The State v. Stubblefield

• Decision Date: 26 June 1900
• Citation: 58 S.W. 337,157 Mo. 360
• Parties: THE STATE v. STUBBLEFIELD, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

58 S.W. 337

157 Mo. 360

THE STATE v. STUBBLEFIELD, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

June 26, 1900

Appeal from Pettis Circuit Court. -- Hon. Geo. F. Longan, Judge.

Affirmed.

Jno. Cashman, Jno. D. Dale and H. B. Shain for appellant.

Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Sam. B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

(1) The indictment is in good form; it follows the language of the statute, and is not subject to serious objection. (2) Defendant objects to instruction numbered three on part of the State, for the alleged reason that it assumes the fact that defendant committed the act charged in the indictment. This objection must fall for the reason that upon interposing the affirmation plea of insanity the act constituting the alleged offense is thereby admitted and confessed. State v. Soper, 148 Mo. loc. cit. 239; State v Pagels, 92 Mo. loc. cit. 309; State v. Welsor, 117 Mo. 570; 1 Wharton's Crim. Law, sec. 61; 2 Bishop's Crim. Law, sec. 669. (3) If error was committed by the court in striking out the words "unless they feel compelled to find him guilty as charged," it was in defendant's favor. He should not and can not complain if error be committed in his favor.

OPINION

SHERWOOD, J.

The defendant has appealed from a judgment based upon a verdict which found him guilty of stopping a railway train with intent to rob (Laws 1895, p. 160) and assessing his punishment at 10 years in the penitentiary. He was embraced in the same indictment with one James L. West, but a severance was granted and separate trials had.

This case, owing to the fact of the defendants being coindictees in the indictment, charged with the same crime is consequently of a piece with West's case, and so the statement of facts heretofore made in the opinion in that case, may stand for such statement in the case before us; and so may certain rulings made in that case on points common to both cases. See State v. West, age 309 of this volume.

In West's case, the indictment therein was held valid for reasons there stated. Additional reasons occur which support the validity of the indictment in the present instance, and show that the opposite position is unsound. Thus, under an act to punish the "attempt to drown, suffocate, or strangle any person, with intent to commit the crime of murder, an approved form of the indictment avers that on, etc., at, etc., the defendant A, 'feloniously and unlawfully did take one X into both the hands of him the said A, and then and there feloniously and unlawfully did cast, throw, and push the said X into a certain pond wherein there was a great quantity of water, and did thereby then and there feloniously and unlawfully attempt the said X to drown and suffocate, with intent then and there and thereby feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought the said X to kill and murder.'" [Bishop's New Crim. Proc., vol. 2, sec. 651; see, also, sec. 655, Ib.]

And it is not necessary to set out the intent with the same degree of minuteness required in an indictment for the complete crime; it will be sufficient in this regard, if it is reasonably precise. [Ib., sec. 77.] And for an assault intending robbery, the thing intended to be taken in the robbery need not be described. [Ib., sec. 85; State v. Hughes, 76 Mo. 323.]

Another contention is made that the act in question was never intended to authorize capital punishment to be inflicted except "where parties so impair a railroad track, in the manner mentioned in the act, as to endanger the entire passenger train and the lives of the people thereon." The main difficulty about this contention is that it runs counter to the plainly worded provisions of the act; and as to the act being unconstitutional because of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, to-wit, capital punishment for any of the acts mentioned in the law, it is enough to say that such acts or many of them, post-date our present Constitution, and are therefore, not embraced therein. But were this otherwise as to the date of the genesis of such crimes, it is by no means to be assumed that the act would be unconstitutional on the ground mentioned. Punishment is not to be regarded as either cruel or unusual because never inflicted before on a certain class of criminals. The Legislature is not necessarily restricted in inflicting the death penalty, because such legislation is newly enacted. The primary object of such a law is its deterrent effect, and the Legislature has the right to so increase the punishment of crimes, as to strike terror into the hearts of those who but for such intimidation, might be more strongly tempted to commit them. Passengers on trains, as well as express agents, engineers, conductors and firemen, have some title to consideration and some hold on legislative and constitutional protection, perhaps as great as those who seek to wreck trains or rob or murder passengers. And it is said that "no punishment is cruel simply because it is severe." [1 Bishop's New Cr. Law, sec. 947.] And it has been ruled that in order to determine whether the punishment inflicted by a statute is so great as to infract the Constitution, must depend materially upon the circumstances and nature of the act for which the punishment is inflicted. [Blydenburgh v. Miles, 39 Conn. loc. cit. 497; Cooley Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), 402.]

As to the instructions, those given at the instance of the State are such as have heretofore received the approval of this court, and were, for the most part, of the same general tenor and effect as those given on behalf of the State in West's case. In that case, drunkenness was offered as an excuse for the crime and this excuse was put forward in the form of one of the refused instructions, and an instruction on the point was given for the State. In this case, the plea of insanity...