Board of Educ. of the Findlay City School Dist. v. Findlay Educ. Ass'n

• Citation: 49 Ohio St.3d 129,551 N.E.2d 186
• Decision Date: 28 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-2051,88-2051
• Parties: , 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3098, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 1293 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the FINDLAY CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, v. FINDLAY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 129

49 Ohio St.3d 129

551 N.E.2d 186, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3098, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 1293

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the FINDLAY CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, v. FINDLAY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants.

No. 88-2051.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 10, 1990.

Decided Feb. 28, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Given the presumed validity of an arbitrator's award, a reviewing court's inquiry into whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority, within the meaning of R.C. 2711.10(D), is limited.

2. Once it is determined that the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and is not unlawful, arbitrary or capricious, a reviewing court's inquiry for purposes of vacating an arbitrator's award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D) is at an end. (R.C. 2711.10[D], construed and applied.)

In August 1983, appellant Stephen Heintzelman was first employed by the Board of Education of the Findlay City School District ("board"), appellee, pursuant to a limited teaching contract. On April 23, 1984, the board voted not to renew Heintzelman's teaching contract and Heintzelman was given written notice of the board's decision to nonrenew.

Pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the board and appellant Findlay Education Association ("association"), Heintzelman, as a member of the association, filed a grievance concerning an alleged violation by the board of Section G, Article IV. In accordance with the contract, the dispute proceeded to arbitration.

The arbitrator found that Heintzelman, at the time of his hire, was certified to teach several subjects including driver education classes. Additionally, at the time of his hire, Heintzelman was told that at the end of the 1983-1984 school year, driver education classes would no longer be taught by teachers employed by the board. Rather, the driver education classes would be "farmed out" by the board to an independent contractor. Furthermore, the arbitrator found that in June and July 1984, following the nonrenewal of Heintzelman's contract, the board hired new regular or permanent substitute teachers for positions for which Heintzelman held the necessary teaching certificates. Heintzelman was not offered any of those positions. Also, the board recalled and gave new contracts to two driver education teachers whose former contracts were cancelled by the board at the same time as the nonrenewal of Heintzelman's contract.

The arbitrator, after full hearing, determined that the board's decision to stop in-house teaching of driver education and, instead, to contract out the driver education program to an independent contractor constituted a "reduction in force" pursuant to Section G, Article IV of the agreement, which provides in relevant part:

"Reductions in force as determined by the Employer may be made as follows:

"1. In making such reduction, the Board shall proceed to suspend contracts in accordance with the recommendation of the Superintendent who shall, within each teaching field affected, give preference to teachers on continuing contracts and to teachers who have greater seniority.

"The position(s) to be abolished will be applied to the seniority list. The teacher with the least seniority who presently holds a position to be abolished is the teacher whose contract is to be suspended, unless it is possible for the involved teacher to displace a teacher with less seniority in another area for which the involved teacher is properly certificated.

"2. Teachers whose continuing contracts are suspended shall have the right of restoration to continuing service status in the order of seniority of service in the district, if and when teaching positions become vacant or are created for which any of such teachers are or become qualified.

"3. After restoration of teachers with continuing contracts, those on limited contracts shall also be restored in the manner described above.

" * * *

"8. Restoration rights shall be effective for each teacher reduced for a period of one (1) year."

The arbitrator concluded that Section G, Article IV of the agreement obligated the board to afford Heintzelman restoration rights. Therefore, the arbitrator awarded Heintzelman any lost earnings traceable to the board's failure to give Heintzelman restoration rights.

Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2711, the board filed, in the Court of Common Pleas of Hancock County, a motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. The association and Heintzelman counterclaimed and moved that an order be granted confirming and enforcing the arbitrator's award. The court of common pleas granted the board's motion to vacate on the ground that the arbitrator's award treated a nonrenewal as equivalent to a suspension, and that there can be no suspension of a contract which has been nonrenewed. Such an interpretation by the arbitrator, reasoned the court, circumvents the nonrenewal provisions of R.C. 3319.11 and the board was powerless to bargain away its right to nonrenew a limited employment contract. The counterclaim of the association and Heintzelman was dismissed and their motion was denied. The court of appeals affirmed.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Rakestraw & Rakestraw and Russell E. Rakestraw, Findlay, for appellee.

Gallon, Kalniz & Iorio Co., L.P.A., Ted Iorio and Christine A. Reardon, Toledo, for appellants.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

Appellants, Heintzelman and the association, contend that the court of appeals erred in determining that the arbitrator's award is contrary to law. Appellants argue that an arbitrator's award is presumptively valid and, therefore, a reviewing court should not look to the underlying merits of the arbitrator's decision but, rather, the courts should merely inquire as to whether the arbitrator delivered his bargained-for interpretation of the contract.

Appellants' contentions present us with a question concerning the necessary degree of judicial restraint for a court to exercise in reviewing an arbitrator's award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D).

R.C. 2711.10 provides in pertinent part:

"In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if:

" * * *

"(D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."

In the case at bar, the arbitrator's award was vacated by the trial court based upon Dayton Teachers Assn. v. Dayton Bd. of Edn. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 127, 70 O.O.2d 223, 323 N.E.2d 714, paragraph one of the syllabus, wherein we held that:

"A board of education is vested with discretionary authority to negotiate and to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, so long as such agreement does not conflict with or purport to abrogate the duties and responsibilities imposed upon the board of education by law." (Emphasis added.)

The court of appeals, like the...