Konstantinidis v. Chen

• Decision Date: 21 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-1313,79-1313
• Citation: 626 F.2d 933,200 U.S. App. D.C. 69
• Parties: Athanasios KONSTANTINIDIS and Vasiliki Konstantinidis, his wife, Appellants, v. C. N. CHEN, M. D.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 933

626 F.2d 933

200 U.S.App.D.C. 69

Athanasios KONSTANTINIDIS and Vasiliki Konstantinidis, his wife, Appellants, v. C. N. CHEN, M. D.

No. 79-1313.

United States Court of Appeals,

District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Oct. 25, 1979.

Decided Feb. 21, 1980.

Wayne M. Mansulla, Alexandria, Va., for appellants.

J. Joseph Barse, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before J. EDWARD LUMBARD, ^* U. S. Senior Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, and TAMM and MIKVA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge TAMM.

TAMM, Circuit Judge:

This controversy concerns the "judicial estoppel" doctrine and its viability in the District of Columbia. After receiving a workmen's compensation settlement for damages that he had alleged resulted solely from a work-related accident, plaintiff Athanasios Konstantinidis sued defendant Cheng Nan Chen, a medical doctor, for essentially the same damages on a claim of medical malpractice. ¹ Relying on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff's prior assertion that his accident was the sole cause of his injuries, according to the court, barred him from now contending that Dr. Chen's negligence was a contributing factor. Plaintiff appealed.

Applying the law of the District of Columbia, we find that the District of Columbia courts have not recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel and would not do so in the present case. We therefore reverse and remand.

I

The facts material to this appeal are not in dispute. On August 30, 1972, while working as a carpenter, Konstantinidis fell off a sawhorse, injuring his neck and back. The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Commission (Commission) granted Konstantinidis' application for a temporary total disability based on these injuries.

Seventeen months later Konstantinidis placed himself under the care of the defendant, Dr. Chen, and received a series of acupuncture treatments. On March 30, 1974, during one such treatment, an acupuncture needle broke off, leaving the tip lodged in Konstantinidis' neck. Konstantinidis subsequently complained of increased neck pain radiating into his right arm. After another physician diagnosed a spinal defect, Dr. John W. Barrett performed a cervical laminectomy to remove a ruptured disc. Dr. Barrett also extracted the needle tip.

Konstantinidis' neck pain and discomfort persisted, and in August of 1974 he filed a supplementary claim with the Commission. After a hearing, Commissioner Frankel denied the supplementary claim, finding that Konstantinidis' accident had not caused the neck disability. The decision was affirmed on rehearing.

Konstantinidis appealed the Commission's adverse ruling to the Prince George's County In early 1977 Konstantinidis filed the present medical malpractice suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. ⁴ Konstantinidis claimed Dr. Chen's negligent acupuncture treatment had caused the ruptured disc and related medical problems that had been detailed in the supplementary workmen's compensation application as having been due to the sawhorse fall. Dr. Chen moved for summary judgment, arguing that Konstantinidis' submissions and pleadings before the Commission and the Prince George's County Circuit Court judicially estopped Konstantinidis to attribute the injuries to the broken needle rather than the sawhorse accident. ⁵

Circuit Court, ² but before the court could act the parties reached a settlement. Konstantinidis received $20,000 from his employer and the employer's insurer. In return, Konstantinidis executed a final compromise and release, which the Commission approved. ³

The district court found that Konstantinidis had consistently contended in the past that the fall from the sawhorse constituted the only cause of his neck, arm, and back pains. Concluding that the judicial estoppel doctrine barred Konstantinidis from claiming that Dr. Chen's actions were responsible for the injuries, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Chen. Konstantinidis now appeals that decision.

