Trammell v. Vaughan

• Decision Date: 12 November 1900
• Citation: 59 S.W. 79,158 Mo. 214
• Parties: TRAMMELL v. VAUGHAN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

59 S.W. 79

158 Mo. 214

TRAMMELL v. VAUGHAN.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

November 12, 1900.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY — DISEASE — POSTPONEMENT — MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

1. Where defendant, after entering into a contract to marry plaintiff, discovered that he was infected with a contagious venereal disease, he was entitled to postpone the marriage for a reasonable time, whether or not plaintiff,

with knowledge of his condition, was willing for the marriage to take place.

2. An instruction that if plaintiff was engaged to another, and defendant induced her to break that engagement, and promise to marry defendant, he not intending to marry her, such conduct was an aggravation of plaintiff's damages, was erroneous, since it would allow plaintiff to gain advantage from her wrongful act in breaking the engagement.

3. The measure of damages for breach of promise to marry is the injury to plaintiff's feelings, affection, and wounded pride, as well as the loss of the marriage, but not for punitive damages; and an instruction for punitive damages if defendant entered into the engagement with malice was erroneous, such conduct being only aggravation increasing compensatory damages.

4. Where defendant, though entitled, by reason of disease, to postponement of the marriage for a reasonable time, openly stated that he never intended to marry plaintiff, she could maintain action for the breach of promise immediately.

Appeal from circuit court, Audrain county; E. M. Hughes, Judge.

Action by Laura A. Trammell against Edward G. Vaughan. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor, defendant appeals. Reversed.

The plaintiff sues the defendant for damages for breach of contract of marriage. The petition is in two counts. The first count alleges a contract of marriage entered into between the parties on the 4th day of December, 1896, to be performed at Hartsburg, Boone county, on December 6, 1896; the procuring of the necessary marriage license, by the defendant, from the recorder of Cole county; the public announcement of the contract; the meeting of the parties at the appointed time and place; the willingness and offer of the plaintiff and the positive refusal of the defendant to carry out the contract; and asks $5,000 damages. The second count alleges that the defendant "willfully, falsely, fraudulently, and maliciously induced plaintiff to enter into said marriage contract" for the purpose of humiliating and disgracing her in the public estimation, and to prevent her marrying any one else, but with no intention of performing the contract himself, and asks $5,000 damages. The prayer of the petition is for $5,000 actual damages and $5,000 exemplary damages. The answer is a general denial and special pleas. The special pleas are: (1) An admission of the contract, the procurement of the license, the meeting at Hartsburg, and an inability to procure Rev. C. A. Mitchell to perform the ceremony. (2) A postponement of the marriage, by mutual consent, to an unstated time, the continuance of the defendant's visits to plaintiff, and the institution of this suit, eight days later, without notice to defendant of intention to sue, and without giving him any opportunity to carry out the contract. (3) That when the contract was entered into the defendant believed himself to be well, and physically in a proper condition to marry, but that, after procuring the license, and going to Hartsburg to carry out the contract, he discovered on the evening of December 5th that, without any fault, wrong, or negligence on his part done after entering into the contract, he became afflicted with a loathsome venereal and contagious disease, which rendered it unsafe, unwise, improper, and morally wrong for him to marry the plaintiff at that time. The reply is a general denial.

The facts developed at the trial were, briefly, these: The plaintiff and defendant had formerly been engaged for many years, but that engagement was canceled about 18 months before, and the plaintiff had become engaged to one Brown. On December 4, 1896, the plaintiff and defendant met at a spelling bee at the Dry Forks school house, about two miles from her home. They rode to her home together that night, with the result that it was agreed that they should be married the next Sunday (December 6th) at the home of her brother-in-law, Mr. Bush, in Hartsburg. Accordingly the next morning the plaintiff started with her sister, Dollie, and Dick Foster, a young man who worked for plaintiff's family, for Hartsburg, which was 15 miles distant. The defendant overtook them, and the plaintiff thereafter rode with him. They reached Hartsburg about half past 11 o'clock a. m. The defendant telegraphed for Rev. Mitchell, and then the defendant and plaintiff's brother-in-law, Bush, went to Jefferson City, and procured the marriage license. Upon their return a telegram awaited him, saying Rev. Mitchell could not come. They discussed other ministers. That evening the defendant was sick, ate no supper, and went to bed early. The plaintiff and her sisters were engaged making her a wedding dress. During the night the defendant discovered for the first time that he had the disease aforesaid. The next morning he kept his bed. The plaintiff carried him a glass of milk, which he drank. He then told her he was too sick to marry, and was going home to see his doctor. The plaintiff insisted on marrying, and he finally told her she did not know what was the matter with him, but to send her brother-in-law, Bush, into the room, and he would tell him, and he could tell his wife, and she could tell plaintiff. This was done. Then the brother-in-law, his wife, and the plaintiff returned to the room, and the plaintiff insisted upon the marriage taking place at once; said she would marry him as he was, and he could then go to St. Louis, or some springs, for treatment, for three weeks or a month, and she could stay with her sister; adding that she did not believe he was sick at all. He refused this proposition. That evening he drove to his home, a distance of some 15 miles. The next morning her sister, Dollie, saw the defendant as she passed his house on her way home, and asked him when he was going to marry the plaintiff, and he replied he was not going to marry her at all. That day the defendant drove to Fulton, a distance of 15 miles, and, when congratulated upon his marriage, he said to several persons he was not married; did not intend to marry; only went to Hartsburg to show Alfred Longley, Bill Gibbs, and Mr. Reynolds, who did not like him, or like plaintiff to associate with him, that he could marry the plaintiff if he chose. On the next day — Tuesday — the defendant went to Hartsburg again to see the plaintiff. The evidence is conflicting as to whether on Sunday, before he left her, it was agreed to postpone the marriage until he got well. He says she did. In her deposition, taken some time before the trial, she said she agreed to postpone the marriage upon the advice of her brother-in-law, but on the trial she denied agreeing to a postponement, and in explanation of her testimony in her deposition said she did not know the meaning of the word "postpone." At any rate, she says that on Tuesday, when he came to see her, he told her he came to tell her he was not going to marry her. She returned to her home the following Saturday, and the next day he came to see her, and told her he had been to see a doctor, and was going away the first part of the next week; that nothing was said about their marrying; that he asked her if she had heard from Brown, and she said no; that he then asked her if Brown was not coming out to see her that day, and she said no; that he said he was, and she replied she knew nothing about it; that she asked him if he was going to write to her while he was away, but he got on his horse, and rode off, and did not answer her. The next day she went to Fulton, and instituted this suit. Under instructions, hereinafter referred to, the case was submitted to the jury, and a verdict for $1,000 compensatory damages and $3,000 exemplary damages was returned for the plaintiff. The defendant then perfected this appeal.

David H. Harris and I. W. Boulware, for appellant. A. Finley and D. P. Bailey, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J. (after stating the facts).

1. The principal question in this case is whether the defendant had a right to postpone the marriage upon the appearance of the disease between the date of the contract and the date appointed for its performance; in other words, stated broadly, whether the defendant would have been justified in marrying the plaintiff, even with her consent, while he had the disease. The proposition is stated thus broadly because it is incredible that the plaintiff would have been willing to marry him if she knew the nature and character of the disease. This, too, even if the consummation of the marriage was to be...