Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1985
• Docket Number: 72852,10,Docket Nos. 71647,Nos. 9,s. 9
• Citation: 43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1195,362 N.W.2d 650,420 Mich. 355
• Parties: Curt MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C.A. MUER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. Rosemary LOWRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SINAI HOSPITAL OF DETROIT, a Michigan Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar420 Mich. 355, 362 N.W.2d 650, 43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1195, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,234, 44 A.L.R.4th 1035
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 650

362 N.W.2d 650

Curt MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C.A. MUER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Rosemary LOWRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SINAI HOSPITAL OF DETROIT, a Michigan Corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 71647, 72852.

Calendar Nos. 9, 10.

420 Mich. 355, 362 N.W.2d 650,

43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1195,

37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,234, 44 A.L.R.4th 1035

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 3, 1984.

Decided Dec. 28, 1984.

Released Jan. 15, 1985.

Karl R. Bennett, Jr., P.C., Karl R. Bennett, Jr., Detroit, for defendant-appellant in No. 71647.

Fieger & Fieger, P.C. by Geoffrey N. Fieger, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellee in No. 71647.

Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk & Pedersen, P.C. by John P. Jacobs, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee in No. 72852.

Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, Detroit, for defendant-appellant in No. 72852.

LEVIN, Justice.

In these cases, consolidated on appeal, the defendant employers promulgated antinepotism policies applicable to the employment of relatives, including spouses. ¹ The principal question is whether the policies impermissibly discriminate on the basis of "marital status" within the meaning of Sec. 202 of the Michigan civil rights act. ² We hold that the policies are not facially discriminatory. We remand, however, for further consideration because impermissible discrimination may occur in the application of a policy not facially discriminatory.

A

Plaintiff Curt Miller worked as a waiter at a restaurant operated by defendant C.A. Muer Corporation. Miller became engaged to a woman who worked as a waitress at the same restaurant. When Miller told the restaurant manager of his marriage plans, the manager informed him of the company's policy ³ that prohibited a husband and wife from working in the same restaurant. Miller was told that after his marriage he would be required to choose between quitting his employment, being discharged, or being transferred to another restaurant operated by Muer. Miller quit his employment in apparent response to the restaurant's policy. Subsequently, he commenced this action alleging employment discrimination on the basis of marital status and seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

The circuit judge granted Muer's motion for summary judgment stating that "discrimination based on marital status means discrimination based on 'the existence or non-existence of a spouse.' " The Court of Appeals reversed stating that "[t]he Legislature's intent would be furthered by construing the term 'marital status' to include a prohibition against discriminatory employment practices based on the identity of one's spouse." Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 124 Mich.App. 780, 784, 336 N.W.2d 215 (1983).

B

Plaintiff Rosemary Lowry was employed as a security officer by defendant Sinai Hospital of Detroit. She married William Lowry who also was a security officer employed by Sinai Hospital. Shortly after their marriage, the Lowrys were told that hospital policy ⁴ required that one of them leave the employment or transfer to another department. Approximately four months after the marriage, Rosemary Lowry transferred to a different department where she received lower hourly compensation without the possibility of merit increases or promotion. She quit her employment approximately eight months after the transfer. Subsequently, she commenced this action alleging that the hospital's policy discriminated on the basis of marital status and seeking compensatory and exemplary damages.

The circuit judge, relying on his earlier opinion in Miller, ⁵ granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided opinion the cause was submitted to the entire Court, and a majority voted to follow the opinion issued in Miller and reverse the decision of the circuit judge. Lowry v. Sinai Hospital, 129 Mich.App. 726, 343 N.W.2d 1 (1983) (en banc ).

C

In both Miller and Lowry we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.

I

The validity of antinepotism and no-spouse policies has been consistently sustained when challenged under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2. ⁶ The Michigan civil rights act, however, in contrast with the federal act, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of a person's marital status.

