Schultz v. Cally
| Decision Date | 30 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 74--1884,74--1885,s. 74--1884 |
| Citation | 528 F.2d 470 |
| Parties | Albert SCHULTZ, Appellant, v. Frank R. CALLY and Amos Purcell, Appellees and Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Harvey I. Marcus, Englewood, N.J., for appellant.
Frank R. Cally, pro se.
Amos Purcell, pro se.
Before VAN DUSEN, HASTIE and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.
This case serves as a graphic illustration of the ways in which an essentially simple lawsuit can become unnecessarily complicated when the parties fail to delineate their factual and legal approaches at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. The disposition of this appeal that we now make further demonstrates that the time and efforts of neither the court nor the parties have been wisely utilized.
Plaintiff Schultz sued defendants Cally and Purcell, alleging that he 'was fraudulently induced to invest the sum of $25,000 by the defendant(s) . . . in a corporation known as Scaico Controls, Inc. and invested the sum . . . on certain representations made by the defendant(s) . . . which representations were false, misleading, dishonest, and fraudulent intending to induce the plaintiff to invest . . ..' Complaint, para. 2. After a four-day trial to a jury, plaintiff recovered a judgment for $25,000. At a post-trial hearing, plaintiff moved for the assessment of costs and interest, while defendant moved for judgment NOV or a new trial. The trial court denied the defendants' motions and granted the plaintiff's motions only as to statutory costs and post-judgment interest. Both parties have appealed.
The presentation of the case in this court has been seriously deficient. We note first that appellant (Schultz) did not file a brief in response to the cross-appeal. Neither party has included in its brief the required statement of subjectmatter jurisdiction, or the required statement of the standard of review. 3d Cir.R. 21(1). In addition, the appendix filed by appellant contains none of the pleadings and no part of the trial testimony. Fed.R.App.P. 30(a).
Because we found it difficult to understand or evaluate the arguments of the parties from the limited materials provided, we set this case for oral argument although counsel for both sides had agreed to submit the case without oral argument. Since the claims of both parties depend on the extent to which federal securities law was implicated in the trial of this case, counsel were questioned as to the jurisdictional basis of the suit in the district court. Counsel for apellant initially stated that the complaint was based on both the federal statutes and on common law, while counsel for appellees claimed that only common law had been at issue.
At the outset we must notice a consequence of this uncertainty as to controlling law more serious than those briefed and argued by the parties. The second (unnumbered) and third (paragraph '1') paragraphs of the complaint state that:
Jurisdiction of this Court is based on diversity of citizenship, plaintiff being a New Jersey resident, defendant being a New York resident, and upon Section 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C., Section 78 (78aa) the amount in controversy exceed (sic) $10,000.
1. The defendant, Frank Cally, is an Attorney at Law of the State of New York, having his principal place of business at 150 Broadway, New York City, New York.
Since there are no other allegations even arguably relevant to the citizenship of the parties, the complaint fails to set forth the elements of the claimed diversity. Even if plaintiff had properly alleged that he is a citizen of New Jersey and that Cally is a citizen of New York, the complaint would be fatally defective for failure to allege the citizenship of defendant Purcell. The record makes it clear that Purcell is a citizen of New Jersey. (E.g., Transcript of Proceedings, April 3, 1974, p. 10--15). Since total diversity has not been shown, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 1 is not available. Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972).
