61 P.3d 626 (Idaho App. 2002), 26017, Goodwin v. State
|Docket Nº:||26017, 27821.|
|Citation:||61 P.3d 626, 138 Idaho 269|
|Opinion Judge:||PERRY, Chief Judge.|
|Party Name:||Randall C. GOODWIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.|
|Attorney:||[138 Idaho 270] Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Paul S. Sonenberg, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kimberly J. Blas, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.|
|Case Date:||October 29, 2002|
|Court:||Court of Appeals of Idaho|
Review Denied Jan. 17, 2003.
In these consolidated appeals, Randall C. Goodwin challenges orders of the district court dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Goodwin pled guilty to burglary. I.C. §§ 18-1401, -1403. The district court sentenced Goodwin to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years. No appeal was taken from Goodwin's judgment of conviction or sentence. Goodwin subsequently filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting the district court to reconsider the sentence imposed, which was denied. Goodwin did not appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
Goodwin then filed an application for post-conviction relief. In his application, Goodwin alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) not informing Goodwin of his right to appeal the denial of his Rule 35 motion; (2) failing to advise the district court of an alleged plea agreement between Goodwin and the state at sentencing, whereby the state agreed to recommend a suspended unified term of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of one year, and that Goodwin be placed on probation for five years in exchange for Goodwin's guilty plea; and (3) not requesting that the pretrial conference, where the purported plea agreement was discussed, be recorded by a court reporter. In addition to his ineffective assistance claims, Goodwin asserted that the state breached the alleged plea agreement by recommending a minimum period of confinement of four years. The state filed an answer and requested that Goodwin's application be dismissed.
In September 1999, the district court entered its first order dismissing Goodwin's application with regard to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. However, the district court scheduled further proceedings with respect to Goodwin's claim regarding the state's breach of the alleged plea agreement. In October, Goodwin's post-conviction relief application was dismissed with regard to the breach of the alleged plea agreement. Goodwin appealed. This appeal was docketed as No. 26017. After his appeal was filed, the Idaho Supreme Court granted a motion by the state to remand the case to the district court based on the district court's failure to provide Goodwin twenty days' notice of its intent to dismiss his application as required by I.C. § 19-4906(b). Upon remand, the district court entered its third order dismissing Goodwin's post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing and modifying Goodwin's sentence to run concurrent with a sentence imposed in an unrelated case. Goodwin again filed a notice of appeal, which was filed separately under Docket No. 27821. His original appeal, under docket No. 26017, was reinstated. The two appeals were then consolidated for review by this Court. On appeal, Goodwin asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to consult with him about appealing the denial of his Rule 35 motion and failed to request the recordation of the pretrial conference by a court reporter. Goodwin does not argue any issues relating to the alleged plea agreement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App.1992). Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, for an application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P...
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