A

The Legislature did not define the term "marital status" in the civil rights act. It has been said that the term means "whether one is married or not married," Maryland Comm. on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 300 Md. 75, 83, 475 A.2d 1192 (1984), or "the social condition enjoyed by an individual by reason of his or her having participated or failed to participate in a marriage," Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc., v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950 (1980). The usual answer to a query about one's marital status is "married," "single," "divorced," "widowed," or "separated." Id., pp. 511-512, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950. The relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one is married. Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 509 F.Supp. 13, 18 (E.D.Mich.1980) (supplemental memorandum opinion issued February 26, 1981).

In the context of challenges to antinepotism or no-spouse policies, a number of courts have construed "marital status" to mean whether or not one is married. ⁷ Other courts, including the Court of Appeals in the instant cases, have adopted more expansive definitions to further their perceptions of legislative purpose and intent. ⁸ We are persuaded, however, that the Legislature did not intend that the term "marital status" include the identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse.

Civil rights acts seek to prevent discrimination against a person because of stereotyped impressions about the characteristics of a class to which the person belongs. ⁹ The Michigan civil rights act is aimed at "the prejudices and biases" borne against persons because of their membership in a certain class, Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 420 Mich. 308, 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984); Freeman v. Kelvinator Inc., 469 F.Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D.Mich.1979), and seeks to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.

By including marital status as a protected class, the Legislature manifested its intent to prohibit discrimination based on whether a person is married. To include the identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse within the definition of "marital status" might enlarge the protected class to include all married persons who desire to work with their spouse. ¹⁰ Such a construction would invalidate most antinepotism policies.

Some of the reasons advanced in justification of antinepotism policies include potential emotional interference with job performance, collusion in grievance disputes, favoritism, morale problems resulting from the appearance of favoritism, and conflicts of interest that arise if an employee is required to supervise the employee's spouse. ¹¹ Whether these reasons are valid in all circumstances or not, they do not appear to reflect offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, or biases. Absent a more specific manifestation of legislative intent, we conclude that the prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of "marital status" was not meant to protect a right to be employed in the same department as one's spouse.

B

The instant antinepotism policies do not, in terms, discriminate on the basis of whether a person is married. In Miller, the policy applies to "any relatives (natural or through marriage)." In Lowry, the policy applies to parents, children, siblings, spouses, grandparents, and legal guardians. Neither of these policies facially treats employees differently on the basis of whether they are married, nor is there any facial indication of an adverse effect upon married, single, divorced, separated, or widowed employees.

C

Miller and Lowry claim that the instant antinepotism policies interfere with their fundamental right to marry and that such interference violates their rights of privacy, freedom of choice, due process, and equal protection under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ¹² They urge that we adopt a standard of "strict scrutiny" when reviewing the validity of antinepotism policies. ¹³

In confronting similar arguments, federal courts have applied a "rational basis" test and have upheld antinepotism policies against constitutional challenges. ¹⁴ The United States Supreme Court has indeed said that the freedom to marry is a "vital personal right." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967). The antinepotism policies in the instant cases, however, do not prohibit marriage or deny co-workers the right to marry. Not every regulation that "relates in any way to the incidents of * * * marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny"; such scrutiny is applicable when regulations "interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-387, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978). Antinepotism policies may require co-workers who desire to marry to confront serious and difficult choices. Such policies do not, however, infringe on the right to marry "directly and substantially." See Parsons v. County of Del Norte, 728 F.2d 1234, 1237 (CA 9, 1984), cert. den. --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 158, 83 L.Ed.2d 95 (1984); Cutts v. Fowler, 223 U.S.App.D.C. 414, 417, 692 F.2d 138 (1982).

II

We turn to the argument that the instant antinepotism policies are discriminatory as applied to Miller and Lowry. A facially neutral employment practice can operate as a mask or pretext for impermissible discrimination. Thus our decision that the instant policies are facially neutral concerning the...