Melton v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 24 November 1948
• Parties: MELTON v. ANDERSON et ux.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

222 S.W.2d 666

32 Tenn.App. 335

MELTON v. ANDERSON et ux.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Western Section.

November 24, 1948

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court March 11, 1949.

Timothy M. Melton brought an ejectment suit against Isaac Anderson and wife. From a decree of Chancellor L. D. Bejach, in Shelby County, for the complainant, the defendants appealed.

The Chancellor upheld the contention of the complainant that defendants, who claimed title to the realty through a brother of deceased former owner, were precluded under the doctrine of judicial estoppel from denying the truth of a complaint which the deceased former owner of the realty had filed in probate court, alleging that complainant was her son.

The Court of Appeals, Anderson, P.J., affirmed the decree of the Chancellor, holding, after defining 'judicial estoppel', that defendants were estopped to deny the truth of the allegations of the deceased former owner of the realty that complainant was her son.

Feuerstein, Fleet & Feibelman, Memphis, for appellants.

W. H Fisher, Memphis, for appellee.

ANDERSON Presiding Judge.

This is an ejectment suit involving the title to a house and lot in the city of Memphis. The chancellor's decree was for the complainant. The defendants appealed.

The property in question was formerly owned by Laura Melton and occupied by her as a home. She died intestate in March, 1940. She was a widow, her husband having predeceased her some 28 years or thereabouts. The complainant claims that he is the son of Laura Melton; that she had no other children; and hence that he took the property by descent. The defendants deny that the complainant is a son of Laura Melton and aver that she had no children; that she was survived by her brother, Oscar Sims, who is her sole heir at law; that Sims conveyed the property to one Latting, who in turn conveyed to the defendants as tenants by the entireties.

Complainant contends not only that he is the son of the deceased, Laura Melton, but that her brother Sims and those claiming under him are estopped to say otherwise by reason of a certain proceeding in the probate court of Shelby County, instituted by Laura Melton wherein she averred that the complainant was her son.

The theory of the defendants with respect to the relationship of the complainant and L. A. Melton, as set forth in the answer is as follows:

'Complainant who claims to be the son of L. A. Melton, is truly the son of a colored woman named Jeannette and whose last name is unknown, and was born to her in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee, at or about September 1924.

'That upon his birth, Jeannette, natural mother of complainant surrendered custody of him to Sallie Fizer who cared for the complainant for one month. That thereupon with the consent of the natural mother of complainant, Sallie Fizer surrendered the custody of complainant to L. A. Melton.'

The defendants sought to support this theory by the testimony of five Negro women, at least one of whom seems to have been more or less engaged in the business of disposing of illegitimate children unwanted by their mothers. The witnesses do not support the version of the matter as set out in the answer in all its details; but notwithstanding the discrepancies they al testify substantially that the complainant was not the son of L. A. Melton but the illegitimate child of another woman who was taken from his mother by one of the witnesses at birth and after a few months turned over to L. A. Melton, who reared him.

The chancellor held that 'it appears to the court from the preponderance of the evidence that Timothy Melton is not the natural son of, and was not born to Laura A. Melton; and but for the principle of judicial estoppel applicable to and applied by the court in this cause, the court would so find as a fact.'

There is no controversy about the facts alleged to give rise to the judicial estoppel. As stated in the bill, they are as follows:

'Oscar Sims, the brother of L. A. Melton, and uncle of complainant came to Memphis, when L. A. Melton died, and took possession of the property for and on behalf of complainant, whom he took to his home in Abilene, Texas. It was not until just before the bill was filed that complainant learned that Oscar Sims had done with the property.

'Oscar Sims, and all those who claim under him, are estopped by judicial records from claiming that complainant is not the son of L. A. Melton. In the record of the Probate Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, there is a proceeding, entitled, 'Guardianship of T. M. Melton,' being Cause No. 41750 R. D. (Ended No. 33,152); a petition for appointment of guardianship was filed by Charles Melton, April 6, 1940, which recites that L. A. Melton is the mother of T. M. Melton (who is the present complainant). In this cause Oscar Sims, on June 22, 1940, filed a petition for the removal of Charles Melton as guardian. In this petition, Oscar Sims recites that he is the next friend, and uncle of T. M. Melton. No question was made of the former petition stating that L. A. Melton was his mother.

