Riggin v. Board of Trustees of Westminster College

• Decision Date: 26 February 1901
• Citation: 160 Mo. 570,61 S.W. 803
• Parties: RIGGIN et al. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF WESTMINSTER COLLEGE et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

61 S.W. 803

160 Mo. 570

RIGGIN et al. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF WESTMINSTER COLLEGE et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

February 26, 1901.

WILLS — TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY.

It is no ground for setting aside a will because of want of testamentary capacity of testator that he was of advanced age and feeble, and that he gave his large estate to his wife and a stranger, to the exclusion of his stepbrother, where the will was several days in preparation, and while the testator was in his usual health and in possession of his mental faculties, and was witnessed by his personal friends, whom he had known for many years, and where his wife, who knew all about the provisions of the will, was entirely satisfied therewith.

Appeal from Hannibal court of common pleas; Reuben F. Roy, Judge.

Proceedings by Eugene Riggin and Isabella Thornton against the board of trustees of Westminster College and others to set aside the will of William Sausser, deceased. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

This is a proceeding under the statute to contest the validity of the will of William Sausser, who died on the 14th day of January, 1892, at the advanced age of 77 years. The validity of the will is assailed upon various grounds set forth in the petition, including undue influence in the procurement of the execution of the will by his wife, Adelaide Sausser, and the want of mental capacity in the testator to make a will. The trial court excluded all other questions, and confined the issues to the single one as to whether there was in fact a will or not. The proponents, having made due proof by the subscribing witnesses to the will of its proper execution, and of the sanity of the testator at the time of its execution, read the will in evidence and rested. The testator left no children. The contestants are the son and daughter of a deceased half-brother, who at the time of the execution of the will lived in the city of Los Angeles, Cal., and were in moderately affluent circumstances. The will is a holographic one, having been written by the testator on the 13th day of February, 1889, about 2 years and 11 months before his death. By it he disposed of his large estate by providing for his funeral expenses and the erection of a monument at the graves of himself and wife, and then bequeaths and devises to her, should she survive him, the homestead estate for life or widowhood, with all the property thereon, absolutely, and an annuity of $2,500 per annum, to be paid her in two equal sums, semiannually. The remainder of his estate, subject to the annuity, is given to the board of trustees of Westminster College in trust for the endowment of theological professorships and scholarships as therein provided for and directed. His wife survived him, and is one of the defendants to this suit. She knew perfectly well how her husband was disposing of his property while he was preparing his will, and fully approved of its provisions. Immediately after its execution the testator and his wife made a visit to the plaintiffs, in California. While the evidence shows the testator to have been a tall, spare man, of delicate constitution, it also shows him to have been a man of indomitable energy, of extraordinary intelligence, and of shrewd business capacity. He took much care against exposure, and very rarely required the services of a physician, and had not had one for four or five years before his last illness. He continued the management of his large business interests as he was accustomed to do down to and within a few days before his death. For the purpose of showing the want of mental capacity in the testator to make the will, plaintiffs introduced evidence: That the testator was a queer man. That he looked "really funny." That "he talked kind of funny." That "he seemed to be physically weak. His eyes seemed to be suffering from some cause." Said "he was making plug for a rupture on his own body." "That he was very keen in his expression." "He was afflicted with bowel trouble." "He complained of headache-vertigo." "Years ago he had fits of frenzy." That some 45 years before his death he complained of being impotent. The use of intoxicating liquors. Losing $100 gambling in a poker den, about which he cried, but got his money back. He pressed his debtors for money. Was miserly. Had been a dispeptic. When he loaned money, he would have the notes made payable to other parties, and then indorsed to him, to keep from paying taxes upon them. That he thought it was right and proper for a person to keep from paying taxes upon his property if he could. Delusions as to inventions. Cruelty to an inoffensive slave. And other matters of a similar character, which are unnecessary to mention, and the fact that he gave his large estate, said to be worth $150,000, to his wife and a stranger, and disinherited his only heirs at law and his half-brother, John Riggin. At the close of all the evidence the court, over the objection and exception of plaintiffs, instructed the jury that under the pleadings and the evidence the verdict must be for the defendants; and, the jury having so found, plaintiff's in due time filed their motion for a new trial, which being overruled, they appeal.

J. L. Robards, W. M. Boulware, and T. H. Bacon, for appellants. F. L. Scofield, H. S. Priest, and Geo. A. Mahan, for respondents.

BURGESS, J. (after stating the facts).

There have been three printed briefs filed by counsel for plaintiffs in this case, containing in the aggregate 240 pages; and, while there are only 13 assignments of error in the original brief, these are discussed under 84 separate and distinct heads with marked ability, and in a manner which shows great research. But we shall not undertake to follow them in their order; for we are not inclined to believe that it would subserve any useful purpose to do so, or that it is at all necessary to a proper disposition of the case from a legal standpoint.

It is argued that the testator had not the testamentary capacity to make a will at the time of the execution of the one in contest, and in support of this contention a large number of incidents of a peculiar and eccentric character, heretofore specified, which occurred during the last 40 to 50 years of his life, are largely relied upon. In passing upon the same character of evidence in Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72, which was a will contest, it was said: "There was serious error in submitting the question of testamentary capacity to the jury at all. The learned judge should have withdrawn it altogether. At...