Welling v. Owens State Community College
| Citation | 535 F.Supp.2d 886 |
| Decision Date | 28 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:07 CV 859. |
| Parties | James WELLING, Plaintiff, v. OWENS STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Jillian M. Bullard, R Michael Frank, Arnold, Caruso, Green & Belazis, John D. Franklin, R. Kevin Greenfield, Franklin & Greenfield, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiff.
Todd R. Marti, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on the defendants' motions to dismiss (Doc. 8) and for summary judgment (Doc. 27). The Court heard oral arguments in this matter on December 18, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Plaintiff James Welling was employed by Defendant Owens Community College as its athletic director. He was terminated from that position on November 13, 2006, the proffered reasons being that he allegedly accepted $800.00 from a semiprofessional athletic team for space rental on October 28 and 29, 2006, but did not submit that fee to Owens. On November 14, 2006, Defendant Cynthia Eschenberg, Associate Vice President for Human Resources at Owens, filed a police report with the Perrysburg Township Police Department in which she accused Plaintiff of stealing $800.00.
A local television report on November 14, 2006 reported that Plaintiff had been fired for embezzlement. A November 15, 2006 Toledo Blade article read that Plaintiff had been fired for accepting a secret payment. Plaintiff alleges that these media gathered the information for their reports from Owens and Owens officials. The Perrysburg Police did not charge Plaintiff with any crime due to a lack of evidence.
Eschenberg also filed a report with the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services' Office of Unemployment alleging that Plaintiff was discharged for dishonesty, theft, and "possible embezzlement of $800.00 of college funds." As a result, Plaintiff was denied unemployment compensation. He contested that decision and a formal hearing, was conducted on May 30, 2007. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, cross-examined two witnesses, testified himself, and did not present witnesses. Defendants approximate that around half of the hearing (73 of the 134 pages of the hearing transcript) dealt with the October 28 and 29 rental and subsequent payment issues. Unemployment Decision, In re claim of James R. Plaintiff Case No. H2007-080-0058 (Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, June 19, 2007) (Doc. 28, EL 1).
The hearing officer issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was properly terminated, but noting that Plaintiff denied any wrong-doing. Plaintiff appealed, raising further arguments about his actions, the clearance by the police, and the defamatory, actions taken by Defendants. His request for review was denied. Decision Disallowing Request for Review, In re claim of James R. Plaintiff Case No. H2007-080-0058 (Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, July 31, 2007) (Doc. 28, Ex. 4). Plaintiff did not appeal the decision to state court as permitted. Id. He filed suit against Owens in the Ohio Court of Claims, arguing that Owens defamed him and breached his employment contract. Plaintiff filed this suit on March 22, 2007, pursuant' to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of due process and state law and defamation.
A. Motion to dismiss
No complaint shall be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Pfennig v. Household Credit Sens., 295 F.3d 522, 525-26 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998)). When deciding a motion brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the inquiry is essentially limited to the content of the complaint, although matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record, and attached exhibits also may be taken into account. Yanacos v. Lake County, 953 F.Supp. 187, 191 (N.D.Ohio 1996). The Court's task is to determine not whether the complaining party will prevail on its claims, but whether it is entitled to offer evidence in support of those claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Court must accept all the allegations stated in the complaint as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 81, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984), while viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683. A court, however, is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).
B. Summary judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the non-movant's claim. Id. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant meets this burden, the opposing party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio. Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Harris v. General Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 802 (6th Cir.2000). Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
"In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Williams v. Belknap, 154 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1071 (E.D.Mich.2001) (citing 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987)). However, "`at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,'" Wiley v. U.S., 20 F.3d 222, 227 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505); therefore, !Nile Court is not required or permitted ... to judge the evidence or make findings of fact." Williams, 154 F.Supp.2d at 1071. The purpose of summary judgment "is not to resolve factual issues, but to determine if there are genuine issues of fact to be tried." Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 928, 930 (S.D.Ohio 1999). Ultimately, this Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Atchley v. RK Co., 224 F.3d 537, 539 (6th Cir.2000).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff filed his claim before this Court, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated his due process rights, injunctive relief requiring a name-clearing hearing, compensatory and punitive damages, and litigation costs and attorney's fees.
Defendants argue that they are immune as state actors with regard to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim, and that. Plaintiff may not bring a claim in this Court because he already filed a claim in the Court of Claims. With regard to Plaintiffs request for a name-clearing hearing, Defendants claim that such hearing would be redundant in light of the worker's compensation hearing.
"[A] person's good name, reputation, honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir.1989); Bessent v. Dyersburg State Community College, 224 Fed. Appx. 476, 480 (6th Cir.2007). Defamation alone, however, is insufficient to invoke due process concerns. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). "Some alteration of a right or status `previously recognized by state law,' such as employment, must accompany damage to reputation." Bessent, 224 Fed.Appx. at 480, citing Quinn v. Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Paul 424 U.S. at 711-12, 96 S.Ct. 1155). "A non-tenured public employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing when he shows that he has been stigmatized by the public dissemination of false information during the decision to terminate his employment." Bessent, 224 Fed.Appx. at 480 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 709-10, 96 S.Ct. 1155),
Five elements must be satisfied to implicate a liberty interest in one's...
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