Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co.
| Decision Date | 14 March 1985 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 83-0686. |
| Citation | 604 F. Supp. 730 |
| Parties | N. Brown FELTY, Plaintiff, v. GRAVES-HUMPHREYS COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Donald W. Huffman, Nate L. Adams, III, Bird, Kinder & Huffman, Roanoke, Va., for plaintiff.
Bayard E. Harris, William P. Wallace, Jr., Woods, Roger, Muse, Walker & Thornton, Roanoke, Va., for defendant.
This case is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendant, Graves-Humphreys Company. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The action was filed by the plaintiff, N. Brown Felty, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. On August 14, 1984, the court entered an order taking the defendant's motion under advisement to consider the issue of equitable tolling of the statutory filing period. The parties have submitted briefs, the court has heard oral argument, and the matter is ripe for a decision by this court.
The facts relevant to the motion for summary judgment are not in dispute.1 Mr. Felty worked for Graves-Humphreys Company for forty-two (42) years. A letter of recommendation from the defendant describes Mr. Felty as loyal and dependable, and it states that he had an excellent attendance record and that he often went beyond what was expected of him. (Exhibit B to Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents filed February 20, 1985.) On November 12, 1982, Mr. Felty received notice that he was being terminated due to a reduction in the work force. The notice stated: "As of today, November 12, 1982, notice is being given that your last work day will be March 31, 1983." The notice was unequivocal and was neither modified nor rescinded. The notice also included an incentive plan for terminated employees who continued to work through March 31, 1983, and provided for paid time off to look for employment elsewhere.
At the time Mr. Felty received his notice of termination, he was told by the Vice President and General Manager of Graves-Humphreys not to discuss his termination with anyone else in the company on penalty of immediate dismissal. In his deposition in March of 1984, Mr. Felty admitted that on November 12, 1983, he had in fact discussed his termination with a fellow employee. At that time Mr. Felty learned that the younger employee, Mr. Harry Dooley, was being retained:
Deposition of N. Brown Felty, March 2, 1984, pp. 39-40.
Mr. Felty filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on June 2, 1983, and again on June 24, 1983.2 Both allege that Mr. Felty was the victim of age discrimination in that he was discharged and a younger man with less experience, Mr. Harry Dooley, was retained to do the work Mr. Felty had previously performed. Upon completion of the EEOC process, Mr. Felty filed the present action on August, 3, 1983.
The first issue to be addressed by the court is when the 180-day filing period provided under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) begins to run. The rule in the Fourth Circuit is that the statutory filing period begins to run from the date the employee is informed unequivocally that he would be terminated, regardless of when the effects of the termination are felt. Price v. Litton Business Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 963 (4th Cir.1982), citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) and Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). The United States Supreme Court in Chardon stated:
As we noted in Ricks, "mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination." In the cases at bar, respondents were notified, when they received their letters, that a final decision had been made to terminate their appointments. The fact that they were afforded reasonable notice cannot extend the period within which suit must be filed.
454 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 29.
In light of these strong pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit, this court must hold that the 180-day filing period began to run on November 12, 1982, when Mr. Felty was given unequivocal notice of his termination.
The second issue involves the application of equitable tolling in this case. Tolling will not apply unless "the employee's failure to file in a timely fashion is the consequence either of a deliberate design by the employer or of actions that the employer should unmistakably have understood would cause the employee to delay filing his charge." Price at 965. See also Miller v. ITT, supra.
Assuming, without deciding, that the conduct of the employer in this case would support the application of equitable tolling, such tolling is effective only until "facts that would support a charge of discrimination ... were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff." Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975).3 In the case at bar, the plaintiff discovered on November 12, 1982, that a younger employee was being retained to perform his duties. Therefore, any tolling which might apply would only toll the time from the termination notice on November 12, 1982, until he discovered that Mr. Dooley was being retained which, according to Mr. Felty's deposition, occurred that same day. At that point Mr. Felty had sufficient knowledge to support a charge of age discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit in Vaught v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 745 F.2d 407 (7th Cir.1984) discussed the Reeb tolling standard which requires facts that would support a charge of discrimination, not necessarily facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case in a lawsuit. Apparently, the rationale behind this rule is that the purpose of an EEOC charge "is only to initiate the EEOC investigation, not to state sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case." Id. at 411, quoting Graniteville Company v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir.1971). The Supreme Court in EEOC v. Shell Oil Company, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984) stated:
a charge of employment discrimination is not the equivalent of a complaint initiating a lawsuit. The function of a Title VII charge, rather, is to place the EEOC on notice that someone ... believes that an employer has violated the title.
Id., quoted in Vaught, at 411-412.
While not persuaded that these ideals of EEOC investigations are consistent with the realities of the situation, this court is bound to follow the law as provided by the higher federal courts. Therefore, any tolling which might arguably apply is not effective, as the plaintiff on November 12, 1982, knew the facts necessary to support an EEOC complaint charging age discrimination in his termination, in spite of warnings by the...
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Prelich v. Med. Res., Inc.
...in spite of warnings by the employer which were allegedly designed to prevent just such knowledge.” Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 604 F.Supp. 730, 733 (W.D.Va.1985). On appeal, Felty again contended that “he did not know until after his termination that Graves–Humphreys was engaged in a di......
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Prelich v. Med. Res. Inc.
...in spite of warnings by the employer which were allegedly designed to prevent just such knowledge." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 604 F. Supp. 730, 733 (W.D. Va. 1985). On appeal, Felty again contended that "he did not know until after his termination that Graves-Humphreys was engaged in a......
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Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co.
...that the doctrine of equitable tolling did not excuse Felty's delay. The court therefore granted defendant's motion. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys, 604 F.Supp. 730 (W.D.Va.1985). On appeal, this court agreed with the district court on the issue of equitable tolling, but remanded the case to the......