Therefore, unless the plaintiff has established federal question jurisdiction, the district court was without any jurisdiction. While the complaint, as quoted above, invokes the jurisdictional section (§ 27) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2 there is no reference to any substantive provision of the Act. 3 Assuming that plaintiff intended to invoke the 'anti-fraud' provisions of Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 4 and Rule 10b--5 5 promulgated thereunder, the factual allegations of the complaint are inadequate to support the jurisdictional allegation. There is nothing in the complaint from which the involvement of 'any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange' could be found, as required by § 10(b). It might also be open to question whether plaintiff's allegations that he 'invested' in a corporation can, in the absence of a direct reference to § 10(b), fairly be read as a claim that the fraud complained of occurred 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security' as required by § 10(b). 6
It is hornbook law that the jurisdiction of the federal court must appear in the plaintiff's statement of his claim. Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 340--41, 26 S.Ct. 478, 50 L.Ed. 776 (1906). McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 782, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b), 7 however, a pleading may be amended to conform to the proof, and if an issue, though never actually pleaded, is tried by express or implied consent of the parties, the pleadings may be deemed amended to conform, even after judgment or on appeal. E.g., Niedland v. United States, 338 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1964).
In the present case, there was evidence introduced at trial which would have cured the jurisdictional pleading deficiencies (involvement of interstate commerce, purchase and sale of securities). The difficulty arises in trying to decide whether it can fairly be said that the defendants, by failing to object to evidence, 'consented' to the trial of the inadequately pleaded federal question. Of the evidence introduced by plaintiff which could have supported a well-pleaded federal securities claim, almost all of it was also relevant to the common law claims that the parties thought they were trying under diversity jurisdiction. 'Under this rule (15(b)), there is implied consent to litigate an issue if there is no objection to the introduction of evidence on the unpleaded issue, as long as the non-objecting party was fairly apprised that the evidence went to the unpleaded issue.' Id. at 258 (emphasis added). Amendment is not accomplished 'merely because evidence which is competent and material upon the issues created by the pleadings incidentally tends to prove another fact not within the issues in the case.' Simms v. Andrews, 118 F.2d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 1941). The only evidence which would not also be relevant to the common law claims would be that tending to show the involvement of interstate commerce. In the absence of other notice that a federal question was then at issue, we are not sure that defendants could have been expected to object to seemingly innocuous testimony that plaintiff traveled from New Jersey to a meeting in New York, that the mails were used, etc. 8 The absence of consent is further suggested by the defendants' objections, both before (Transcript of Proceedings, April 4, 1974, pp. 2--3) and after (id. at 65--66) the charge, to any mention of the federal securities statutes. 9
It may well be that the defendants were on actual or constructive notice of the federal question(s) throughout, but we are unable to determine that on the present record. There was no pretrial conference; 10 the trial court ordered that the pleadings would constitute the pretrial order. While the record at one point refers to a 'memorandum immediately prior to trial' (Transcript of Proceedings, June 10, 1974, p. 11), no such pretrial memoranda are included in the district court record. In addition, the transcript for the first day of trial has not been filed in the district court.
On such a limited record, we are reluctant to reach a decision as to the existence of federal question jurisdiction based on amendment by 'implied consent.' 'The rule (15(b)) is applicable only where it clearly appears from the record that an issue not raised in the pleadings and not preserved in the pretrial order has in fact been tried and that this procedure has been authorized by express or implied consent of the parties.' Systems, Inc. v. Bridge Electronics Co., 335 F.2d 465, 466--67 (3d Cir. 1964) (emphasis added). Since a decision here would not, for the reason discussed below, establish jurisdiction over the entire case, a remand for such a determination is more appropriate. 11
It is clear from the record that the case proceeded to trial at least in part under common law theories of fraud and breach of contract (an escrow agreement). That much was conceded at oral argument. Therefore, even if we were to find that federal question jurisdiction had been established, it would still be necessary to find a jurisdictional basis for the state law claims. Diversity is lacking. While it is quite possible that a decision to hear such claims as pendent to the federal cause of action would have been proper, see Huber v. Bissel, 39 F.R.D. 346 (E.D.Pa.1965), there is absolutely no evidence that such a decision was made here.
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...A basic requirement of pleading is that the jurisdiction of a federal court must appear on the face of the complaint. Schultz v. Cally, 528 F.2d 470, 474 (3d Cir.1975). Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that jurisdiction is founded upon: (a) the existence of federal questions construing ......
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