Washington v. Glucksberg

• Decision Date: 26 June 1997
• Docket Number: 96-110.
• Citation: 521 U.S. 702,138 L. Ed. 2d 772,117 S. Ct. 2258
• Parties: WASHINGTON ET AL. v. GLUCKSBERG ET AL.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

521 U.S. 702

138 L. Ed. 2d 772

117 S. Ct. 2258

WASHINGTON ET AL. v. GLUCKSBERG ET AL.

No. 96-110.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued January 8, 1997

June 26, 1997

REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined in part, post, p. 736.STEVENS, J., post, p. 738, SOUTER, J., post, p. 752, GINSBURG, J., post, p. 789, andBREYER, J., post, p. 789, filed opinions concurring in the judgment.

William L. Williams, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for petitioners.With him on the briefs were Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and William Berggren Collins, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Acting Solicitor General Dellinger argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal.With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Preston, Irving L. Gornstein, and Barbara C. Biddle.

Kathryn L. Tucker argued the cause for respondents.With her on the brief were David J. Burman, Kari Anne Smith, and Laurence H. Tribe.^*

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUISTdelivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented in this case is whether Washington's prohibition against "caus[ing]" or "aid[ing]" a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.We hold that it does not.

It has always been a crime to assist a suicide in the State of Washington.In 1854, Washington's first Territorial Legislature outlawed "assisting another in the commission of self-murder."¹Today, Washington law provides: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide."Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1)(1994)."Promoting a suicide attempt" is a felony, punishable by up to five years' imprisonment and up to a $10,000 fine.§§ 9A.36.060(2)and9A.20.021(1)(c).At the same time, Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the "withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment" at a patient's direction "shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide."Wash. Rev. Code § 70.122.070(1).²

Petitioners in this case are the State of Washington and its Attorney General.RespondentsHarold Glucksberg, M. D., Abigail Halperin, M. D., Thomas A. Preston, M. D., and Peter Shalit, M. D., are physicians who practice in Washington.These doctors occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, and declare that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for Washington's assisted-suicide ban.³In January 1994, respondents, along with three gravely ill, pseudonymous plaintiffs who have since died and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide, sued in the United States District Court, seeking a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1)(1994) is, on its face, unconstitutional.Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459(WD Wash.1994).⁴

The plaintiffs asserted "the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide."Ibid.Relying primarily on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833(1992), andCruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261(1990), the District Court agreed, 850 F. Supp., at 1459-1462, and concluded that Washington's assisted-suicide ban is unconstitutional because it "places an undue burden on the exercise of [that] constitutionally protected liberty interest."Id., at 1465.⁵The District Court also decided that the Washington statute violated the Equal Protection Clause's requirement that " 'all persons similarly situated . . . be treated alike.' "Id., at 1466(quotingCleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 439(1985)).

A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that "[i]n the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional right to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of final jurisdiction."Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F. 3d 586, 591(1995).The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc, reversed the panel's decision, and affirmed the District Court.Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, 798(1996).Like the District Court, the en banc Court of Appeals emphasized our Casey and Cruzan decisions.79 F. 3d, at 813-816.The court also discussed what it described as "historical" and "current societal attitudes" toward suicide and assisted suicide, id., at 806-812, and concluded that "the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death—that there is, in short, a constitutionally-recognized 'right to die.' "Id., at 816.After "[w]eighing and then balancing" this interest against Washington's various interests, the court held that the State's assisted-suicide ban was unconstitutional "as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians."Id., at 836, 837.⁶The court did not reach the District Court's equal protection holding.Id., at 838.⁷We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1057(1996), and now reverse.

I

We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.See, e. g., Casey, supra, at 849-850;Cruzan, supra, at 269-279;Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503(1977)(plurality opinion)(noting importance of "careful 'respect for the teachings of history' ").In almost every State—indeed, in almost every western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide.⁸The States' assisted-suicide bans are not innovations.Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life.Cruzan, supra, at 280("[T]he States—indeed, all civilized nations—demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime.Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide");seeStanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 373(1989)("[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus is . . . the pattern of enacted laws").Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide—and, therefore, of assisting suicide—are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages.See generally Marzen 17-56; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context 77-82 (May 1994)(hereinafter New York Task Force).

More specifically, for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.⁹Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 294-295(SCALIA, J., concurring).In the 13th century, Henry de Bracton, one of the first legal-treatise writers, observed that "[j]ust as a man may commit felony by slaying another so may he do so by slaying himself."2 Bracton on Laws and Customs of England 423 (f. 150)(G. Woodbine ed., S. Thorne transl., 1968).The real and personal property of one who killed himself to avoid conviction and punishment for a crime were forfeit to the King; however, thought Bracton, "if a man slays himself in weariness of life or because he is unwilling to endure further bodily pain . . . [only] his movable goods [were] confiscated."Id., at 423-424(f. 150).Thus, "[t]he principle that suicide of a sane person, for whatever reason, was a punishable felony was . . . introduced into English common law."¹⁰Centuries later, Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England not only provided a definitive summary of the common law but was also a primary legal authority for 18th- and 19th-century American lawyers, referred to suicide as "self-murder" and "the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure . . . ."4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *189.Blackstone emphasized that "the law has . . . ranked [suicide] among the highest crimes,"ibid., although, anticipating later developments, he conceded that the harsh and shameful punishments imposed for suicide "borde[r] a little upon severity."Id., at *190.

For the most part, the early American Colonies adopted the common-law approach.For example, the legislators of the Providence Plantations, which would later become Rhode Island, declared, in 1647, that "[s]elf-murder is by all agreed to be the most unnatural, and it is by this present Assembly declared, to be that, wherein he that doth it, kills himself out of a premeditated hatred against his own life or other humor: . . . his goods and chattels are the king's custom, but not his debts nor lands; but in case he be an infant, a lunatic, mad or distracted man, he forfeits nothing."The Earliest Acts and Laws of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 1647-1719, p. 19(J. Cushinged. 1977).Virginia also required ignominious burial for suicides, and their estates were forfeit to the Crown.A. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 108, and n. 93, 198, and n. 15 (1930).

Over time, however, the American Colonies abolished these harsh common-law penalties.William Penn abandoned the criminal-forfeiture sanction in Pennsylvania in 1701, and the other Colonies (and later, the other States) eventually followed this example.Cruzan, supra, at 294(SCALIA, J., concurring).Zephaniah Swift, who would later become Chief Justice of Connecticut, wrote in 1796:

"There can be no act more contemptible, than to attempt to punish an offender for a crime, by exercising a mean act of revenge

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