Yoho v. Thompson
Decision Date | 26 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 25273.,25273. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | Dorothy YOHO, Petitioner, v. Marguerite THOMPSON, Respondent. |
Gene M. Connell, Jr., of Kelaher, Connell & Connor, of Surfside Beach, for petitioner.
G. Michael Smith and M. Mark McAdams, of The Thompson Law Firm, of Conway, for respondent.
We granted certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals holding the trial court properly limited cross-examination of a witness to exclude any reference to insurance. Yoho v. Thompson, 336 S.C. 23, 518 S.E.2d 286 (Ct.App.1999). We reverse.
Petitioner Dorothy Yoho sued respondent Marguerite Thompson to recover damages for injuries she sustained when Thompson's car struck Yoho's car from behind. Prior to trial, Thompson's insurer paid Yoho the policy limits of $50,000 and Yoho's underinsured motorist carrier, Nationwide Insurance Company (Nationwide), then assumed Thompson's defense. At trial, Thompson admitted liability, leaving damages as the only issue for the jury.
Prior to trial, Thompson indicated she would call Dr. William Brannon as a witness. Dr. Brannon had reviewed Yoho's medical records and would give an opinion as to the extent of her injuries. In motions made before trial and prior to Dr. Brannon's testimony, Yoho asked the trial judge to allow her to cross-examine Dr. Brannon regarding his relationship with Nationwide to establish possible bias. Yoho presented Dr. Brannon's deposition testimony from another case that he did "a fair amount of consulting work with Nationwide" and had given lectures to Nationwide agents and adjusters. Yoho also presented information that ten to twenty percent of Dr. Brannon's practice consisted of reviewing records for insurance companies, and that his yearly salary was based on the amount of money his practice earned, which included his consulting work. The trial court denied Yoho's motion on the basis that the probative value of the content of the cross-examination would be outweighed by the prejudicial effect of injecting the issue of insurance into the proceedings. The court informed Yoho that she could discuss Dr. Brannon's bias by using generic terms such as "defense," "defendants," and "defense lawyer," but that she could not discuss his possible bias by using the word "insurance."
On direct examination, Dr. Brannon testified he was employed by the University of South Carolina School of Medicine as a professor and was hired by Thompson's attorney to review Yoho's medical records. During cross-examination, Yoho established that Dr. Brannon had worked for Thompson's attorneys on three prior occasions. She also asked Dr. Brannon about the fees he charged for the records review.
The jury awarded Yoho $20,000 in damages. Yoho's motions for a new trial absolute or a new trial nisi additur were denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Yoho v. Thompson, 336 S.C. 23, 518 S.E.2d 286 (Ct.App.1999).
Did the trial court err in denying Yoho's request to
cross-examine Dr. Brannon regarding his possible bias?
"A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility." Rule 611(b), SCRE. Considerable latitude is allowed in cross-examination to test a witness's bias, prejudice, or credibility. See State v. Johnson, 338 S.C. 114, 124, 525 S.E.2d 519, 524,cert. den., 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's ruling concerning the scope of cross-examination of a witness to test his or her credibility, or to show possible bias or self-interest in testifying, absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 124-25, 525 S.E.2d at 524. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law. Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 529 S.E.2d 528 (2000). The trial court's ruling in this case was controlled by an error of law, namely, a misunderstanding of new Rule 411, SCRE.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 411 in 1995, the longstanding rule in South Carolina was that a defendant's insurance against liability in an action for damages should not be revealed to the jury. Dunn v. Charleston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 S.C. 43, 426 S.E.2d 756 (1993). Rule 411 modified this rule by providing that the admissibility of evidence of insurance depends upon the purpose for which such evidence is introduced. Rule 411 provides:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
Rule 411, SCRE (emphasis added). As Thompson admitted liability, the unquestioned purpose of the requested cross-examination was to prove bias, and not liability. Moreover, the evidence Yoho sought to introduce was relevant to the issue of Dr. Brannon's bias.
Because Rule 411 did not require the exclusion of the evidence in this case, we must determine whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect and potential for confusing the jury. See Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. ..."). In making this determination, we are mindful that Charter v. Chleborad, 551 F.2d 246 (8th Cir.1977).
A majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue apply a "substantial connection" analysis to determine whether an expert's connection to a defendant's insurer is sufficiently probative to outweigh the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the jury's knowledge that the defendant carries liability insurance. See, e.g., Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422 (Colo. 2000)
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