Grinter v. Knight

• Citation: 532 F.3d 567
• Decision Date: 19 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 05-6755.,05-6755.
• Parties: Henry David GRINTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chad KNIGHT, individually and in his official capacity as Sergeant, Kentucky State Penitentiary, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

532 F.3d 567

Henry David GRINTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chad KNIGHT, individually and in his official capacity as Sergeant, Kentucky State Penitentiary, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-6755.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted: February 7, 2008.

Decided and Filed: June 19, 2008.

ON BRIEF: Henry David Grinter, Eddyville, Kentucky, pro se.

Before: NORRIS, BATCHELDER, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

A Kentucky prisoner proceeding pro se appeals the district court's order dismissing his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for violations of due process, equal protection, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment during a mandatory screening procedure before the complaint was served on the defendants. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

Henry David Grinter filed a pro se complaint in which he sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. He names the following persons as defendants in their individual and official capacities: (1) Sergeant Chad Knight of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, (2) Lieutenant and Adjustment Committee Chairman William Henderson of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, (3) Lieutenant and Adjustment Committee Member Jay R. Jones of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, (4) Case Worker and Adjustment Committee Member Steve Hern of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, (5) Warden Glenn Haeberlin of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, (6) Commissioner John D. Rees of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, (7) Lieutenant Joel Dunlap, head of Internal Affairs at the Kentucky State Penitentiary, (8) Lieutenant Will Thomas, Internal Affairs employee at the Kentucky State Penitentiary, and (9) Lieutenant Tim White of the Kentucky State Penitentiary. Grinter alleges his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 resulted from violations of his due process, equal protection, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In his complaint, Grinter alleges that on January 3, 2003, Knight came to his cell to investigate an incident report that had been filed.¹ He alleges that Knight presented the report to him through a food opening in the door of Grinter's cell in the segregation unit and that Knight refused to add witnesses to an incident report in response to his request. After that, Knight closed the slot and slipped a copy of the report under the door.

Grinter avers that a short time later, White and another guard dressed in full riot gear approached his cell without a nurse present. White ordered Grinter to remove his clothes, pinned him to the wall while Grinter's linens and personal property were removed, and placed him under four-point restraints.² Grinter remained in the restraints, shackled to his bed, for four hours and sustained cuts and bleeding.

Grinter alleges that the following day, January 4, 2003, he was issued a disciplinary report claiming he assaulted defendant Knight. The incident report detailing the January 3 incident, which was attached to the complaint, stated that Grinter wadded up and threw the incident report. The report also stated that Grinter struck Knight's left arm and that Knight had a "small red spot" on his wrist. According to the incident report, at a hearing several weeks later the adjustment committee found Grinter guilty. The report states, "Based on facts as stated by Sgt. Knight and [the] medical report from Nurse Roystor ... Grinter did strike Sgt. Knight[,] causing a red spot on his left wrist." The adjustment committee assessed a non-restorable penalty of sixty days forfeiture of good time credits.

Grinter alleges that he was never provided a copy of any medical records, the testimony Nurse Roystor gave cannot be true because she did not witness the incident, and J. Belt's written statement regarding the incident is troubling. Plaintiff appealed to the warden and the state department of corrections but was unsuccessful.

The district court dismissed the claims against Rees, Haeberlin, Hern, Jones, Henderson, Thomas, and Dunlap and the due process claims against Knight and White for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). It dismissed the claims against the defendants, state employees, in their official capacities as claims against Kentucky — which was immune from suit. It dismissed the substantive due process claims based upon the use of the four-point restraints, the challenge to the procedures used by the adjustment board, and the denial of good-time credits, finding no liberty interest present. Likewise, it dismissed the claims for failure to intervene in or overturn the finding of guilt, explaining that the defendants could not be named on the basis of their supervisory roles and that there was no liberty interest. The district court dismissed the § 1981 claim against Knight, holding that Knight, as a public official, cannot be sued under § 1981.

The district court dismissed Grinter's § 1983 claims for violation of his equal protection rights against defendant Knight and the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant White for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. At the direction of this court, the district court granted Grinter permission to file a late notice of appeal. This appeal followed.

II.

We review a district court's decision to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e de novo. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.1997) (overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 918-19, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007)). The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires district courts to screen and dismiss complaints that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

III.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action for those persons subject to a deprivation of the "rights, privileges or immunities" guaranteed under the Constitution when that deprivation is effected by a person operating "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" of a governmental entity. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[T]he violation of a federally protected right" is necessary for there to be liability against a government official under § 1983. Schroder v. City of Fort Thomas, 412 F.3d 724, 727 (6th Cir.2005). In addition, the deprivation must be committed by a person acting under color of law. Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996).

A. Due Process

We first turn to Grinter's due process claims. The district court dismissed Grinter's substantive due process claims for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Grinter appears to assert that the district court erred. Grinter argues that "the defendants did separately and jointly violate[ ] the substantive due process rights of the plaintiff."

i. Official Capacity

Grinter names the defendants to the § 1983 claim in both their individual and official capacities. The district court dismissed the claims against the defendants in their official capacities as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought in federal court against a state and its agencies unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or consented to be sued in federal court. Id. at 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304. See also Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 876-77 (6th Cir.1986). All of the defendants are state employees and Kentucky has not waived its sovereign immunity. To the extent they are sued in their official capacities, the § 1983 claim fails.

ii. Individual Capacity

Grinter alleges his substantive due process rights were violated when he was placed under four-point restraints for four hours, when prison adjustment procedures were not followed at his disciplinary hearing, and when the adjustment committee did not comply with the Kentucky statute authorizing good-time credits. The district court dismissed each of these claims for failure to state a claim.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a person may not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. "The doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed has come to be known as substantive due process." Bowers v. City of Flint, 325 F.3d 758, 763 (6th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). "These limitations are meant to provide heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Does v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "However, identifying a new fundamental right subject to the protections of substantive due process is often an uphill battle, as the list of fundamental rights is short." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A fundamental right must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Prisoners have narrower liberty interests than other citizens as "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted). We "reach the question of what...