Gunasekera v. Irwin

• Decision Date: 26 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2:06-CV-732.,2:06-CV-732.
• Citation: 517 F.Supp.2d 999
• Parties: Jay S. GUNASEKERA, Ph.D., Plaintiff, v. Dennis IRWIN, Ph.D., et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

517 F.Supp.2d 999

Jay S. GUNASEKERA, Ph.D., Plaintiff, v. Dennis IRWIN, Ph.D., et al, Defendants.

No. 2:06-CV-732.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

September 26, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Spenceley Marshall, Edward Reilley Forman, Louis Abraham Jacobs, Steven D. Dransfield, Marshall & Morrow LLC, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.

Andrew J. Mollica, Mollica, Gall, Sloan & Sillery-2, Athens, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARBLEY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff Dr. Jay S. Gunasekera ("Dr.Gunasekera"), brought a complaint against Defendants Dean Dennis Irwin and Provost Kathy Krendl (collectively "Defendants" or individually "Dean Irwin" or "Provost Krendl") for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Due Process Clause by: (1) suspending his Graduate Faculty status without notice and opportunity to be heard; and (2) denying him a name-clearing opportunity. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

Dr. Gunasekera led a distinguished academic career as the Moss Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the Russ College of Engineering and Technology of Ohio University. He served as Chair of the Department of Mechanical Engineering for fifteen years. But in 2004, a graduate student alleged that candidates for advanced degrees in mechanical engineering committed plagiarism in their masters and doctoral theses. For two years the student's allegations filtered through the academic bureaucracy, eventually reaching Krendl, Provost of Ohio University. She instructed Irwin, Dean of the Russ College of Engineering and Technology, to take action. Dean Irwin enlisted an administrator Gary D. Meyer, and a distinguished retired faculty member, Hugh L. Bloemer, to investigate the allegations.

On May 30, 2006, Meyer and Bloemer submitted their report ("Meyer/Bloemer Report") to Dean Irwin and Provost Krendl. The Meyer/Bloemer Report concluded that for over twenty years, graduate students had committed rampant and flagrant plagiarism in theses submitted to the Department of Mechanical Engineering for advanced degrees. The report singled out three faculty members, including Dr. Gunasekera, for ignoring their ethical responsibilities and contributing to an atmosphere of negligence toward issues of academic misconduct. The following day, Provost Krendl held a press conference publicizing the Meyer/Bloemer Report and implicating Dr. Gunasekera in the scandal.

On June 21, 2006, Dean Irwin suspended Dr. Gunasekera from Graduate Faculty status for three years. As a result, Dr. Gunasekera is prohibited from advising or evaluating graduate student theses. But Defendants did not cut Dr. Gunasekera's compensation, strip him of his tenure, bar him from conducting research, nor prohibit him from teaching. With the exception of Graduate Faculty status, his position and duties remained unchanged.

Following the suspension of his Graduate Faculty status and the publication of the Meyer/Bloemer Report, Dr. Gunasekera requested a name-clearing opportunity. Particularly, Dr. Gunasekera demanded that Defendants publicize the hearing with the same vigor as they publicized the Meyer/Bloemer report, permit him to cross-examine university officials, provide an impartial moderator to preside over the hearing, and hire a stenographer. Defendants balked at these conditions. Instead, Defendants offered a name-clearing hearing at which Dr. Gunasekera could be represented by counsel, call witnesses, offer documentary evidence, and testify on his own behalf. Denouncing the proposed name-clearing hearing as a sham proceeding, Plaintiff declined to participate.

On August 9, 2006, Dr. Gunasekera brought a defamation action against the state of Ohio in the Court of Claims. On August 28, 2006, Dr. Gunasekera filed a complaint in this Court against Dean Irwin and Provost Krendl. Dr. Gunasekera alleges that Defendants violated the Due Process Clause by: (1) suspending his Graduate Faculty status without notice and opportunity to be heard; and (2) denying him a name-clearing opportunity. Dr. Gunasekera seeks injunctive relief including reinstatement of Graduate Faculty status, expungement of the suspension from his record, and a meaningful name-clearing opportunity. Dr. Gunasekera also demands, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, compensatory and punitive damages, back pay, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys fees. Defendants brought this Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court is limited to evaluating whether a plaintiff's complaint sets forth allegations sufficient to make out the elements of a cause of action. Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1983). A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the [p]laintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). This Court must "construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor and accept as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences therein." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. While, the complaint need not specify every detail of a plaintiff's claim, it must give the defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir.1994). While liberal, this standard of review does require more than the naked assertion of legal conclusions. Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Scheid v. Fanny Fanner Candy Shops Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.1988).

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on four grounds: (1) sovereign immunity bars some of plaintiff's claims; (2) Plaintiff waived his § 1983 claims for money damages in federal court by filing a defamation action in the Court of Claims; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for money damages; and (4) Plaintiff's claims for equitable relief fail to allege a due process violation upon which relief can be granted.

A. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Sovereign immunity, derived from the Eleventh Amendment¹ and flowing by "implication from the nature of sovereignty itself," Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388, 59 S.Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed. 784 (1939), is a significant limitation on the judicial power of federal courts. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713;, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). It is axiomatic that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). Sovereign immunity also precludes suits for money damages against state employees in their official capacities. Will v. Mich. Dept of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The Supreme Court has devised three primary mechanisms for circumventing the Eleventh Amendment and freeing federal courts to police state compliance with federal law: (1) prospective injunctive relief; (2) waiver; and (3) congressional abrogation. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 7.1 (5th ed.2007).

1. Official Capacity

First, sovereign immunity "does not apply if the lawsuit is filed against a state official for purely injunctive relief enjoining the official from violating federal law." Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358-59 (6th Cir.2005) (en banc) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). The rational is simple: "an official cannot be acting on behalf of the state when she acts illegally or unconstitutionally, and therefore is not entitled to the state's immunity." Thomson v. Harmony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1318 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)). As such, Ex Parte Young permits a constitutional right "to serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974).

Neither party disputes that Ohio University is a state instrumentality and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. See McIntosh v. University of Cincinnati, 24 Ohio App.3d 116, 493 N.E.2d 321 (1985). Similarly, neither party disputes that Provost Krendl and Dean Irwin are state officials. Therefore, the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity saves plaintiff's claims for prospective equitable relief. Namely, Plaintiff seeks reinstatement to Graduate Faculty status, expungement of the disciplinary action from his record, and a meaningful name-clearing opportunity. Such relief would have only an "incidental or ancillary effect on the state treasury." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Since Plaintiff's equitable claims do not threaten state coffers, the longstanding doctrine of Ex Parte Young ushers them into federal court.

But Ex parte Young does not apply to claims for retrospective relief against Defendants in their official capacities. Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 636, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002). Nor do the two other primary exceptions to state sovereign immunity preserve Plaintiff's claims for money damages...