The State ex rel. Exchange Bank v. Allison
| Decision Date | 27 March 1900 |
| Citation | 56 S.W. 467,155 Mo. 325 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. EXCHANGE BANK v. ALLISON, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Ray Circuit Court. -- Hon. E. J. Broaddus, Judge.
Reversed.
J. W Shotwell & Son for appellant.
(1) The filing of the demurrer admits all facts, set up in the return to the writ, that are well pleaded, and upon the facts so admitted in this case the judgment and finding of the trial court must be reversed. (2) By section 8589, R. S. 1889, and by the decisions of this court, the fiscal year begins the first day of January and closes the thirty-first day of December of each year. State ex rel. v. Appleby, 136 Mo. 408; Wilson v. Knox Co., 132 Mo. 387. The return to the alternative writ denies all allegations in the petition and writ not specifically admitted, and therefore denies that relator is the legal owner of the warrants and scrip set up in the petition, and writ. The relator sues by the name of "Exchange Bank of Richmond," and all of said warrants and scrip are assigned, as shown by the petition and writ, to "Exchange Bank," not to the "Exchange Bank of Richmond."
Lavelock Kirkpatrick & Divelbiss for respondent.
(1) The return of the appellant to the alternative writ of mandamus is not sufficiently specific to raise an issue, and the demurrer thereto was properly sustained. Merrill on Mandamus sec. 274; High on Extr. Leg. Rem. (2 Ed.), secs. 460-464; 7 Lawson's R. R. & Pr., secs. 4037; State ex rel. v. Williams, 96 Mo. 18; State ex rel. v. Trammel, 106 Mo. 515; State ex rel. v. Beyers, 41 Mo.App. 507; Sansom v. Mercer, 68 Tex. 488; Woodruff v. Railroad, 59 Conn. 93; Williams v. New Haven, 68 Conn. 263. (2) The income and revenue provided to meet the necessary expenses of maintaining the county government for any one fiscal year must be applied to the payment of the indebtedness of that year, and warrant issued for the necessary expenses of such year, and drawn on and payable out of the revenue fund so provided, levied and collected for that fiscal year, are entitled to priority over outstanding warrants of prior years. Const. of Mo., art. 10, sec. 12; R. S. 1889, secs. 3166, 3167; Laws 1893, p. 131; High on Ex. Leg. Rem. (2 Ed.), sec. 352; State ex rel. v. Macon Co. Ct., 68 Mo. 46; Lamar Water Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188; Andrew County ex rel. v. Schell, 135 Mo. 31; Shaw v. Statler, 15 P. 833; Schwartz v. Wilson, 15 P. 449; San F. Gas Co. v. Brickwedel, 62 Cal. 641; Smith v. Broderick, 107 Cal. 644; McBean v. Fresno, 112 Cal. 159. (3) The word "year" ordinarily means a "calendar year," but when reference is made to matters of revenue, it relates to a "fiscal year," and means the period of time embraced between the opening and closing of the annual account. While this period, "as to the State," commences on the first day of January of each year, as to the county it commences on the first day of May. R. S., secs. 3187, 3188, 3166; Andrew County ex rel. v. Schell, 135 Mo. 31.
OPINION
In Banc.
-- This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Ray county awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus against the defendant, the appellant, the treasurer of the county requiring him to pay certain county warrants held by the relator. The case was submitted for final judgment on demurrer to the return to the alternative writ. Therefore the facts presented in the record are undisputed. The facts are that the relator, the Exchange Bank of Richmond, held certain warrants amounting to $ 302.95, regularly issued under order of the county court during the year 1895, for current expenses of the county during that year, and drawn against the county revenue fund for that year, duly registered, presented and protested for non-payment. These warrants of the relator were issued after May 1, 1895, for county expenses incurred after that date.
At the time they were presented and payment refused the county treasurer had on hand belonging to the county revenue fund for that year $ 1,700, but the reason he refused to pay them was that there were outstanding unpaid registered warrants issued prior to May 1, 1895, amounting to $ 32,000, of which $ 22,000 were issued prior to January 1, 1895, for county expenses incurred before that date, and $ 10,000 were issued between January 1, and May 1, 1895, for necessary current expenses of the county incurred during that period, and which warrants were registered, presented for payment and protested before the issuance of relator's warrants, and the money on hand was held to be applied towards the payment of those senior warrants.
