that an order denying a defendant public official a right to assert a defense of qualified immunity is the procedural equivalent of an appealable final judgment. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1999) (en banc). Qualified immunity is not a mere defense to liability; it is a rule of law that the defendant public official is immune to suit and any obligation to defend it. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. If a public official is unable to appeal the denial of qualified immunity immediately, he would be forced to endure the cost, expense, and inconvenience of defending an action to which he may be immune. To require him to delay his appeal challenging the trial court's rejection of his qualified immunity defense until the underlying liability issue is determined, would defeat one of the very purposes for which the doctrine exists. Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, but only to the extent the appeal turns on an issue of law. Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir.2005). For purposes of this appeal, the appellants have conceded the plaintiffs' version of the facts and raise only the issue of the students' right to privacy from videotaping under the Fourth Amendment.

For these reasons, we are satisfied that the order rejecting the defendants' claim of qualified immunity is a final judgment and that we have jurisdiction to entertain the defendants' appeal. We proceed, now, to the substantive issue.

III.

Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to permit an injured person to recover in federal court against defendants who violate a plaintiff's federal statutory or constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. Neuens v. City of Columbus, 303 F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir.2002). There is no dispute in this case that the defendant school officials were acting under color of state law when they authorized the installation and operation of the security cameras at LMS. However, public officials are entitled to be dismissed from a lawsuit on qualified immunity grounds if they can show that they did not violate any of the plaintiff's federal statutory or constitutional rights that were "clearly established" at the time of the alleged misconduct and of which the defendants could reasonably be expected to have been aware. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

On appeal of a district court's order denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, we consider all the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and review de novo the district court's determination on the legal question of the availability of qualified immunity. Solomon, 389 F.3d at 172. The approach we take in determining whether the defendants are entitled to claim the legal defense of qualified immunity is to decide whether a constitutional right of the students was violated and whether the constitutional right violated was clearly established and one of which the defendants can reasonably be expected to have been aware. Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir.2005).

A.

The students argue that their constitutionally protected right to privacy encompasses the right not to be videotaped while dressing and undressing in school athletic locker rooms—a place specifically designated by the school authorities for such intimate, personal activity. The plaintiffs also argue that the basis of their privacy right resides in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as in the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that the privacy right involved here is one protected by the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches, and that in this case, the defendants violated...