Cornerstone Christian v. Univ. Interscholastic

• Decision Date: 20 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-50429.,08-50429.
• Citation: 563 F.3d 127
• Parties: CORNERSTONE CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS; Scott Farhart; Sandra Farhart; J.F., Minor child of Scott and Sandra Farhart, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE (UIL); William Farney; Charles Butcher, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

563 F.3d 127

CORNERSTONE CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS; Scott Farhart; Sandra Farhart; J.F., Minor child of Scott and Sandra Farhart, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE (UIL); William Farney; Charles Butcher, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 08-50429.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 20, 2009.

Jonathan D. Pauersttein (argued), Tuggery, Rosenthal, Pauerstein, Sandoloski, Agather, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Lucius Desha Bunton, Jr., Jack Rurick Crier, Law Offices of Lucius D. Bunton, James C. Todd, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Gen. Lit. Div., Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before KING, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Scott and Sandra Farhart enrolled their minor son, J.F., at Cornerstone Christian Schools. The Farhart parents, J.F., and Cornerstone Christian Schools together bring this suit against the University Interscholastic League alleging that it infringed plaintiffs' free exercise, equal protection, and due process rights when it denied Cornerstone Christian Schools an opportunity to apply for membership. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court converted parts of defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for partial summary judgment and sought additional motions, briefing, and supporting evidence. It then granted defendants' motion to dismiss principally because plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which the court could grant relief. It simultaneously granted defendants' motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Cornerstone Christian Schools was eligible for membership in the University Interscholastic League pursuant to section 12(d) of its Constitution and Contest Rules. We affirm the district court's judgment in so far as it granted defendants' motion to dismiss and resulted in the dismissal of the case, and we vacate the district court's judgment in so far as it granted defendants' initial motion for summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Cornerstone Christian Schools ("Cornerstone"), Scott and Sandra Farhart, and their minor son, J.F., bring this suit against the University Interscholastic League and its director and chairman (collectively, the "UIL" or "defendants"). Plaintiffs allege that the UIL violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses when it adopted and enforced section 12(d) of the UIL's Constitution and Contest Rules ("section 12(d)"), which effectively banned most nonpublic schools from membership.

A. Factual Background

Cornerstone is a Christian college preparatory school located in San Antonio. It incorporates athletics into its educational program. J.F. attends Cornerstone and has participated in numerous sports programs including football, track, soccer, and baseball, as well as other extracurricular activities.

From 1998 until September 2006, Cornerstone was a member of the Texas Association of Private and Parochial Schools ("TAPPS").¹ TAPPS is an interscholastic athletic and academic league for private and parochial schools. Membership in TAPPS is governed by an annual contract. Each year, member schools complete the contract, which TAPPS effectively treats as an application for renewal. In September 2006, TAPPS's directors voted not to renew Cornerstone's contract. After TAPPS's directors decided not to continue Cornerstone's membership, Cornerstone inquired about applying for UIL membership.

The UIL is a non-profit association of public schools and open-enrollment charter schools in Texas that organizes interscholastic athletic and academic competition. The UIL is part of the Division of Continuing Education of the University of Texas at Austin, submits its rules and procedures to the commissioner of the Texas Education Agency for approval, and files its accounting report with the governor of Texas and each house of the Texas Legislature. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 33.083(d). The UIL is the largest interschool organization of its kind in the world, comprising over 1300 public school districts.

Since 2003, the UIL has permitted private and parochial schools to apply for membership if they meet specific and narrow qualifications established by section 12(d). That section states:

PRIVATE SCHOOLS. Unless its right to participate has been suspended or revoked for violating rules or codes by another league similar to the UIL, a Texas non-public school may apply for UIL membership in the largest conference (currently 5A) provided the school meets all of the following conditions: * * *

(2) school does not qualify for membership in any other organization similar to the League;

* * *

UIL CONSTITUTION AND CONTEST RULES FOR 2006-2007 § 12(d). Under this provision, the UIL has admitted two large parochial schools; however, when Cornerstone sought to apply for membership in the UIL in September 2006, the UIL refused to allow Cornerstone to submit an application for the stated reason that Cornerstone was eligible for admission to other organizations similar to the UIL. According to plaintiffs' complaint, the UIL's understanding was that such other organizations included TAPPS, the Texas Christian Athletic League ("TECAL"), and the Southwest Preparatory Conference (the "SPC").

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 12, 2007, seeking a judgment declaring section 12(d) unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. They alleged that section 12(d) burdens Cornerstone's parents' and students' free exercise of religion and Cornerstone's parents' right to control their children's education by sending them to a parochial school. They also alleged that the policy violates equal protection because it excludes nonpublic schools and arbitrarily distinguishes between nonpublic schools of different sizes, effectively limiting membership to the two large parochial schools already admitted into the UIL. Finally, plaintiffs argued that section 12(d) violates chapter 110 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, a claim not at issue on appeal.

In their answer, defendants averred that Cornerstone was ineligible for membership under section 12(d) because it was eligible for membership in another league and because its membership in TAPPS was suspended or revoked for rules violations. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). They moved to dismiss all or part of the complaint on three grounds: first, they argued that Cornerstone lacks standing to raise the constitutional rights of its students and their parents; second, defendants asserted that section 12(d) does not burden plaintiffs' free exercise of religion or the parents' right to control their children's education; and third, they contended that section 12(d) does not violate equal protection of the laws. The district court decided to convert portions of the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. In particular, the court asked for summary judgment motions, briefing, and supporting evidence regarding Cornerstone's qualification to apply for membership in the UIL under section 12(d). After discovery, defendants reasserted their motion to dismiss and filed an initial motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which plaintiffs opposed. The primary disputes with regard to the summary judgment motion were, for the purpose of application of section 12(d), whether Cornerstone qualifies for membership in TAPPS and whether TAPPS's decision not to renew Cornerstone's membership constituted a suspension or revocation of Cornerstone's right to participate in TAPPS. An affirmative answer to either inquiry would disqualify Cornerstone from membership in the UIL under section 12(d).

In a single order, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and initial motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed the complaint because: (1) Cornerstone lacks standing to bring the free exercise claim on behalf of its students and their parents because those claims "must be asserted by the individuals whose religion is being infringed"; (2) section 12(d) "does not burden the exercise of religion, does not violate the First Amendment, and does not violate the fundamental right of Cornerstone parents to control the education of their children"; and (3) section 12(d) does not violate equal protection because it "bears a rational relationship to the state's interest of reducing unfair or unequal competition in extracurricular activities and prevents the UIL from becoming a dumping ground for those private schools eligible or qualified to compete in TAPPS or similar organizations but violate rules to be precluded from those organizations in order to join the UIL [sic]." The district court proceeded to grant defendants' initial motion for summary judgment because Cornerstone is ineligible for membership in the UIL under section 12(d) for two alternative reasons: (1) TAPPS's decision in 2006 not to renew Cornerstone's membership was predicated on Cornerstone's recruiting violations and thus the equivalent of a revocation or suspension for a rules violation; and (2) Cornerstone is eligible for membership in TAPPS.²

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) based on Cornerstone's lack of standing to allege a free exercise claim. See Donelon v. La. Div. of Admin. Law ex rel. Wise, 522 F.3d 564, 566 (5th Cir.2008). We apply the same de novo standard to review the district court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a free exercise, due process, or equal protection claim. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Chase...