Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Thornton

• Decision Date: 12 December 1899
• Citation: 54 S.W. 445,152 Mo. 570
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: KANSAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R. CO. v. THORNTON.

54 S.W. 445

152 Mo. 570

KANSAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R. CO. v. THORNTON.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

December 12, 1899.

TAXES — PAYMENT — WARRANTS OF PREVIOUS YEARS.

Under Const. art. 10, § 12, declaring that no county shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting at an election held for that purpose, and Rev. St. 1889, § 7604, providing that county warrants shall be received in payment of county taxes, county warrants are not receivable in payment of taxes for any year other than that for which they were issued.

Brace, P. J., dissenting.

Appeal from circuit court, Texas county; L. B. Woodside, Judge.

Agreed case between the Kansas City, Ft. Scott & Memphis Railroad Company, as plaintiff, and J. W. Thornton, as defendant. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This is an agreed case, submitted to the circuit court of Texas county, pursuant to the provisions of section 2233, Rev. St. 1889, as follows: "It is hereby stipulated and agreed between the plaintiff and defendant: (1) That the plaintiff is a railroad corporation organized under the laws of the state of Missouri. (2) That the defendant is the legally qualified and acting collector of the revenue within and for Texas county, Missouri. (3) That as such collector the defendant has in his hands the tax books of the said county for the year 1896, whereon appear the state, county, village, and school taxes for the said year 1896. (4) That there appear on said books the following taxes against this plaintiff: State taxes, $560.66; county taxes, $1,121.33; school taxes, $1,368.02; village, $61.31. (5) That plaintiff has paid all of said state, village, and school taxes, and $421.33 on said county taxes, and has tendered in payment of the balance of said county taxes county warrants issued by said county for the years 1893, 1894, and 1895, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $700; that said warrants were legally issued, and the plaintiff is the legal owner and holder thereof; that plaintiff still tenders said warrants into court in payment of said county taxes, and the defendant refuses to accept said warrants on the sole ground that county warrants issued in 1893, 1894, and 1895 do not constitute a legal tender in payment of taxes for 1896; that said warrants are tendered in payment of what is known as the `County Revenue Taxes' for said year 1896, levied under section 7662, Rev. St. 1889. (6) That plaintiff claims that said warrants constitute a valid and legal tender of county taxes under sections 3205, 7604, Rev. St. 1889. Defendant claims that said warrants do not constitute a legal tender, for the reason that they were not issued for the year 1896, and because said warrants were issued prior to January 1, 1896. (7) It is further agreed that upon the filing by plaintiff, in the office of the circuit clerk for said Texas county, a good and sufficient bond in the sum of $1,500, that the judge of the circuit court may issue an order restraining the collection of said county taxes until the final disposition of this case; that this cause is submitted under the provisions of section 2233, Rev. St. 1889, and it is agreed that the costs of this suit be taxed against the unsuccessful party. It is also agreed that there were outstanding and unpaid warrants of 1896, and the revenue provided for 1896 will not exceed the expenses of said year." The circuit court held that the warrants were "legally issued and are valid," but that they "do not constitute a legal tender for the taxes levied against the plaintiff for the year 1896, for the reason that said warrants were issued in 1893, 1894, and 1895. The court further finds that said warrants would constitute a legal tender for said taxes under sections 3205, 7604, Rev. St. 1889, but for the ruling of the supreme court in the case of Andrew Co. v. Schell, 135 Mo. 31, 36 S. W. 206, which is binding on this court." After proper steps, the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Wallace Pratt, I. P. Dana, and W. J. Orr, for appellant.

MARSHALL, J. (after stating the facts).

It is not denied that the decision in State v. Payne, 52 S. W. 412, decided by this court, in banc, in July of this year, applies to, and is decisive of, this case; nor is it seriously denied that the decision in that case follows the principles announced in Andrew Co. v. Schell, 135 Mo. 31, 36 S. W. 206, nor yet that it conflicts in any way with what was said in Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. 246, was the purpose of the framers of the constitution of 1875 in adopting section 12 of article 10 of the constitution. It is contended, however,...