'Also, L. A. Melton, and all who claim under her, are estopped by judicial records from making any claim that she is not the mother of T. M. Melton, the complainant. In the Probate Court of Shelby County, Tenn., there is a cause entitled, 'L. A. Melton Gdn. of T. M. Melton, a Minor,' being No. 33,297 R.D. (Ended No. 22033), wherein L. A. Melton filed a petition for her appointment as guardian, in which she stated that she was in mother of T. M. Melton; and she made oath to this petition, and the Court acted thereon, and named her guardian, and she served as such; settled a claim for damages, received the money in hand, received allowance therefrom; all as shown by the records in said cause.'

At the time of the trial the complainant was 23 years of age. He testified that he was born at Memphis, and that his mother was the deceased L. A. Melton, or Laura Melton; that he remembered her from the time he was a very small child and lived with her until she died; that she treated him as her child, supported him. Asked whether she claimed to be his mother, he replied, 'That is all I have ever known.' He said that the fact that she was his mother had never been questioned by anyone; that after the death of Laura Melton her brother, Oscar Sims, came to Memphis and 'He taken charge of everything' ; that Sims took him to his, Sims' home in Texas, where he remained for some nine months until he enlisted in the United States Army, from which he was discharged in October, 1945; that he enlisted in the Army in January, 1941, and since he was then under 18 years of age he had to get a 'written statement' from Sims as his uncle to enable him to enlist; that upon his discharge from the Army he came back to Memphis and for the first time discovered that his uncle had sold the property. This suit resulted.

Referring to the guardianship proceeding instituted by L. A. Melton in the probate court in 1931, the chancellor held as follows: 'The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the rule of judicial estoppel applies, and that the aforesaid record inconclusive upon the question as to whether complainant was the son of L. A. Melton, and by reason of estoppel he must be taken as the son and heir of L. A. Melton. This estoppel bound her and her estate, so that on the instant of her death intestate, her real estate passed by descent case to complainant as heir. This estoppel bound L. A. Melton, and binds those who claim to be the heirs of L. A. Melton, and those tracing title through them. The title to the property vested at once in complainant, and did not, and could not vest, in Oscar Sims who had no title to pass to his grantees.'

The defendants insist that whatever would be true as against Laura Melton if she were living and sought to repudiate her oath in the probate court proceedings, her sworn statements therein made are not binding on her heir, Oscar Sims, or on them as his grantees. It is contended that in this respect there is a distinction between judicial estoppel and equitable estoppel arising out of the fact that the latter is based solely on equitable considerations and prejudice to the one invoking the doctrine must be shown; whereas the latter is based solely on public policy which forbids that a party be allowed to repudiate his solemn oath. Williams v. Nottingham, 19 Tenn.App. 162, 84 S.W.2d 114, and cases cited.

A general statement of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is that where one states on oath in former litigation, either in a pleading or in a deposition or on oral testimony, a given fact as true, he will not be permitted to deny that fact in subsequent litigation, although the parties may not be the same. Tate v. Tate, 126 Tenn. 169, 212, 148 S.W. 1042, and cases cited. The opinion in the case of Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 266 S.W. 313, is virtually a treatise on the subject, but what is there said must be considered in the light of subsequent decisions. Among these are the cases of Black Diamond Collieries v. Deal, 150 Tenn. 474, 477, 265 S.W. 985, and Helfer v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 170 Tenn. 630, 96 S.W.2d 1103, 1105, 113 A.L.R. 921. The latest expression is contained in Rose & Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 519 et seq., 206 S.W.2d 897 wherein the Supreme Court adopts the able opinion prepared for this court by Judge Felts, Presiding Judge of the Middle Section of the Court, when that case was before us.

The doctrine in no sense depends upon prejudice to the party invoking it. Upon the contrary it rests solely on public policy which exalts the sanctity of the oath. The object is to safeguard the administration of justice by placing a restraint upon the tendency...