II

At the outset we must distinguish "equitable estoppel" from the more obscure concept of "judicial estoppel." ⁶ See generally "Judicial estoppel," on the other hand, although otherwise similar to the equitable estoppel rule against inconsistency, does not require proof of privity, reliance, or prejudice. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 648-49, 266 S.W. 313, 317 (1924). This distinction reflects a difference in policy objectives: in contrast to equitable estoppel's concentration on the integrity of the parties' relationship to each other, judicial estoppel focuses on the integrity of the judicial process. To the extent that prior sworn statements are involved, the doctrine upholds the "public policy which exalts the sanctity of the oath. The object is to safeguard the administration of justice by placing a restraint upon the tendency to reckless and false swearing and thereby preserve the public confidence in the purity and efficiency of judicial proceedings." Melton v. Anderson, 32 Tenn.App. 335, 339, 222 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Ct.App.1948). See Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857). Furthermore, even when the prior statements were not made under oath, the doctrine may be invoked to prevent a party from playing " 'fast and loose with the courts.' " Scarano v. Central Railroad, 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953). ⁸

1B Moore's Federal Practice P 0.405(8) (2d ed. 1965). Virtually all courts agree that equitable estoppel may be applied to preclude a party from contradicting testimony or pleadings successfully maintained in a prior judicial proceeding. See, e.g., Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689, 15 S.Ct. 555, 558, 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895). The party seeking to invoke the estoppel, however, must have been an adverse party in the prior proceeding, must have acted in reliance upon his opponent's prior position, and must now face injury if a court were to permit his opponent to change positions. See Galt v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 74 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 159, 120 F.2d 723, 726 (D.C.Cir.1941). See also Note, Procedure Judicial Estoppel Sworn Statements, 11 Sw.L.J. 96, 96-97 (1957). The privity, reliance, and prejudice requirements demonstrate that the doctrine is designed to ensure fairness in the relationship between the parties. As Professor Pomeroy states, the rule's "object is to prevent the unconscientious and inequitable assertion or enforcement of claims or rights which might have existed or been enforceable by other rules of law, unless prevented by the estoppel." 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 802 (5th ed. 1941). The party seeking the protection of the estoppel is the intended beneficiary of the doctrine, for "its practical effect is, from motives of equity and fair dealing, to create and vest opposing rights in the party who obtains the benefit of estoppel." Id. ⁷

Whatever the value of the judicial estoppel doctrine, we must bear in mind that this case comes before the federal courts because of the parties' diversity of citizenship. Therefore, the Supreme Court's decisions in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), and Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947), compel us to look to District of Columbia law to determine whether judicial estoppel should be applied. ⁹ We No District of Columbia court has ever adopted the judicial estoppel doctrine. In certain cases the District's courts have imposed a bar against inconsistent statements, but in every instance the elements of privity, reliance, and prejudice have been present. See, e.g., Jamison v. Garrett, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 205 F.2d 15 (D.C.Cir.1953) (applying District of Columbia law); Clark v. Barber, 21 App.D.C. 274 (D.C.Cir.1903) (applying District of Columbia law); Atkins v. United States, 283 A.2d 204, 206 (D.C.1971). On the other hand, when one or more of these elements have been missing the District's courts have refused to impose an estoppel. See, e.g., Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 4, 174 F.2d 657 (D.C.Cir.1949) (applying District of Columbia law); Dexter v. Gordon, 11 App.D.C. 60 (D.C.Cir.1897) (applying District of Columbia law). Thus, although the law of the District recognizes the existence of the equitable estoppel doctrine, no case has embraced the broader judicial estoppel concept.

cannot overrule the decision of the District's highest court, for "(n)o matter what the result, we cannot 'correct' a state court's interpretation of its own law. . . . The rule of Erie . . . calls on us to apply state law, not, if we can be persuaded to doubt its soundness, to participate in an effort to change it." Tarr v. Manchester Insurance Corp., 544 F.2d 14, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1976).

We realize that no District of Columbia court has ever expressly rejected judicial estoppel. Nevertheless, the District's cases evidence some hostility to the concept. Moreover, judicial estoppel has not been followed by anything approaching a majority of jurisdictions, nor is there a discernible modern trend in that direction. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit observed in Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 437-38 (10th Cir. 1956), judicial estoppel "reflects the minority viewpoint which has encountered inhospitable reception outside the State of Tennessee." Even the state of Maryland, whose workmen's compensation commission would allegedly be insulted by plaintiff Konstantinidis' shift in position, would not apply the judicial estoppel doctrine. See, e.g., Travelers Corp. v. Boyer, 301 F.Supp. 1396, 1401 n.4 (D.Md.1969) (applying Maryland law).

Furthermore, we agree with the Tenth Circuit that utilization of the judicial estoppel theory "would be out of harmony with (the modern rules of pleading) and would discourage the determination of cases on the basis of the true facts as they might be established ultimately." Parkinson...