State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 06 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 18777,18777 |
| Citation | 122 Idaho 164,832 P.2d 337 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lauron E. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, Timothy L. Hansen, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for defendant-appellant. Timothy L. Hansen argued.
Larry J. EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent. Michael A. Henderson argued.
Lauron E. Smith pled guilty to grand theft by possession of stolen property, I.C. §§ 18-2403(4) and 18-2407. At the arraignment, Smith informed the court that he wished to proceed pro se. The district court required Smith to speak with a public defender before accepting his request to waive counsel. After informing Smith of the nature of the charges against him and the possible penalties, the district court accepted Smith's waiver of counsel. Smith entered a plea of guilty. Smith continued to represent himself at the sentencing hearing. The court imposed a five-year sentence with two years' minimum confinement, but retained jurisdiction for 180 days. The court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction. After Smith was sentenced, but before the court relinquished jurisdiction, Smith requested that a public defender be appointed to represent him. Through his attorney, Smith filed a Rule 35 motion which the district court denied.
Smith timely appealed, seeking review of the judgment and sentence, the order relinquishing jurisdiction, and the order denying his Rule 35 motion. He argues that: (1) he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel, (2) that the district court abused its discretion in imposing his sentence, (3) that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, and (4) that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. We conclude that Smith was afforded representation by counsel at the arraignment. We also conclude that any error relating to the waiver of counsel is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. We further conclude that the district court acted within the bounds of its discretion when it imposed sentence, relinquished jurisdiction, and when it denied Smith's Rule 35 motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and orders challenged on appeal.
The facts of the case are as follows. The state charged Smith with three crimes: grand theft by possession of stolen property, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(4) and 18-2407; operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor, I.C. § 18-8004; and driving without a license, also a misdemeanor, I.C. § 49-316. At the arraignment, Smith indicated that he wished to proceed without an attorney. He also told the district court that he had a very limited education. The court advised Smith that it would be unwise to proceed without an attorney and insisted that Smith discuss his case with a member of the public defender's office who happened to be in the courthouse at that time. 1 The district court did not inform Smith that he had the right to a court-appointed attorney free of charge if he was unable to afford an attorney of his own choosing.
The district court recessed for a few minutes while Smith spoke with a public defender. There is no record of what was said during the conversation, though Smith did state that he was satisfied with the information he obtained in the conversation. After the conversation had taken place, Smith again told the district court that he wished to represent himself.
The district court explained to Smith the rights he would have if he pled not guilty and the rights he would give up if he pled guilty. The district judge also informed Smith that he had a right to appeal from the decision of the district court, that he had the right to be represented by an attorney in the appeal, and that the cost of the appeal would be at public expense if Smith were indigent. After explaining these rights to Smith, the court asked him if he wanted any extra time to decide how he wanted to plead. Smith indicated that he did not need any additional time to make his decision.
Smith then informed the district court that he wished to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of grand theft by possession of stolen property. He also stated that the prosecutor had made an agreement with the public defender to drop the misdemeanor charges in exchange for a guilty plea to the grand theft charge. The prosecutor confirmed this. 2 The public defender then asked to be excused. The district court proceeded to question Smith regarding his knowledge of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. After receiving satisfactory answers, the court accepted Smith's guilty plea.
At the sentencing hearing one month later, Smith appeared representing himself. In response to the presentence investigation report, Smith asked the district court to take notice of the fact that he did not actually steal the truck from the true owner, he merely had possession of the truck after it was stolen. The prosecutor did not submit any additional evidence at the sentencing hearing but did recommend a five-year sentence with an eighteen-month minimum period of confinement.
The district court imposed a five-year sentence with a two-year minimum period of confinement, and retained jurisdiction for 120 days. Several weeks later, the court extended jurisdiction for an additional sixty days. After receiving a report which indicated that Smith would not be a good candidate for probation, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and remanded Smith to the custody of the Board of Correction.
During the time the district court retained jurisdiction, Smith requested that a public defender be appointed as his counsel. The district court appointed counsel from the Ada County Public Defender's office to represent Smith. Smith's newly-appointed attorney filed a Rule 35 motion to reduce Smith's sentence. The district court denied the motion without a hearing. Smith's attorney then filed this appeal.
Smith's first argument is that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Although Smith attempted to waive counsel at his arraignment, we conclude that Smith was, in fact, represented by counsel at the arraignment. The district court requested that a member of the public defender's office discuss Smith's case with him and represent him during plea negotiations. Compare United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.1982) (). In fact, the public defender was able to negotiate a plea agreement in which the prosecutor dismissed two of the three charges against Smith. As noted, Smith also was represented by appointed counsel later when the district court relinquished jurisdiction after sentencing Smith and when the court denied Smith's motion to modify his sentence. The question is thus limited to whether Smith's appearance without counsel during the plea taking and sentencing hearing warrants reversal of the judgment of conviction.
Smith's assertion that the district court failed to find that he knowingly and intelligently waived his sixth amendment right to counsel is made for the first time on appeal, for Smith never made this argument to the district court by a motion to change his plea or otherwise.
[I]ssues not raised in the trial court cannot later be raised on appeal, State v. Mauro, [121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 109 (1991) ]; State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991), unless the alleged error would constitute 'fundamental error.' State v. Mauro, [supra]; State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976); State v. Grob, 107 Idaho 496, 690 P.2d 951 (Ct.App.1984). Fundamental error is error 'which so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process.' State v. Mauro, [supra ]; State v. Morris, 116 Idaho 834, 780 P.2d 156 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Koch, 115 Idaho 176, 765 P.2d 687 (Ct.App.1988).
State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 828 P.2d 871 (1992).
Since Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), it has been the rule that "an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). This type of analysis has been applied even in sixth amendment deprivation of counsel cases. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (). Some constitutional errors require reversal without regard to the evidence in a particular case because they are so fundamental that they necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). Examples of these kinds of error include the complete denial of the right to counsel, adjudication by a biased judge, and directing a verdict for the prosecution in a criminal trial by jury. Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir.1989); Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1289 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944, 110 S.Ct. 349, 107 L.Ed.2d 337 (1989) (listing additional examples). Compare Lavy, 121 Idaho at 844, 828 P.2d at 873 ().
To determine whether any error was committed in connection with Smith's waiver of counsel, w...
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People v. Becker, D049585 (Cal. App. 10/23/2008)
...judgment about whether the [error] might have affected [the outcome]." (Satterwhite, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 258.) In State v. Smith (Idaho App. 1992) 832 P.2d 337, 341-342, an Idaho appellate court applied Satterwhite's criteria and concluded a violation of a defendant's right to counsel bas......