U.S. v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 01 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | 981696 |
| Citation | 529 U.S. 53,146 L.Ed.2d 39,120 S.Ct. 1114 |
| Parties | Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT1696 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
v.
JOHNSON
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Argued December 8, 1999.
Decided March 1, 2000
Respondent had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. As a result, he had served 2.5 years' too much prison time and was at once set free, but a 3-year term of supervised release was yet to be served on the remaining convictions. He filed a motion to reduce his supervised release term by the amount of extra prison time he served. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon respondent's actual release from incarceration, not before. The Sixth Circuit reversed, accepting respondent's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.
Held: This Court is bound by the controlling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which, by its necessary operation, does not reduce the length of a supervised release term by reason of excess time served in prison. Under §3624(e), a supervised release term does not commence until an individual "is released from imprisonment." The ordinary, commonsense meaning of "release" is to be freed from confinement. To say respondent was released while still imprisoned diminishes the concept the word intends to convey. Section 3624(e) also provides that a supervised release term comes "after imprisonment," once the prisoner is "released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer." Thus, supervised release does not run while an individual remains in the Bureau of Prisons' custody. The phrase "on the day the person is released" in §3624(e) suggests a strict temporal interpretation, not some fictitious or constructive earlier time. Indeed, the section admonishes that "supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned." The statute does provide for concurrent running of supervised release in specific, identified cases, but the Court infers that Congress limited §3624(e) to the exceptions set forth. Finally, §3583(e)(3) does not have a substantial bearing on the interpretive issue, for this directive addresses instances where conditions of supervised release have been violated, and the court orders a revocation. While the text of §3624(e) resolves the case, the Court's conclusion accords with the objectives of supervised release, which include assisting individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration. The Court also observes that the statutory structure provides a means to address the equitable concerns that exist when an individual is incarcerated beyond the proper expiration of his prison term. The trial court, as it sees fit, may modify the individual's supervised release conditions, §3583(e)(2), or it may terminate his supervised release obligations after one year of completed service, §3583(e)(1). Pp. 3 7.
154 F.3d 569, reversed and remanded.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[March 1, 2000]
An offender had been serving time in federal prison for multiple felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. As a result, he had served too much prison time and was at once set free, but a term of supervised release was yet to be served on the remaining convictions. The question becomes whether the excess prison time should be credited to the supervised release term, reducing its length. Bound by the text of the controlling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), we hold that the supervised release term remains unaltered.
Respondent Roy Lee Johnson was convicted in 1990 on two counts of possession with an intent to distribute controlled substances, 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), on two counts of use of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994 ed., and Supp. IV), and on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, §922(g). He received a sentence of 171 months' imprisonment, consisting of three concurrent 51-month terms on the §841(a) and §922(g) counts, to be followed by two consecutive 60-month terms on the §924(c) counts. In addition, the District Court imposed a mandatory 3-year term of supervised release for the drug possession offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The Court of Appeals, though otherwise affirming respondent's convictions and sentence, concluded the District Court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment for the two §924(c) firearm offenses. United States v. Johnson, 25 F.3d 1335, 1337 1338 (CA6 1994) (en banc). On remand the District Court modified the prisoner's sentence to a term of 111 months.
After our decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), respondent filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his §924(c) convictions, and the Government did not oppose. On May 2, 1996, the District Court vacated those convictions, modifying respondent's sentence to 51 months. He had already served more than that amount of time, so the District Court ordered his immediate release. His term of supervised release then went into effect. This dispute concerns its length.
In June 1996, respondent filed a motion requesting the District Court to reduce his supervised release term by 2.5 years, the extra time served on the vacated §924(c) convictions. The District Court denied relief, explaining that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) the supervised release commenced upon respondent's actual release from incarceration, not before. Granting respondent credit, the court observed, would undermine Congress' aim of using supervised release to assist convicted felons in their transitions to community life.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. 154 F.3d 569 (CA6 1998). The court accepted respondent's argument that his term of supervised release commenced not on the day he left prison confines but earlier, when his lawful term of imprisonment expired. Id., at 571. Awarding respondent credit for the extra time served, the court further concluded, would provide meaningful relief because supervised release, while serving rehabilitative purposes, is also "punitive in nature." Ibid. Judge Gilman dissented, agreeing with the position of the District Court. Id., at 572 573.
The Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions on the question presented. Compare United States v. Blake, 88 F.3d 824, 825 (CA9 1996) (), with United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 485 (CA5 1998) (); United States v. Joseph, 109 F.3d 34 (CA1 1997) (same); United States v. Douglas, 88 F.3d 533, 534 (CA8 1996) (same). We granted certiorari to resolve the question, 527 U.S. ___ (1999), and we now reverse.
Section 3583(a) of Title 18 authorizes, and in some instances mandates, sentencing courts to order supervised release terms following imprisonment. On the issue presented for review whether a term of supervised release begins on the date of actual release from incarceration or on an earlier date due to a mistaken interpretation of federal law the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) controls. The statute provides in relevant part:
The quoted language directs that a supervised release term does not commence until an individual "is released from imprisonment." There can be little question about the meaning of the word "release" in the context of imprisonment. It means "[t]o loosen or destroy the force of; to remove the obligation or effect of; hence to alleviate or remove; [t]o let loose again; to set free from restraint, confinement, or servitude; to set at liberty; to let go." Webster's New International Dictionary 2103 (2d ed. 1949). As these definitions illustrate, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Goran Pleho, LLC v. Lacy
... ... SCWC-12-0000025 Supreme Court of Hawaii. APRIL 10, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION This case requires us to consider a series of rulings by the trial court in a complex commercial dispute involving the sale of a limousine service. Goran and Ana Maria 2 ... " Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson , 529 U.S. 53, 58, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000) ); see also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar , 421 U.S. 773, 787, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d ... ...
-
Rosillo-Puga v. Holder
... ... That it did not do so in the general provisions of § 1229a(c)(7)(A) leads us to conclude that Congress did not make presence in the United States a prerequisite to filing a motion to reopen." Id ... Having ... See United States v. Brown, 529 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir.2008); see also United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000) ("When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have ... ...
-
United States v. Peguero
... ... 2005); United States v. Meeks , ... 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994), abrogated on other ... grounds by Johnson v. United States , 529 U.S. 694 ... (2000). As we noted above, revocation proceedings "are ... not deemed part of a criminal prosecution" ... Wilkerson , 361 ... F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, it is ... "neither appropriate nor possible" for us to reject ... our prior decisions upholding ... the constitutionality of supervised release. Shipping ... Corp. of India v. Jaldhi ... ...
-
United States v. Peguero
... ... 2005) ; United States v. Meeks , 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States , 529 U.S. 694, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000). As we noted above, revocation proceedings "are not deemed part of a ... Wilkerson , 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, it is "neither appropriate nor possible" for us to reject our prior decisions upholding the constitutionality of supervised release. Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd. , 585 F.3d ... ...
-
Sentencing
...prison does not, and that purpose would be undermined if convicts did not have to seek “postconfinement assistance.” U.S. v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60 (2000). 2316. See, e.g. , U.S. v. Montez-Gaviria, 163 F.3d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (defendant entitled to credit for period in state custody......