Jones v. Lexington County Detention Center

• Citation: 586 F.Supp.2d 444
• Decision Date: 24 January 2008
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 3:07-3962-PMD-JRM.
• Parties: Rafer Darrel JONES, Plaintiff, v. LEXINGTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, and James R. Metts, Sheriff of Lexington County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Page 444

586 F.Supp.2d 444

Rafer Darrel JONES, Plaintiff, v. LEXINGTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, and James R. Metts, Sheriff of Lexington County, Defendants.

C.A. No. 3:07-3962-PMD-JRM.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina.

January 24, 2008.

Rafer Darrel Jones, Lexington, SC, pro se.

ORDER

PATRICK MICHAEL DUFFY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Rafer Darrel Jones ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner awaiting trial at the Lexington County Detention Center, filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The record contains the report and recommendation ("the R & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Joseph R. McCrorey, which was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). This matter is before the court upon the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed. A party may object, in writing, to a report and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy of that report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On December 21, 2007, Defendant filed his timely objections to the R & R, and also sought leave to amend his initial complaint.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee at Lexington County Detention Center. On December 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Lexington County Detention Center and James R. Metts, the sheriff of Lexington County. Plaintiff alleges that his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had been violated through his inability to have access to legal research materials. Plaintiff filed this action simultaneously with other actions alleging violations of his § 1983 rights based on allegations of inadequate medical and dental care. Plaintiff is seeking a declaratory judgment, access to legal research materials, and punitive damages.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.1990).

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 269, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The court reviews de novo those portions of the R & R to which specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of objections to the R & R, this court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir.1983). Plaintiff filed Objections to the R & R on December 21, 2007. After a review of the entire record, the R & R, and Plaintiff's objections, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge summarized the facts and applied the correct principles of law. Accordingly, the R & R is adopted in full and specifically incorporated into this Order.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants unjustly deprived him of access to the legal materials, which he needed to defend himself in his criminal action and pursue his other civil claims under § 1983. Plaintiff claims that this constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights,¹ and gives rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides an individual with a cause of action for damages against a person who, under color of state law, causes that individual to be deprived of his constitutional rights.

In the R & R, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed, as it had not stated a claim for legal relief. The R & R recommended that Plaintiff's claim against Lexington County Detention Center be dismissed, because as a physical facility and an institution, it is not subject to liability under § 1983. (R & R at 3.) The R & R further recommended that Plaintiff's claim against Defendant James R. Metts be dismissed because he has immunity from § 1983 claims under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 3-4. Finally, the R & R recommended that Plaintiff's claim be dismissed because county jails, as short-term holding facilities, are not required to have legal libraries, and also that Plaintiff has not alleged any specific harm suffered by him as a result of the alleged lack of access to legal materials. Id. at 4-5.

Plaintiff has filed Objections to the R & R, stating that the specific injury is the lack of access to the law library, and apparently challenging the fairness and correctness of several of the cases that have held that local jails need not have legal library facilities available to those held awaiting trial. (Objections at 2-3.)

"[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries ..." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). The Fourth Circuit has unambiguously held that:

In discussing a situation quite like the one before us, the Fifth Circuit, in Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.1975), took account that county jails, as is the city jail here, are generally short-term holding facilities confining individuals serving misdemeanor sentences or awaiting trial or transfer to prisons, and that, in the case of individuals not awaiting trial, the confinement may be so brief as to make it reasonable for them to await transfer to a permanent facility before petitioning the courts. Thus, the court reasoned "... in determining whether all inmates have adequate access to the courts, the district court need not consider those inmates whose confinement is of a very temporary nature or for purposes of transfer to other institutions. The district judge should have little difficulty, realizing the fundamental nature of the right of access, in determining those cases where the brevity of confinement does not permit sufficient time for prisoners to petition the courts."

Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 333) (5th Cir.1975).

Plaintiff is indisputably being temporarily held in a county detention facility awaiting trial on a criminal charge. While the record does not indicate the exact date of Plaintiff's incarceration, he does not allege that he has been incarcerated for too long, and there is no indication that he is pursuing any sort of claim regarding his rights to a speedy trial.² Accordingly, the law is quite clear, that those being temporarily detained in county facilities awaiting criminal trials do not have a constitutional right to a law library, and so Plaintiff's claim therefore fails as a matter of law.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to allege how he has been harmed in any way by such a lack of access. An inmate does not have standing to allege a deprivation of his or her constitutional right to litigate unless he or she has suffered an "actual injury." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). "[A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That would be the precise analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the inadequacy of the prison infirmary." Id. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Actual injury cannot be established merely by conclusory statements that the inmate would have fared better in litigation had he or she had more or better access to legal research materials. See, e.g., Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th Cir.1993) ("The only evidence Hause offers of injury is a conclusory statement that he was unable to plead his claims properly or properly prepare his (unsuccessful) motion for appointment of counsel. We have examined Hause's motion and pleadings, together with the record as a whole, and are satisfied that the alleged lack of legal assistance did not affect the outcome either of his motion or of his various claims."); Magee, 810 F.2d at 452 (4th Cir.1987) ("He advises us of no specific problem he wished to research and of no actual injury or specific harm which has resulted to him by his limited access to the jail library or its limited contents."). As one example of a sufficient "actual injury," an inmate could show "that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174.

Plaintiff states that, "[t]he injury itself is from the lack of access to the law material or law library to determine a standard of constitutionality of the conditions his pretrial detainment presents." (Objections at 3.) What Plaintiff is in essence arguing is that the way that not having access to a law library has injured him is because he does not have access to a law library. Such an argument is inherently circular and fails as a matter of law. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1385 (4th Cir. 1993) ("`A...