Hanley v. State
| Citation | 624 P.2d 1387,97 Nev. 130 |
| Decision Date | 20 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 11309,11309 |
| Parties | Gramby Andrew HANLEY, Sr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nevada |
Paul H. Schofield, Las Vegas, for appellant.
Richard H. Bryan, Atty. Gen., Carson City, Robert J. Miller, Dist. Atty., Clark County, James N. Tufteland, Deputy Dist. Atty., Las Vegas, for respondent.
On March 2, 1978, several days into a jury trial in which he was being tried for murder and kidnapping, appellant Gramby Andrew Hanley, Sr., decided to plead guilty to murder in the first degree. On that day there was presented to the court a written "plea agreement," approved by Hanley's counsel and signed by Hanley, in which it was agreed that Hanley would "plead guilty to Count Two of the Information filed in the above-entitled case, the degree of the crime specifically to be Murder of the First Degree " In exchange for such a plea, the district attorney agreed that kidnapping charges against Hanley would be dismissed.
At the time set for entry of judgment and sentencing, April 25, 1978, Hanley himself addressed the court and made a request to withdraw the agreed-to plea of guilty entered on March 2. His request was made on the ground that he was "forced" into a plea of guilty by reason of a state of mind at the time of the plea which was brought about by conditions in the Clark County jail and aggravated by his wife's having been assaulted on the third day of trial.
When inquiry was made as to how he claimed to have been forced into a plea of guilty, Hanley responded by saying that he suffered from a "detachment from reality" which was "similar to brainwashing."
The court rather summarily dismissed this request, noting that such possibilities had been carefully gone into at the plea hearing. The court recalled that at the plea hearing Hanley "appeared to be lucid and in full control of his facilities (sic)."
After denying the request for change of plea and after hearing from Hanley's counsel and from Hanley himself, the court, at the conclusion of the April 25 hearing, sentenced Hanley to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Formal judgment of conviction with accompanying sentence was filed on May 3, 1978.
After judgment and sentencing, Hanley filed a number of post-conviction motions and a petition for writ of habeas corpus, all going to the same issue: whether or not defendant knowingly, voluntarily and understandingly entered his plea of guilty to murder in the first degree. Claims of coercion and "brainwashing" were not pursued below and are not urged in this appeal.
This court has held in Higby v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 774, 476 P.2d 959 (1970), in harmony with the United States Supreme Court decision, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), that in cases where a guilty plea is accepted, the "record should affirmatively show" that certain "minimal requirements" are met. These are, generally:
3. Understanding of consequences of the plea, the range of punishments, and
4. An understanding of the charge, the elements of the offense.
The first two of these "requirements" are not issues in this appeal. Appellant claims that the second two requirements, understanding of the consequences of his plea and understanding of the charge, have not been met.
Such requirements are codified in NRS 174.035(1) which prohibits the court's acceptance of a guilty plea "without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and consequences of the plea."
With regard to understanding of the consequences of the plea and the range of punishment following therefrom, appellant was asked at the time of entry of plea on March 2, 1978: "Then you do understand that by virtue of your plea of guilty today, that the Court could impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?" Hanley's answer to this question was: "I am fully aware of it." Under such circumstances, this court simply cannot find that Hanley did not understand the range of punishment. He certainly understood the maximum, 1 and that maximum became his ultimate sentence. If there were any failure of understanding in this case, it was not in relation to the possible penalty.
The most substantial point raised by appellant is his claim that the "court failed to ascertain defendant Hanley's understanding of the nature of the charge itself and particularly the elements of the crime of first degree murder."
In discussing this point, we adopt principles declared in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), cited and relied on by Appellant in both of his briefs. The United States Supreme Court 2 recalled in Henderson the long-accepted principle that a guilty plea must provide a trustworthy basis for believing that the defendant is in fact guilty. Thus, the "constitutional rule relevant" to such cases is "that the defendant's guilt is not deemed established by entry of a guilty plea, unless he either admits that he committed the crime charged, or enters his plea knowing what the elements of the crime charged are."
We accept this "constitutional rule" and hold that unless appellant either (1) admitted that he committed the crime charged, first degree murder, or (2) that he entered the plea knowing what the elements of this crime were, the plea must be set aside.
There is no evidence in this record that at the time of the entry of his plea, appellant had been canvassed in order to determine if he knew what the elements of first degree murder were. In the course of the court's canvass appellant's attorney was asked if he had explained to appellant "the elements of the crime with which he is charged in Count II of the Information in this case?" Counsel replied in the affirmative, and this was followed by questions to the appellant as to whether he had such discussions with his attorney and whether he understood what his attorney was saying to him. His answer to the court was that "yes" he had had such discussions, that he understood what was said to him and that he had no further questions in the matter.
There was no mention of murder in the first degree or any other crime in this portion of the canvassing; there was no mention of the "elements" of first degree murder or any other crime; there was no statement as to what, if anything, was explained, nor what, if anything, the defendant understood as a result of such explanation. As a showing that defendant under the stated circumstances knew or understood what the elements of the crime he was pleading to were, the record is completely deficient.
Any claimed showing of an "understanding" on the part of the appellant of "the elements of the crime with which he is charged" is further complicated by the fact that first degree murder can be committed in any of three distinct and separable ways; that is, by (1) commission by poison, or lying in wait, torture, or any other kind of willful deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) commission in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary or sexual molestation of a child under the age of 14 years, or (3) commission to avoid or prevent lawful arrest. NRS 200.030. A complex of questions thus arises: What was explained? What elements? What did he understand? Answers to such questions certainly are not "affirmatively shown" in this record.
Although we have disclaimed the necessity for "articulation of talismanic phrases," Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 516 P.2d 1403 (1973), in plea hearings and have declined to "impose upon our trial judges the rigid requirements imposed upon federal judges when pleas are taken under Federal Rules Criminal Procedure, rule 11, Wynn v. State of Nevada, 96 Nev. 673, 615 P.2d 946 (1980), we would hold that constitutional requirements and the statutory requirement of NRS 174.035(1) demand either a showing that the defendant himself (not just his attorney) understood the elements of the offense to which the plea was entered or a showing that the defendant, himself, has made factual statements to the court which constitute an admission to the offense pled to. 3
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