Espinoza v. Thoma, 77-1954
| Decision Date | 02 August 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1954,77-1954 |
| Parties | 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1362, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8500 Karen M. ESPINOZA, Appellant, v. Fred THOMA, Chairman of the Board of Directors, William Ramsey, Vice-Chairman, Johnnie Hayden, Secretary-Treasurer, Donald Stern and Robert Brennan, Membersof the Board of Directors, and Jerome Erdman, Executive Director, Individuallyand intheir official capacities, Robert Lager, Manager-Employee Relations, AnthonyKidd, Personnel Supervisor, Individually and in their official capacities,Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Clyde A. Christian, Omaha, Neb., for appellant.
Timothy M. Kenney, Omaha, Neb., for appellees; Frederick A. Brown, Omaha, Neb., on the brief.
Before HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges, and BECKER, * Senior District Judge.
Karen Espinoza appeals from the denial of her civil rights complaint (42 U.S.C. § 1983) charging discrimination in refusing her employment with Metro Area Transit (MAT), a corporation owned by the Transit Authority of the City of Omaha, on the basis of her sex and national origin. The district court 1 found there was no evidence of race discrimination and that Ms. Espinoza was denied employment pursuant to MAT's no-spouse rule which was not constitutionally defective. 2 We affirm.
Ms. Espinoza, an American citizen of Mexican-American descent, applied for a position as bus driver with MAT in March 1974. During her initial interview with Robert Lager, employee relations manager, Lager suggested that she was too small to handle the large buses in use at that time but indicated that a job in the maintenance department might be more suitable. In May 1974 Espinoza filed a complaint against MAT before the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission pursuant to Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that MAT's refusal to hire her based on height and weight requirements was unlawful. Subsequently, on June 28, 1974, Espinoza and MAT entered into a conciliation agreement which provided, Inter alia, that MAT would hire Espinoza as a bus operator trainee no later than September 18, 1974, provided, however, that Espinoza meet "other qualifications required of bus drivers, i. e., physical examination, driving record, etc." Espinoza waived her rights to refile a charge against MAT and covenanted not to sue MAT with respect to the matters conciliated subject to MAT's compliance with the conciliation agreement.
Espinoza took the pre-employment physical examination for the bus driver position on July 22, 1974. The examination disclosed she was three months pregnant and therefore unable to pass the physical examination requirements. However, she was informed that she should return after delivery for another physical examination.
Espinoza returned to MAT in February 1975 and began the application process anew. She passed the physical examination and arrived on June 18, 1975, for the training session. At that time she was informed by Lager that because of the fact that she was living with a MAT bus driver, Norman Hardin, MAT could not hire her in light of its operating policy, then in effect, which states:
Members of the immediate family, spouse, parent, child, of a present employee are not to be considered for employment by MAT. The employment of other close relatives is discouraged. This does not affect relatives presently working for the authority. (Policy No. 3).
Lager testified that he determined that under the above policy:
(W)e would not hire people living together in an espoused relationship. * * * An espoused relationship as we define it means that this is two people living together, sharing bed and board, siring children, sharing financial, recreational, social activities together, along with the normal cares and woes of raising a family, without the benefit of a marriage license or marriage ceremony.
Under the circumstances Lager interpreted the MAT policy as applying to Espinoza, thereby foreclosing her employment with MAT.
Thereafter Espinoza again filed complaints charging discrimination by MAT with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission, which ordered conciliation efforts. However, no conciliation agreement was entered into and the matter was set for a hearing April 21, 1976. Espinoza elected to withdraw the charge of discrimination at that time and filed her complaint in the district court, claiming in substance: (1) that the MAT Policy No. 3 is illegal and void as applied to her since she is a single woman and not a spouse; and (2) that the failure to retain Espinoza because of MAT Policy No. 3 violated the conciliation agreement which required MAT to hire Espinoza and resulted in a continuance of the original incident of discrimination against Espinoza.
The district court held that the preclusion of spouses is a reasonable classification which bears a fair and substantial relation to the objectives of the policy to eliminate the potential for serious conflicts that might affect job performance; that the classification is neither arbitrary nor capricious; and that there was no evidence which would indicate that all persons similarly circumstanced as Espinoza would not be treated alike. Furthermore, that the interpretation of the word "spouse" to include a person who lives in an espoused relationship, although without the benefit of legal marriage, 3 is valid and logical. The court further found that in view of its holding that the dismissal of Espinoza pursuant to MAT Policy No. 3 was valid and legal, her claim of continuing discriminating conduct by MAT stemming from its refusal to hire her because of her size was not well founded. That matter was conciliated and MAT has met its obligation under the conciliation agreement. 4
The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether MAT's no-spouse employment policy is illegal and void as applied to appellant because she is a single woman and not a spouse under Nebraska law.
Initially we consider Espinoza's contention that MAT's no-spouse employment policy is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253-254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), the Supreme Court discussed application of the clause to Idaho's statute giving preference to men over women in the appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate:
In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways. (Citations omitted.) The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to...
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