In the brief for respondent there is some criticism of the form of the return, the argument being that it does not with sufficient certainty state facts to justify the refusal to pay the relator's warrants. The rule of pleading in such case is correctly stated by the learned counsel. A mere general denial is not a sufficient traverse of the material recitals in the writ. The denial must be direct and specific, and matter in avoidance must also conform to the rules of pleading in respect of certainty. [State ex rel. v. Williams, 96 Mo. 13, 8 S.W. 771; State ex rel. v. Trammel, 106 Mo. 510, 17 S.W. 502.]
But the point in this return is not its denials, but its averment that there were outstanding warrants drawn on the county revenue fund to the amount of $ 10,000 issued to pay for necessary current county expenses incurred between January 1 and May 1 of that year, and which were registered, presented and protested before those of the relator were issued. If under the law those outstanding senior warrants were entitled to be paid before those of relator of more recent date the fact is sufficiently pleaded in the return.
And the respondent is correct in the second proposition advanced in its brief, viz.: the revenue provided for any one fiscal year must be first applied to the payment of the ordinary and usual expenses incurred in conducting the necessary business of the county for that year. It was so expressly decided by this court in Andrew Co. ex rel. v. Schell, 135 Mo. 31, 36 S.W. 206. Therefore as to $ 22,000 of the $ 32,000 of outstanding county warrants, they afforded no reason for the non-payment of the relator's warrants and with reference to the remaining $ 10,000 of those warrants they also were no answer to the relator's demand, if the relator is right in his contention that the fiscal year for the county began May 1, 1895, but if the fiscal year for the county began January 1, 1895, then the relator's warrants must wait on the payment of those issued, presented and registered before May 1 of that year. The sole question then is when does the fiscal year for the county begin? That question has already since the judgment of the circuit court in this case, been answered by this court in two decisions. Wilson v. Knox County, 132 Mo. 387, 34 S.W. 45, and State ex rel. v. Appleby, 136 Mo. 408, 37 S.W. 1122. But respondent asks us to review the subject again, and we will not refuse to do so in the light of the earnest argument in that behalf.
The judiciary in its own sphere is independent of both the other departments of government, and therefore in the interpretation of instruments passing under its judgment it acts independently of suggestion or direction of the legislature unless the instrument under consideration for construction is the utterance of the legislature itself, made contemporaneously with or in conformity to such suggestion or direction, or unless it is an act done in view of the legislative definition. But when the legislature issues a codification or revision of laws and as a part of it lays down definitions and rules of construction of terms therein used, the courts get at the meaning of the lawmakers by applying those definitions to those terms, and following those rules of construction. The definition under those circumstances is authoritative, and to be read into the statute as a part of itself. Therefore when the legislature declares as it has in section 3166, Revised Statutes 1889, as interpreted by this court in Andrew Co. ex rel. v. Schell supra, that no warrant shall be paid out of the county's revenue "for any one year" until the necessary expenses incurred in maintaining the county for that year are paid, and when in the same revision it further declares (sec. 6570): "....First, words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense; .... third, the word 'month' shall mean a calendar month, and the word 'year' shall mean a calendar year, unless otherwise expressed, and the word 'year' shall be equivalent to the words 'year of our Lord,'" it would seem to leave no room for construction as to the meaning of the words "for any one year" in the section first quoted. That an artificial year for a particular purpose may be designated either in a matter of private contract or a public act, is unquestioned, and it is not unusual that such is the case in statutes relating to the public revenue. Under the General Statutes of 1865, the fiscal year began October 1, and ended September 30th of each year (G. S. 1865, chap. 10, section 11), and so the law was until the act of November 13, 1868 (Laws 1868, p. 178), when that statute was amended defining the fiscal year as beginning January 1st, and ending December 31st, and so it has remained ever since. [Revised Statutes 1889, sec. 8589.] It is contended, however, that the statute applies to State affairs only, and not to those of a county, it being in the chapter treating particularly of the State Treasury department. The language is: "The fiscal year of the State shall commence on January first and...
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