Hous. NFL Holding L.P. v. Ryans, 01-18-00811-CV

• Decision Date: 01 August 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 01-18-00811-CV,01-18-00811-CV
• Citation: 581 S.W.3d 900
• Parties: HOUSTON NFL HOLDING L.P. d/b/a Houston Texans, Appellant v. DeMeco RYANS, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

581 S.W.3d 900

HOUSTON NFL HOLDING L.P. d/b/a Houston Texans, Appellant

v.DeMeco RYANS, Appellee

NO. 01-18-00811-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued August 1, 2019

Wesson H. Tribble, Maureen Spector, Paul J. Sembera, Tribble | Ross, 6371 Richmond Ave., Houston, Texas 77057, for Appellant.

Robert E. Ammons, Andrea A. Zarikian, April A. Strahan, The Ammons Law Firm, L.L.P., 3700 Montrose Blvd., Houston, TX 77006, Rory Ryan, Baylor Law School, One Bear Place #97288, Waco, TX 76698-7288, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Landau.

Laura Carter Higley, Justice

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.¹ DeMeco Ryans, a former professional football player for the Philadelphia Eagles, suffered a career-ending injury while playing an away game against the Houston Texans. Ryans sued the Texans in state court, asserting a claim for premises liability as an invitee. The Texans filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Football League's club owners and players' union, and the trial court denied the motion.

In a single issue, the Texans argue that the trial court abused its discretion because the CBA contains a valid arbitration agreement and Ryans' claim falls within the agreement's scope. We agree and therefore reverse the order denying the motion and remand to the trial court so that it can sign an order compelling arbitration and staying this suit.

Background

The material facts are undisputed. DeMeco Ryans is a former All-Pro NFL linebacker who suffered a career-ending injury while playing an away game against the Houston Texans. Ryans sued the Texans in state court, and the Texans, after a failed attempt to remove the case to federal court, moved to compel arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement between the NFL team owners, on the one hand, and players' union, on the other. The issue in this appeal is whether Ryans' state law tort claim falls within the scope of the CBA's arbitration clause.

Ryans suffers a career-ending injury while playing an away game against the Texans

Ryans began his career in 2006 with the Houston Texans and was later traded to the Philadelphia Eagles in 2012. Ryans' career came to an abrupt end on November 2, 2014, when he tore his Achilles tendon during an away game at NRG Stadium against his former team, the Texans. The tear to Ryans' Achilles tendon was a non-contact injury—it was not caused by and did otherwise involve contact with another player. After the tear, Ryans was placed on injured reserve and eventually released by the Eagles. After his release from the Eagles, Ryans was not signed by another team. Ryans never fully recovered from his injury and never played professional football again.

Ryans sues the Texans in state court

In October 2016, Ryans sued the Texans in state court, asserting a claim for premises liability.² In his amended petition, Ryans alleges that, at the time of his injury, the Texans were a lessee and possessor of NRG Stadium, and he was an invitee. He alleges that the Texans, as possessor, owed him, as invitee, a duty of ordinary care, including a duty to provide him and other NFL football players with a reasonably safe playing field.

Ryans alleges that the Texans breached their duty of ordinary care by negligently selecting an unreasonably dangerous design for the field—one that was made up of hundreds of individual "turf modules" instead of a single, contiguous piece of natural grass. Ryans alleges that the Texans further breached their duty by negligently installing and maintaining the modules. According to Ryans, the negligent design, installation, and maintenance of the field resulted in a "severely uneven" playing surface with "uneven hardness" and other "continuity problems," such as gaps, seams, creases, and holes. These hazards, Ryans alleges, caused players to "land awkwardly, trip, stumble, [and] sink into the turf," leading in some cases to severe, career-ending injuries and numerous complaints from players and coaches.

Ryan alleges that the Texans' negligence caused the condition of the field to pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the football players who used the field for its intended purpose: the playing of professional football. The Texans knew that the field at NRG Stadium was negligently designed, constructed, and maintained and failed to exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the known risks posed by the condition of the field. By failing to exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the known risks, the Texans directly and proximately caused Ryans' career-ending injury. Had the field not been negligently designed, constructed, and maintained, Ryans alleges, he would not have suffered a career-ending injury and would have continued to play professional football.

The Texans remove the case to federal court

After Ryans filed his petition, the Texans removed the case to federal district court based on federal-question jurisdiction. ³

The Texans argued that Ryans' premises-liability claim was preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because resolution of the claim would require the interpretation of the CBA.⁴

The federal court remands the case back to state court

Ryans filed a motion to remand, which the federal district court granted.⁵ In its remand order, the federal district court acknowledged that the CBA governs "certain aspects" of the parties' relationship. But the federal district court nevertheless held that Ryans' claim was not preempted under Section 301 because the claim involved questions about the parties' conduct that did not implicate any term of the CBA.

The Texans move to compel arbitration under the CBA

In June 2018, the Texans filed a motion to compel arbitration under Article 43 of the CBA. Article 43, entitled "Non-Injury Grievance," requires arbitration of certain disputes involving the interpretation or application of the CBA itself or other listed documents. It provides, in relevant part:

Any dispute (hereinafter referred to as a "grievance") arising after the execution of [the CBA] and involving the interpretation of, application of, or compliance with, any provision of [the CBA], the NFL Player Contract, the Practice Squad Player Contract, or any applicable provision of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws or NFL Rules pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment of NFL players, will be resolved exclusively in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Article, except wherever another method of dispute resolution is set forth elsewhere in [the CBA].

The Texans argued that Ryans' premises-liability claim falls within the scope of Article 43 because the claim involves the interpretation and application of

• the CBA itself, as the CBA contains various provisions addressing player health and safety and the benefits to which players are entitled in the event of an on-field injury and establishes several committees tasked with addressing issues relating to player health and safety, specifically including issues relating to field safety;

• the NFL Player Contract, which required Ryans to enter NRG Stadium and play as directed by his team, the Eagles, on the day he sustained his injury and, like the CBA itself, contains provisions addressing player health and safety; and

• the NFL Rules, which contain Playing Field Specifications addressing field hardness, infill depth and evenness, and other issues relating to field safety.

Ryans filed a response, arguing that his claim falls outside the scope of the Article 43 because the claim is based on the common law duty of care that a premises owner owes to invitees and is thus unrelated to any provision of the CBA.

The trial court denied the Texans' motion. The Texans appeal.

Motion to Compel Arbitration

In a single issue, the Texans argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to compel arbitration because Article 43 of the CBA is a valid arbitration agreement that encompasses Ryans' premises-liability claim. Ryans responds that, although Article 43 is a valid arbitration agreement, it is narrow in scope and does not encompass state law tort claims that, like his, neither depend on nor require reference to the CBA or other documents to which Article 43 applies.

A. Applicable law and standard of review

The FAA was enacted almost 100 years ago to overrule the judiciary's long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. , 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989). Section 2, the primary substantive provision of the act, provides, in relevant part, that a "written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.

The United States Supreme Court has described Section 2 as reflecting both a liberal policy favoring arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion , 563 U.S. 333, 339, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011). In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms. Id.

A party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must establish that (1) a valid arbitration agreement exists and (2) the claim at issue falls within that agreement's scope.⁶ In re Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. , 186 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2006) ; FD Frontier Drilling (Cyprus), Ltd. v. Didmon , 438 S.W.3d 688, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

Here, it is undisputed that Article 43 of the CBA is a...