People v. Haney
| Citation | 298 N.Y.S.2d 415,59 Misc.2d 162 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Booker W. HANEY, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 18 March 1969 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New York) |
This is a motion by defendant for an Order permitting him to inspect the Minutes of the Grand Jury which presented the Indictment herein. There is an additional prayer for the granting of other and further relief.
This Indictment in substance accuses the defendant of Criminally negligent homicide. (New Penal Law Sec. 125.10). (New Penal Law will hereinafter be referred to as N.P.L.). It is charged Inter alia therein that on April 28, 1968, defendant allegedly operated an automobile at a high, reckless, dangerous and unlawful rate of speed and in the course thereof, passed a red light and struck one, Angela Palazzo, a pedestrian, inflicting injuries upon her which resulted in her subsequent death.
N.P.L. Sec. 125.10 provides that a person is guilty of the crime of 'criminally negligent homicide' when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person. The term 'criminal negligence' is specifically defined in N.P.L. Sec. 15.05 subd. 4 as follows:
(Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the enactment of the New Penal Law (effective September 1, 1967) the culpable negligence of any person not constituting murder in its first or second degree or the first degree of manslaughter resulting in, but without design to effect death, constituted the crime of Manslaughter in the Second Degree (Penal Law Sec. 1052 subd. 3). It would appear under the prior law that an individual whose automobile, driven by him in a culpably negligent manner, struck another, resulting in the latter's death, could be prosecuted for Manslaughter in the Second Degree. However, (People v. Morrell, 196 Misc. 1016, 1019--1020, 92 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891--892; People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 147, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 571, 138 N.E.2d 799, 808, 63 A.L.R.2d 970). Consequently, in 1936 the Legislature enacted Penal Law Sec. 1053--a which refers specifically to Criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death. This statute provided that:
'A person who operates or drives any vehicle of any kind in a reckless or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is killed, is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death.'
It may be observed that subsequently thereto Penal Law Sections 1053--c and 1053--e were enacted concerning criminal negligence while engaged in hunting or in the operation of a vessel resulting in the death of another. The essence of the three crimes, Penal Law Sections 1053--a, 1053--c and 1053--e, lay in the 'reckless' or 'culpably negligent' manner in which the automobile, the fire-arm or the vessel was employed. The ultimate crime in each of these sections was 'criminal negligence' which consisted of 'reckless' or 'culpably negligent' conduct.
To overcome in part the problem suggested in People v. Morrell supra, the punishment for each of these crimes was imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years or by a fine, whereas the punishment for manslaughter in the second degree was a prison term not exceeding fifteen years or by a fine. (Penal Law Sections 1053, 1053--b, 1053--d, 1053--f).
The terms 'reckless' and 'culpably negligent' in their very nature are not susceptible of precise delineation or application in view of the 'unforeseeable, infinite variety of circumstances to which they might apply.' (Burke, J. in People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 130, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551, 555, 138 N.E.2d 794, 797). It might also be observed that the terms 'culpable negligence', 'criminal negligence' and 'recklessness' appear to be interchangeable.
The problem thus posed invited recodification and clarification of vehicular homicide. Therefore, the New Penal Law effective September 1, 1967 contains Sec. 125.10 upon which the Indictment herein is predicated declaring that a person who, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another is guilty of the crime of Criminally negligent homicide. This crime is designated as a Class E Felony, the maximum penalty for which upon conviction is a term of imprisonment not exceeding four years. Sec. 125.10 would appear also to include the crimes under, not only former Penal Law Sec. 1053--a, but also those designated in Sections 1053--c and 1053--e and these three sections were therefore not included specifically in the New Penal Law.
We have observed that criminal negligence is defined as the failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, which risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. (N.P.L. Sec. 15.05 subd. 4).
Where, however, the conduct of defendant is of a more serious nature than the failure to perceive the risk and is such as may be characterized as 'reckless' the degree of crime is raised to Manslaughter in the Second Degree as defined in Sec. 125.15 and is a Class C Felony punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen years.
This dichotomy in classification of vehicular homicide thus separates passive or negative negligence (failure to perceive a substantial risk, etc.) from the more aggravated degree of recklessness.
The statutory distinction between these two degrees of misconduct is contained in New Penal Law Sec. 15.05(3) and (4) and basically lies in the awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Failure to perceive such a risk is criminal negligence whereas awareness and perception of such risk and consciously or deliberately by conduct to invite the consequences thereof is recklessness. In the one case where such conduct results in death it is 'criminally negligent homicide'. In the other, it is 'manslaughter in the second degree'.
But in lessening the degree of proof required to convict for criminally negligent homicide, the Legislature did not intend to equate criminal liability for conduct resulting in death with civil responsibility.
A departure from the standard of care exercised by the ubiquitous reasonable man may cast a defendant in damages in a civil suit posited upon his negligence where death ensues, but to be criminally actionable under N.P.L. 125.10 it is not any variance from the standards of reasonable care upon which criminal liability may be predicated but the risk which the accused fails to perceive must be substantial and unjustifiable and of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a Gross deviation from such standards.
I believe that case law interpreting pre-existing statutes on manslaughter in the second degree (P.L. Sec. 1052(3)) and criminal negligence (P.L. Sec. 1053--a) are apposite and may appropriately be considered here in discussion of criminal negligence, and failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
I do not discern a legislative intent in N.P.L. Sec. 125.10 to create a new and theretofore unknown crime or to place the stigma of venality upon theretofore benign or venial conduct but rather the purposeful demarcation between that type of negligence which lies in the failure to perceive a risk from that where the risk is known and appreciated but nevertheless deliberately assumed. This distinction was not recognized in former Section 1053--a of the Penal Law.
In People v. Eckert, supra, the defendant was indicted for committing the crime of criminal negligence in violation of Penal Law Sec. 1053--a resulting in death, when he lost consciousness and control of an automobile...
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