State v. Daniel, 20960.

• Decision Date: 09 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 20960.,20960.
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Thomas Aduak DANIEL, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

606 N.W.2d 532

2000 SD 18

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Thomas Aduak DANIEL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20960.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs November 29, 1999.

Decided February 9, 2000.

Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Paul Cremer, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

Jeff Larson, Minnehaha County Public Defender, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.

PER CURIAM.

[¶ 1.] Thomas Aduak Daniel appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence, raising issues involving voir dire and jury selection. Because the record reveals no prejudice to Daniel, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2.] On July 4, 1998, 19-year-old Chris Dyer worked the night shift at the Sioux Falls post office, taking a break from his work at 3:00 a.m. During his break he sat in his car, parked in a nearby grocery store parking lot, and waited for a friend who was to meet him and pick up some belongings left earlier with Dyer. Around 3:15 a.m., 28-year-old Daniel approached the car and asked Dyer for a ride. Dyer consented and drove Daniel two blocks to an apartment parking lot where Daniel produced a knife and threatened Dyer. Daniel instructed Dyer to exit the vehicle or he would cut out Dyer's eyes. Dyer ran to the post office and called the police. Daniel left in Dyer's car.

[¶ 3.] According to testimony at Daniel's trial on charges stemming from this encounter, Daniel claimed the two talked and smoked marijuana in Dyer's car and that he did not notice he was sitting on a knife until he exited the vehicle at the apartment parking lot. He claimed he showed Dyer the knife he found on the seat, stating he had been sitting on it and suggested Dyer put it someplace else so no one would hurt themselves. At that point, according to Daniel, Dyer jumped out of the car and ran away. Daniel stated he drove around looking for Dyer in order to return his vehicle to him but could not find him in that two-block area and in his search, drove 150 miles south of Sioux Falls on I-29 to Missouri Valley, Iowa. There he filled Dyer's car with gas and drove off without paying.

[¶ 4.] Daniel was apprehended a short time later by an Iowa highway patrol officer and told the officer he was driving to Utah. It was determined the car was stolen. Daniel was taken to Logan, Iowa where he was interviewed by a Sioux Falls police detective on July 7. The detective identified himself and read Daniel his Miranda rights. Daniel admitted to the detective that he had taken a knife from his home and produced the knife in Dyer's car, telling Dyer to "get out or I'll stab your eyes out." He also admitted he had stolen the vehicle and had immediately left Sioux Falls driving southbound on I-29. He stated he had earlier been slipped some LSD unbeknownst to him by a friend and that he was paranoid and did not know what he was doing when he took the car out of state.

[¶ 5.] On July 8, 1998, a Minnehaha County grand jury returned an indictment charging Daniel with first degree robbery and aggravated assault. On July 13, Daniel was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. On September 14, he appeared before the trial court and requested a jury trial. Three months later, he entered a guilty plea on the aggravated assault charge. Following substantial discussion with Daniel, the trial court refused to accept the plea and ordered the case to trial.

[¶ 6.] A jury trial was held December 21-22, 1998 and the jury returned guilty verdicts against Daniel on both charges. The court accepted the verdicts and sentenced Daniel to concurrent sentences of 12 ½ years on the robbery conviction and 7 ½ years on the assault conviction.

[¶ 7.] Daniel appeals raising the following issues:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in conducting voir dire.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to remove a juror for cause.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[¶ 8.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion in conducting voir dire.

[¶ 9.] SDCL 23A-20-6 permits the trial court to conduct a general voir dire examination of the prospective jurors prior to examination by the defense and prosecution. The statute provides:

The defense attorney or the defendant, if appearing pro se, and the prosecuting attorney shall conduct examination of prospective jurors. Prior to the examination the court may conduct a general examination of the prospective jurors. The court may in its discretion allow examination of one or more jurors apart from the other jurors.

(emphasis added).

[¶ 10.] Here, the trial court conducted an examination of the prospective jurors covering topics that included, inter alia, courtroom procedure, the ability to follow the law provided by the trial court, knowledge of the parties, jurors' duty as factfinders, presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. Daniel claims the trial court abused its discretion by going beyond the scope of this general examination and questioning jurors regarding specific facts of the case, pretrial publicity, and racial bias. In particular, Daniel, a black South African man, claims the trial court's examination impermissibly intruded on his presentation of his theory of the case which involved cultural differences in perceptions of cross-racial situations based on his South African upbringing and experiences. He claims such issues should have been left for defense counsel to pursue with potential jurors on voir dire and that the lack of notice from the trial court regarding its examination on such issues precluded his advance objection.

[¶ 11.] Jurisdictions vary considerably in the procedures to be followed in conducting voir dire examination. See 3 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 2d, Trial by Jury § 15-2.4C (1986). In South Dakota, voir dire examination of the prospective jurors is largely reserved to the parties' attorneys. SDCL 23A-20-6. Although the extent of the general examination permitted by the trial court is undefined by statute or prior caselaw of this Court, the trial court's discretion in conducting voir dire is limited by the right of the parties to have an impartial jury. See generally 17 AmJur2d, Jury § 200 (1995). The purpose of "[v]oir dire examination is to enable counsel to determine whether any prospective jurors `... are possessed of beliefs which would cause them to be biased in such a manner as to prevent his client from obtaining a fair and impartial trial.'" People v. Mackey, 185 Colo. 24, 521 P.2d 910, 913 (1974) (examining a statute similar to SDCL 23A-20-6).

This process, by which both the defense and the prosecution try to eliminate those prospective jurors who appear sympathetic to the opposition or at least unsympathetic to their side, is commonly perceived as a very important part of trial procedure. It `can turn out to be a battle of wits and maneuvering more dramatic than the trial itself. Many attorneys believe that trials are frequently won or lost during this process.'

Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, 5 Criminal Procedure 2d § 22.3(a) (1999) (quoting J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 139 (1977)).

[¶ 12.] Under our statutory limitations, and after review of the trial transcript in this case, it appears the trial court exceeded the scope of a general examination in questioning the prospective jurors. However, the record demonstrates no prejudice to Daniel by this examination. The...