State v. Richards

• Decision Date: 12 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93-0391-CR,93-0391-CR
• Citation: 201 Wis.2d 845,549 N.W.2d 218
• Parties: , 65 USLW 2001 STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Steiney J. RICHARDS, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 218

549 N.W.2d 218

201 Wis.2d 845, 65 USLW 2001

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Steiney J. RICHARDS, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 93-0391-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 3, 1996.

Decided June 12, 1996.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs and oral argument by David R. Karpe, Madison.

For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, Justice.

Steiney J. Richards (Richards) seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming his conviction for possession of cocaine base with the intent to deliver. Richards argues that because the police failed to "knock and announce" prior to entering his motel room to execute a search warrant, any evidence seized must be suppressed. The issue is simply stated: whether the Fourth Amendment allows a blanket exception to the general requirement of "knock and announce" (the rule of announcement) for entries into premises pursuant to a search warrant for evidence of felonious drug delivery. We conclude that exigent circumstances are always present in the execution of search warrants involving felonious drug delivery: an extremely high risk of serious if not deadly injury to the police as well as the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry by the police. ¹ The public interests inherent in these circumstances far outweigh the minimal privacy interests of the occupants of the dwelling for which a search warrant has already been issued. Accordingly, we re-affirm State v. Stevens, 181 Wis.2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1102, 115 S.Ct. 2245, 132 L.Ed.2d 254 (1995), and conclude that police are not required to adhere to the rule of announcement when executing a search warrant involving felonious drug delivery. ²

As a prefatory note, we took this case to examine the continuing validity of Stevens in light of the recently decided U.S. Supreme Court case of Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). We conclude that Stevens remains valid. In Stevens, this court adopted a blanket exception to the rule of announcement in cases involving a search warrant for felonious drug delivery. Wilson, decided subsequently to Stevens, held that the rule of announcement forms part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. The Court in Wilson left it to the lower courts to determine the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We proceed to do so now.

The dispositive facts for purposes of this appeal can be stated succinctly: on December 31, 1991, police executed a search warrant for the motel room of the defendant seeking evidence of the felonious crime of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of Wis.Stat. § 161.41(1m) (1991-92). ³ They did not knock and announce prior to their entry. Drugs were seized.

The circuit court denied Richards' motion to suppress. Richards subsequently entered pleas of no contest to the felony of possession of cocaine base with the intent to deliver, Wis.Stat. § 161.41(1m), and a tax stamp violation, Wis.Stat. § 139.95(2). ⁴ The court found him guilty and sentenced him to 13 years imprisonment on the possession with intent count and three years concurrent imprisonment on the tax stamp count. Richards appealed. The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's ruling, relying on Stevens. Richards filed a petition for review which we granted.

The sole issue before this court is whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ⁵ allows a blanket exception to the general requirement of "knock and announce" for entries into premises pursuant to a search warrant for evidence of felonious drug delivery. This is a question of law that we review without deference to the lower courts. State v. Betterley, 191 Wis.2d 407, 416-17, 529 N.W.2d 216 (1995).

Richards summarizes the issue in one sentence: "The blanket 'drug house' exception to the 'knock and announce' rule violates the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement." Richards contends that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wilson forbids blanket rules regarding search and seizure because the reasonableness of each search must be examined on a case-by-case basis. The State of Wisconsin (State) argues that Wilson does not forbid blanket rules and, under Wilson, the blanket rule announced in Stevens is still valid. We agree with the State.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wisconsin Constitution art. I, § 11 protect the security of people "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." While this court may interpret Wis. Const. art. I, § 11 more strictly than the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment, it has consistently and routinely conformed the law of search and seizure under the Wisconsin Constitution to the law developed by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Williams, 168 Wis.2d 970, 981, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992); see State v. Guzman, 166 Wis.2d 577, 586-87, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992).

The Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures not only requires that there be probable cause to undertake the search or make the seizure but also that the search or seizure be conducted in a reasonable manner. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1699-700, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The rule of announcement, which requires police officers seeking to enter a dwelling in the execution of a search warrant to announce their identity and allow time for the door to be opened voluntarily, addresses the manner in which a legitimate governmental intrusion is to take place. Williams, 168 Wis.2d at 981, 485 N.W.2d 42. The rule of announcement has a common law heritage and serves three primary justifications: (1) protecting the individual's privacy in the home; (2) decreasing the potential for violence by alerting the resident that the officer is legitimately on the premises; and (3) preventing the physical destruction of property by giving the resident the opportunity to admit the officer voluntarily. Id. at 981-82, 485 N.W.2d 42. Under certain circumstances, a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if the police dispense with the rule of announcement and execute a no-knock entry. Wilson, 514 U.S. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1918-19; see also Stevens, 181 Wis.2d at 423, 511 N.W.2d 591. The knock and announce rule may be excused if "exigent circumstances" exist to justify the no-knock entry. United States v. Singer, 943 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir.1991). Exigent circumstances " 'include a reasonable belief that announcement of police presence would endanger the safety of the police or others, or a reasonable belief that unannounced entry is required to prevent the destruction of evidence.' " Williams, 168 Wis.2d at 982, 485 N.W.2d 42 (citations omitted).

These "exigent circumstances" formed the basis of our decision in State v. Stevens. In Stevens, we held that when the police have a search warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possession with intent to deliver drugs, they necessarily have reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances exist. Stevens, 181 Wis.2d at 424-25, 511 N.W.2d 591. We reasoned that the rationale behind the rule of announcement was no longer valid in today's drug culture. "In fact, by announcing their presence, police may actually increase the likelihood for violence." Id. at 428, 511 N.W.2d 591. When the police execute a search warrant for evidence of drug delivery, there is reasonable cause to believe both that drugs will be destroyed and evidence lost, and that the occupants of the residence will be armed. Id. at 432, 511 N.W.2d 591. Therefore, a no-knock search is reasonable any time the police have a warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for "evidence of drug dealing." Id. The limited privacy interests of the individual were balanced against two other governmental interests: the public's substantial interest in stopping or at least curtailing the drug trade and its related crimes, and the police officers' interest in protecting themselves and others from harm. Id. This court concluded:

When the police execute a search warrant for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possession with intent to deliver, there is reasonable cause to believe both that the drugs will be destroyed and evidence lost and that the occupants of the residence will be armed ... Even when the police dispense with the entire knock and announcement, the societal interest in stopping the drug trade, combined with the police officers' safety interest, outweigh the occupants' limited privacy interests.

Stevens, 181 Wis.2d at 432, 511 N.W.2d 591.

Richards contends that the practical effect of Stevens is a flat rule which cannot be valid given the level of intrusion and the fact that too much discretion is allowed to police officers. Richards argues that the blanket exception to the knock and announce rule is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wilson.

In Wilson, the defendant challenged a police entry into her home pursuant to a search warrant authorizing a search for evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia. The defendant's suppression motion alleged that the police violated the common law principle requiring them to knock and announce their presence and authority before entering. The U.S. Supreme Court held that whether the officers knock and announce their presence and authority before entering a dwelling as required by the common law "forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1916. The Court, however, noted that not all...