State v. Messa
Decision Date | 24 July 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-132-C,90-132-C |
Citation | 594 A.2d 882 |
Parties | STATE v. Thomas J. MESSA. A. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case comes before us on the defendant's appeal from a conviction of one count of second-degree sexual assault. We reverse. The facts of the case insofar as they are pertinent to this appeal are as follows.
During the summer of 1983 thirteen-year-old Todd Buford (Todd) and his seventeen-year-old brother, James Buford (James), were delivering newspapers in their neighborhood. As they delivered a newspaper to the home of defendant, Thomas J. Messa (Messa), he came to the door and invited the two boys inside for some milk and cookies.
Todd testified that he and his brother followed Messa into the kitchen where he offered them the milk and an assortment of cookies. The three then proceeded into Messa's living room where Todd sat on a chair and James sat on the sofa. While Todd was on the chair, Messa approached him "and seemed to want to horse around." He pulled Todd up from the chair and started walking toward the couch. Todd indicated that Messa then "put his arms around me and came from behind" and "[h]e held me there for about five minutes and then he put my hands behind my back." While his hands were being held behind his back, Todd testified, Messa "rested himself against me" and "rubbed his penis against my hands." Todd testified that Messa continued this activity for approximately ten minutes. When Messa released him, Todd remembered, he felt very uncomfortable. He proceeded to testify that Messa then went toward the couch and got on top of his brother, James. Messa allegedly then grabbed James's hands in an effort to make him touch his buttocks. During this incident James stated repeatedly that "[w]e have to go." After several minutes Messa released James and the two boys departed.
James testified that he saw Messa "[r]ubbing himself up and down on Todd." He claimed that the incident lasted only a couple of minutes and that Messa did not approach him on the couch that particular day but on a separate occasion.
On April 30, 1985, Messa was charged with one count of second degree sexual assault upon Todd and one count of assault with intent to commit sexual assault upon James. After a jury trial, Messa was found guilty on count 1 and not guilty on count 2. His motion for a new trial was denied and he was sentenced to fifteen years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with nine years to serve and six years suspended with probation. Messa filed this appeal on April 11, 1989.
Although Messa raises several issues as grounds for his appeal, the first issue raised is dispositive and thereby precludes the necessity of addressing his remaining grounds. He contends that the trial justice erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault. Since the evidence indicates that Messa and Todd were "horsing around" or "wrestling" and Todd expressed uncertainty about whether "he [Messa] was pulling anything or not," Messa maintains that there was a dispute regarding whether he acted for the purpose of sexual gratification. Therefore, he argues, the trial justice should have charged the jury, as requested, with the lesser included offense of simple assault.
The state argues that there was no evidence in the record to support the lesser included offense of simple assault. Since simple assault involves an attempt to injure, not present in this case, the state maintains that the trial justice committed no error by failing to instruct the jury on the offense of simple assault.
When the evidence supports a possible verdict on a lesser included offense, the defendant is entitled--and the trial justice is required--to instruct the jury on that lesser included offense. State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 930 (R.I.1987). Such an instruction is warranted if the element between the greater and the lesser charge is adequately disputed. State v. Brown, 549 A.2d 1373, 1377 (R.I.1988).
Messa is charged with second-degree sexual assault, which is defined in part as "sexual contact with another person and * * * [t]he accused uses force or coercion." G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-37-4, P.L.1981, ch. 119, § 1. Sexual contact is defined as "the intentional touching of the victim's or...
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