Stewart v. Dist. of Col. D. of Emp. Sec.
Decision Date | 17 April 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 90-1500.,90-1500. |
Parties | Harry B. STEWART, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent, District of Columbia Realty and Development Corp. & Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Intervenors. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Joseph A. Blaszkow, for petitioner.
Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, filed a statement in lieu of brief for respondent.
Philip R. Murray, for intervenors.
Before SCHWELB, FARRELL and KING, Associate Judges.
Harry B. Stewart has requested this court to review a ruling by a Hearing and Appeals Examiner of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (DOES or the agency) denying him benefits pursuant to the District of Columbia Workers Compensation Act of 1979 (the Act), D.C.Code § 36-301 et seq. (1988). He contends that the examiner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and that it rests on incorrect legal principles. We affirm.
Most of the relevant facts are undisputed. On August 1, 1984, while employed by D.C. Realty and Development Corporation (the employer), Stewart, then approximately fifty-six years old, fell from a scaffold. He suffered six broken ribs on the right side of his chest, as well as fractures of his skull and left wrist and a collapsed lung. Stewart was disabled by the accident, and he has since been in almost continual pain on the right side of his chest. From the time of the accident to the present, Stewart has sought and received medical treatment.1 The employer does not dispute the compensability of the treatment for Stewart's initial injuries.
In July 1987, almost three years after his fall from the scaffold, Stewart experienced an episode of sharp epigastric chest pain, accompanied by shortness of breath. Although he had suffered some epigastric discomfort previously, the new pain was of a different character. By November 1987, Stewart had suffered two additional attacks of this type.
Following the November 1987 episode, Stewart consulted his physician, Dr. Robert Guedenet. Because Stewart's family history and medical history indicated that he was at high risk for cardiac problems,2 Dr. Guedenet referred him to George Washington University Medical Center (GWUMC) for a cardiac catheterization. The purpose of this procedure was to determine whether Stewart's new pains were caused by severe coronary artery disease.
The tests at GWU, which were conducted under the supervision of Harold Ross, M.D., revealed only minor irregularities of the coronary arteries. Dr. Ross recommended "medical management of what at present is mild coronary artery disease."
Following his stay at GWUMC, Stewart requested compensation for the treatment expenses from his employer pursuant to the Act. The employer declined to pay, contending that the treatment was not job-related and that it had not been caused by Stewart's 1984 injury. Stewart filed a timely claim with DOES, asking that the employer be ordered to pay his medical expenses, as well as interest and penalties. On October 10, 1989, Stewart's claim was heard by a DOES appeals and hearing examiner.
Stewart was the only witness at the hearing. In contending that the treatment was compensable, Stewart also relied on several letters or reports from his treating physician, James Hopkins, M.D., and on the pertinent records from GWUMC. In opposing Stewart's claim, the employer relied largely on a report from Michael Goldman, M.D., who had examined Stewart on behalf of the employer's insurance carrier.
After considering the evidence, the hearing examiner issued a written decision. The examiner found that the expenses incurred by Stewart in connection with his treatment at GWUMC were not causally related to his 1984 accident. Stewart sought review by the Director of the agency, who took no formal action, thus permitting the examiner's decision to become final. See D.C.Code § 36-322(b)(2) (1988). Stewart then filed a timely petition for review by this court.
George Hyman Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 498 A.2d 563, 564 (D.C.1985); see D.C.Code § 1-1509(e) (1987). Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (citations omitted); Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 377 A.2d 436, 439 (D.C.1977).
In order to recover his expenses at GWUMC, Stewart must show by a preponderance of the evidence that these expenses were caused by his work-related injury. See D.C.Code § 36-301(12) (1988) ( ). "The essence of the problem is causation." ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.83, at 7-213 to 7-313 (1991). Where causation is not shown, the expenses are not compensable. Id., § 13.11, at 3-518 n. 9 and authorities cited. "There must be a direct causal connection between the employment and the injury, whether it be the result of accident or disease." Groom v. Cardillo, 73 App.D.C. 358, 360, 119 F.2d 697, 699 (1941). We are satisfied that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the examiner's finding that the requisite causal nexus has not been established.
The hearing examiner made no reference to the tentative character of Dr. Goldman's conclusion, but described his analysis as "well-reasoned and cogent." Although the record would certainly have been more complete if it had contained Dr. Goldman's final assessment rather than only a preliminary one, we cannot disagree with the hearing examiner's assessment of Dr. Goldman's reasoning.
Moreover, the GWUMC records are replete with allusions to the fact that the pain suffered by Stewart in 1987 during the episodes of which he then complained was different in kind from that which had preceded it. The report of Dr. Ross further discloses that the purpose of the procedure was to rule out major coronary disease. Given Stewart's family history and "high risk" personal habits, it was reasonable for the hearing examiner to conclude, on the basis of the employer's presentation and the hospital records, that the work done at GWUMC would have been called for even if Stewart had not suffered his work-related accident in 1984.
Stewart relies on a letter written on October 10, 1989, by Dr. Hopkins, one of Stewart's treating physicians, to a second doctor. It was Dr. Hopkins' opinion, as stated in that letter, that "this coronary catheterization study, as well as other studies, would not have been necessary unless the patient had suffered the accident of 8/01/84." Although Dr. Hopkins wrote this letter two years after Stewart's hospitalization, however, he acknowledged that he "did not know the results of the coronary catheterization and consultation at George Washington Hospital." Moreover, Dr. Hopkins conceded that the physicians were "totally justified in making every effort to determine whether or not the pain could be due to the coronary artery disease." Given that concession, it is difficult to understand why this justification would not have been present even if there had been no accident in 1984.
Aside from the discovery at GWUMC that Stewart was suffering from minor rather than major coronary...
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