State v. Arambula

• Citation: 97 Idaho 627,550 P.2d 130
• Decision Date: 20 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 12001,12001
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Roy ARAMBULA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Page 130

550 P.2d 130

97 Idaho 627

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Roy ARAMBULA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12001.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

May 20, 1976.

Bennett & Frachiseur, Twin Falls, for defendant-appellant.

Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas Deputy Atty. Gen., James F. Kile, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

McFADDEN, Chief Justice.

Defendant Roy Arambula was charged by information with two counts of delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), and with one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine). These charges all constitute felonies. I.C. §§ 37-2732(a)(1)(A), 2732(c)(1). He pleaded guilty to all counts. A presentence investigation report was prepared and submitted to the court. ¹

At the sentencing hearing the trial court inquired if the defendant had seen the presentence report, and was advised he had seen it. Defendant's counsel called attention to an incorrect item in the report and it was corrected. Defendant requested that he be placed on probation, and after hearing arguments presented by counsel for the defendant and the state, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years on each delivery count, the sentences to be served concurrently, and to a three year term on the possession count, to be served consecutively to the other sentences.

The defendant later filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure to reconsider the sentence imposed. At the hearing on this motion the State moved to quash defendant's motion to reconsider the sentence, on the grounds that the appropriate relief for the defendant was by petition for post conviction relief. The trial court granted this motion; however, the trial court after hearing further argument did modify the sentence imposed by changing the three year sentence on the possession count to a concurrent sentence to be served at the same time as the other sentences.

The State, in its brief, moved to dismiss this appeal on the grounds that: (1) the defendant's motion to reduce the sentence was not made a part of this record on appeal; (2) no formal objection was made for the record preserving a contention of overlapping chages; ² (3) this appeal was from a superceded order of conviction and commitment. ³ The State does not argue that it was prejudiced by defendant's alleged procedural errors and under these circumstances the motion to dismiss is denied. See, I.C.R. 52; Supreme Court Appellate Rule 14; Fairchild v. Olsen, 96 Idaho 338, 528 P.2d 900 (1974).

In his first of three assignments of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in quashing his motion for reduction of sentence, since it was properly brought under Rule 35 of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure. Even though we do not have a copy of defendant's motion in this record, from the brief it can be gleaned that the motion was based on I.C.R. 35, which provides:

'Correction or reduction of sentence.-The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence that has been imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of any order of judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding a judgment of conviction. The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as provided by law.'

According to Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, this rule is applicable to three different situations: ⁴

'The rule speaks to three distinct matters. It provides a procedure for correction of an illegal sentence. It provides for correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. Finally it authorizes the court to reduce a lawful sentence if, on further reflection, the court believes that it has been unduly harsh. * * *.' Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 581, p. 552 (1969).

Upon the state of the record before us, we must assume that the defendant by his motion was seeking to reduce a lawful sentence legally imposed. ⁵ Under Rule 35, the district court is empowered to grant the relief which the defendant sought and so the district court erred by quashing the defendant's motion upon this ground. See also, State v. Gish, 87 Idaho 341, 393 P.2d 342 (1964).

We note that a motion to reduce a legal sentence imposed in a legal manner is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 586 (1969). It is also within the district court's discretion to hear testimony or argument on the motion. Wright, supra, § 586. Although the trial court stated that the relief sought by defendant was not available under a Rule 35 motion, nevertheless, the trial court did then reduce the sentence imposed by ordering that the three year consecutive sentence initially imposed be served concurrently with the other sentences. It is the conclusion of this court that the first assignment of error is without merit.

By his second assignment of error, the defendant contends that the record does not reflect whether the trial court considered the presentence report as required by I.C. § 20-220. That section provides in pertinent part:

'When a probation and parole officer is available to the court, no defendant shall be placed on probation until a written report of investigation by a parole and probation officer shall have been presented to and considered by the court, and no defendant charged with a felony or indictable offense shall be released under suspension of sentence without such investigation. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

The defendant contends that this case record fails to reflect that the trial court did in fact consider the presentence report, and that there was no indication of the grounds on which the trial court based its decision. He further contends that '(s)ince the pre-sentence report recommended that Appellant be given probation, and the Judge subsequently imposed a very heavy sentence, the appellant feels that he was at least entitled to an explanation for such a sentence and to a...