Richardson v. City of Boston
Decision Date | 08 November 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-P-170.,99-P-170. |
Citation | 758 NE 2d 629,53 Mass. App. Ct. 201 |
Parties | DANA RICHARDSON v. CITY OF BOSTON & others. |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Present: JACOBS, CYPHER, & GRASSO, JJ.
Andrew M. Fischer for the plaintiff.
Eve A. Piemonte Stacey, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for the defendants.
About one hour after Gloria Montanez arrived at a Boston police station, reporting that she had just been assaulted by Dana Richardson, two officers, acting without a warrant, arrested him. Richardson subsequently filed a nine count complaint against the city, principally claiming he was arrested without probable cause, and asserting several counts based on the allegedly illegal arrest.2 A Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment.3 We affirm.
Factual background. Montanez and Richardson had dated for several years. At about 5:00 P.M. on July 27, 1993, Montanez went to a Boston police station and reported to the sergeant on duty that she had just been struck in the face by Richardson. The sergeant observed that she was bruised and disheveled.4 Montanez stated that she was in fear of her life and safety and of imminent and continuing harm from Richardson. She also mentioned that she had been assaulted by him two days before, causing her to move in with her sister because of her fear of him. A police report on file with respect to that incident stated that Richardson had punched Montanez in the face, thrown a beeper against a wall and a television set on the floor, and then fled. The report identified another witness to some of the violence. The sergeant was also aware of prior claims of domestic violence involving Richardson, having assisted Montanez in obtaining a restraining order against him in March, 1993. However, no restraining order was in effect at the time she made her report to the officer on July 27, 1993.
The sergeant dispatched the defendants, Officers Survillo and Butler, to arrest Richardson at his place of employment for violation of G. L. c. 209A.5 Richardson was arrested by the officers without a warrant at about 6 P.M., held overnight,6 and released the next day after Montanez had obtained a restraining order in the Dorchester District Court.
The warrantless arrest. The plaintiff principally challenges the reliance of the police on G. L. c. 209A to justify his arrest without a warrant. He argues the statute was intended to apply to situations where an officer responding to a domestic violence call perceives that abuse has occurred, although not witnessed by him, and reasonably concludes that the abuser must be arrested and removed from the victim's presence to prevent further abuse. He asserts there was no clear evidence of abuse by him, no danger of imminent harm to Montanez, and no need to make an immediate arrest.
At common law, and in the absence of statutory authority, officers may not arrest, without a warrant, for the commission of a misdemeanor involving a breach of the peace unless the misdemeanor is committed in their view or presence and is continuing at the time of the arrest. See Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332, 334 (1989). "With the enactment of G. L. c. 209A, § 6(7), the Legislature expanded the authority of police to make warrantless arrests for certain misdemeanors in the context of domestic abuse." Commonwealth v. Jacobsen, 419 Mass. 269, 272 (1995).7
General Laws c. 209A, § 6, as amended through St. 1990, c. 403, § 7,8 in portions relevant here, provides as follows:
"Abuse" is defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1, St. 1990, c. 403, § 2, as "the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household members9: (a) attempting to cause or causing physical harm; (b) placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; (c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress."
Montanez's statements to the sergeant, if credited, readily meet the requirements of at least one of the provisions of c. 209A, § 6(7), calling for arrest as the "preferred police response" to domestic abuse. Her immediate complaint of having just been struck in the face by Richardson, and her statement and the police report indicating that Richardson had punched her two days earlier, each essentially described the crime of assault and battery encompassed by the terms of c. 209A, § 6(7)(c).10 Also, each of the assaults which constituted an integral part of the attacks reported by Montanez, see Commonwealth v. Eaton, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 113, 118 (1974) (), coupled with the evidence that Richardson's actions reasonably had placed her in fear of "imminent serious physical harm," see Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 349-350 (1990), could be interpreted as a "misdemeanor involving abuse" under c. 209A, § 6(7)(b). Thus, if the police had probable cause to believe Richardson had committed an assault and battery or a misdemeanor involving abuse upon Montanez they properly could arrest him without a warrant.
Probable cause. The test for probable cause is objective. Commonwealth v. Franco, 419 Mass. 635, 639 (1995). "Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances in the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed." Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 119 n.11 (1996). The testing mind also has been described as that of "a prudent person." Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 321 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 955 (1980); Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238, 241 (1992). Under c. 209A, § 6(7)(b), that standard translates into probable cause to believe that the person arrested had committed a misdemeanor involving abuse as defined in c. 209A, § 1, and under c. 209A, § 6(7)(c), into probable cause to believe that person has committed an assault and battery.
"Probable cause is a relatively low threshold," requiring only sufficiently trustworthy information to instill in a reasonable person the requisite belief of criminality. White v. Marblehead, 989 F. Supp. 345, 349 (D. Mass. 1997). "The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt and this means less than evidence which would justify condemnation or conviction but more than bare suspicion." Smith, Criminal Practice & Procedure § 104 (2d ed. 1983).
The information available to the sergeant who took Montanez's report included her complaint of having just been assaulted by Richardson; her bruised and disheveled condition; her statement that she had been assaulted by Richardson two days before, together with the police report of that incident; her claims of other violence by Richardson earlier that year; and her expressed fear of imminent and further harm from Richardson. That information is imputed to the officers who arrested Richardson under the collective knowledge doctrine, by which the knowledge of each police officer is treated as the common knowledge of all officers. Commonwealth v. Zirpolo, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 307, 311 (1994), and cases cited. The central question, therefore, is whether, in the circumstances, a prudent person in the position of the sergeant reasonably could have believed Montanez's report and assertions.
Here, the fact that the report of the abusive conduct came to the sergeant directly from the victim imparted "an ostensible patina of credibility" to her words. Commonwealth v. Aarhus, 387 Mass. 735, 744 (1982), citing Nelson v. Moore, 470 F.2d 1192, 1197 (1st Cir. 1972) (, )cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951 (1973). Moreover, Montanez's bruised condition tended to corroborate her story. Her credibility was further enhanced by the restraining order she obtained in March, 1993, and by her report of Richardson's abuse of her two days earlier, evidenced by a police report that recited partial corroboration by a witness. Her fear of imminent harm was evidenced by her claim that she had moved from her home and was living with her sister, the latter being a fact easily corroborated. In the circumstances, there was more than a reasonable basis to believe Montanez.
The plaintiff cites no authority supporting his argument that the arrest provisions of c. 209A, § 6(7), are limited to situations in which a police officer responding to a report of domestic violence must remove the abuser from the scene of the violence in order to protect the victim from further abuse. Neither the words of the statute...
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