State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 23 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-1459-CR,90-1459-CR
• Citation: 485 N.W.2d 42,168 Wis.2d 970
• Parties: , 61 USLW 2047 STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. . Oral Argument
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 42

485 N.W.2d 42

168 Wis.2d 970, 61 USLW 2047

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 90-1459-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument March 23, 1992.

Opinion Filed June 17, 1992.

For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral argument by Jack E. Schairer, Asst. State Public Defender.

For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, Asst. Atty. Gen. with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.

CALLOW, Justice.

This appeal arises out of a forcible, unannounced entry by police into the defendant's home to execute a search warrant for illegal drugs where police had knowledge that the defendant possessed a firearm. The circuit court convicted the defendant for possession of illegal drugs with intent to deliver. The defendant appealed the conviction to the court of appeals based on the invalidity of the police entry into his home and the inadmissibility of certain expert opinion testimony. The court of appeals certified the case to us and we accepted the certification pursuant to sec. (Rule) 809.61, Stats. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

There are two issues on appeal. The first issue is whether police knowledge of the existence of illegal drugs and firearms excuses compliance with the announcement requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ¹ and art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution ² in the effectuation of a search warrant. The second issue concerns the admissibility of expert witness opinion testimony on the issue of whether, based on evidence seized from the defendant's home, the residents of the home were engaged in the sale of illegal drugs.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. City of Madison police officers received information from a reliable informant that defendant-appellant Charles Williams was selling illegal drugs out of his apartment. The informant further told police that Williams possessed a gun and carried it with him. According to the informant, Williams carried the gun because he had previously been threatened by another drug dealer. The officers performed a background check on Williams which revealed that Williams had been convicted of felony battery in the state of Illinois, and had a history of narcotics and burglary violations.

On December 1, 1987, Detective Tony Olivas of the Metro Narcotics Unit sought a search warrant from Judge William Byrne to search Williams' apartment based on the information described above. For the safety of the officers executing the search warrant, Detective Olivas desired a search warrant that contained a no-knock authorization allowing the officers to enter the apartment without having to knock and announce their presence. There is no indication from the face of the search warrant or the record in this case that Judge Byrne denied the no-knock request. However, for unknown reasons, the resulting search warrant did not contain a no-knock authorization. Detective Olivas mistakenly believed that he had obtained a search warrant with a no-knock authorization.

Approximately one hour after receiving the search warrant, Detective Olivas and seven other members of the Metro Narcotics Unit proceeded to Williams' apartment to execute the search warrant. The officers first tried to gain entry into the apartment by contacting Williams on the apartment intercom system to entice him into a drug transaction. Williams refused to open the door. The officers subsequently broke the door in with a sledgehammer, shouting "police" as they entered the apartment. Once inside, the officers secured the premises. Williams was found standing within several feet of his jacket that the officers later discovered contained his loaded gun. During the course of the search, the officers discovered large quantities of cocaine and marijuana, assorted drug paraphernalia which included several weight scales, packaging material and diluents, two loaded guns, and a large amount of cash.

Based upon this evidence, Williams was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of secs. 161.41(1m)(b) and 161.16(2)(b)1., Stats., ³ and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in violation of secs. 161.41(1m)(b) and 161.14(4)(t). ⁴ Williams filed a motion to suppress the evidence received in the search. Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Angela Bartell denied the motion and held that the circumstances of this case justified the no-knock entry by the officers. Judge Bartell's decision was based on the facts that the police had specific information that the defendant was armed, had drugs, and had been previously convicted of battery.

During the trial, the prosecution called Richard Raemisch to testify as an expert narcotics officer. Raemisch was an Assistant United States Attorney at the time of trial and a former detective in the Dane County sheriff's department which was one of the departments involved in the search in this case. Over objection, Raemisch testified that, based on the evidence seized from Williams' apartment, he opined that the residents of the apartment were involved in the sale of illegal drugs. Without objection, similar testimony was elicited from Officer David Mahoney.

Williams was convicted on both counts and sentenced to five years in prison. The defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief under sec. 809.30, Stats., based on the invalidity of the police entry into his apartment and the inadmissibility of the expert testimony of Raemisch. Judge Bartell denied the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief. Williams appealed the judgment of conviction of the circuit court. The court of appeals certified the case to this court. We accepted the certification and now affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

I.

Williams first argues that police may dispense with the knock and announce requirement only when they are confronted with exigent circumstances and "particularized grounds" justifying unannounced entry. For this proposition, he cites State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d 615, 630, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984). Williams contends that the mere presence of drugs or guns should not justify unannounced entry. He asserts that due to the danger of surprising someone in their own home, "where police are aware of [firearms], the case for requiring them to give notice of their authority and purpose becomes more rather than less compelling." People v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871, 109 Cal.Rptr. 304, 309, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213 (1983). Therefore, he requests this court to adopt the rule that police knowledge of firearms excuses compliance with the announcement requirements only where the officers reasonably believe the weapon will be used against them if they proceed with ordinary announcements. Williams believes the no-knock search of his apartment was constitutionally unreasonable because nothing indicated that he would use the gun against police.

In response, the State relies on State v. Watkinson, 161 Wis.2d 750, 468 N.W.2d 763 (Ct.App.1991), for the proposition that the presence of drugs and guns is per se sufficient to satisfy the "particular grounds" requirement of Cleveland. In Watkinson, the court of appeals held that when police have knowledge that a drug dealer is armed, an unannounced entry to execute a search warrant is reasonable. Watkinson, 161 Wis.2d at 757, 468 N.W.2d 763. The State further contends that requiring police to have particularized grounds to believe an armed drug dealer would use his weapon against them subjects the officers to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm and ignores the realities of drug trafficking in the 1990s.

The constitutional reasonableness of a search and seizure is a question of law. State v. Jackson, 147 Wis.2d 824, 829, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989). Accordingly, this court shall review this issue independently and without deference to the lower courts. Id.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wisconsin Constitution Art. I, sec. 11 protect the security of people "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." While this court may interpret Art. I, sec. 11 more strictly than the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment, it has consistently and routinely conformed the law of search and seizure under the Wisconsin Constitution to the law developed by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Guzman, 166 Wis.2d 577, 586-87, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992).

The Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures not only requires that there be probable cause to undertake the search or make the seizure but also that the search or seizure be conducted in a reasonable manner. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1699, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The rule of announcement, which requires police officers seeking to enter a dwelling in execution of a search warrant to announce their identity and allow time for the door to be opened voluntarily, addresses the manner in which a legitimate governmental intrusion is to take place. Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d at 622-23, 348 N.W.2d 512. The announcement rule has a common-law heritage and serves three important purposes: (1) protecting the individual's privacy in the home; (2) decreasing the potential for violence by alerting the resident that the officer is legitimately on the premises; and (3) preventing the physical destruction of property by giving the resident the opportunity to admit the officer voluntarily. Id. at 623, 348 N.W.2d 512.

While the United States Supreme Court has not yet detailed the minimum constitutional requirements for the manner in which a search warrant is executed, it is generally recognized that the knock and announce rule may be excused only if "exigent circumstances" exist to justify the no-knock entry. See Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d at 624, 348 N.W.2d 512 and United...