City of St. Paul v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company
| Decision Date | 10 May 1895 |
| Docket Number | 9139--(39 [2] -95 [3] -51 [4] ) |
| Citation | 63 N.W. 267,63 Minn. 330 |
| Parties | CITY OF ST. PAUL v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied 63 Minn. 330 at 341, 350.
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Kelly and Otis, JJ., denying a motion for a new trial. Modified, and remanded for trial of issue concerning City Ordinance No. 286.
Cause remanded, with directions to the court below to modify its conclusions of law and order for judgment in accordance with this opinion.
W. H Norris, Flandrau, Squires & Cutcheon, and F. W. M. Cutcheon for appellant.
Mr Hill was without authority to execute the petition on behalf of the railway company. It was incumbent on plaintiff to show that, in signing the petition, he acted under authority from the company, or that the company, while still in possession of its interest as an adverse claimant, ratified his act with full knowledge of all the facts. James v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co., 91 Ill. 554; City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 45 Minn. 387, 394, 48 N.W. 17. Mr. Hill did not intend by executing the petition to abandon the railway company's claim of title. His act in executing the petition was never ratified by the railway company. To establish ratification it was necessary for plaintiff to show: (1) Actual knowledge on the part of the company of the act assented to and of all the material circumstances affecting it (2 Morawetz, Priv. Corp. § 628; Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co. v. Stevenson, 5 Nev. 224; Clarke v. Lyon County, 7 Nev. 75; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, 629); (2) intent on the part of the company to adopt the act as the act of the corporation (2 Morawetz, Priv. Corp. §§ 628-629). Knowledge possessed by one member of a board, or of any number less than a majority, of a fact affecting the interests of the company does not constitute knowledge on the part of the board, unless such knowledge be obtained in the course of the performance of a duty by such member or members, or concerns a subject on which he or they have special authority to act. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co. v. Stevenson, supra; Shaw v. Clark, 49 Mich. 384, 13 N.W. 786; Mayor of New York v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 111 N.Y. 446, 457, 18 N.E. 618; Fairfield Sav. Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226; Buttrick v. Nashua & L. Railroad, 62 N.H. 413; Farmers & C. Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444; Farrel Foundry v. Dart, 26 Conn. 376. Ratification by silence is ratification by acquiescence, and acquiescence cannot be implied unless there be a duty to speak or profit to be obtained by speaking. Evans v. Smallcombe, L. R. 3 H. L. 249, 260, per Lord Chelmsford; Kersey Oil Co. v. Oil Creek & A. Railroad, 12 Phila. 374, 376; Ormsby v. Vermont Copper Min. Co., 56 N.Y. 623. Non-action on the part of the board or executive committee would not show intention to adopt Mr. Hill's act, unless the matter had been presented to the board when assembled. Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261. If authority can be given only in one way, ratification can occur only in the same way. Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Mnfg. Co., 12 N.H. 205. Nothing has occurred that estops defendant to deny that the vacation petition constituted an abandonment of the Manitoba Company's claim of title. City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 45 Minn. 387, 395-6, 48 N.W. 17. No abandonment of its claim of title made by the Manitoba Company as late as the date of the vacation petition could have any effect on the title to the land in dispute, as against defendant. Basset v. Nosworthy, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1; Dickerson v. Tillinghast, 4 Paige, Ch. 215.
Even if the land in dispute be part of a public levee, defendant has the right to occupy and use the premises for railroad purposes by Sp. Laws 1872, c. 93. The state has the right to dispose of a public levee with or without the consent of the municipal corporation in such manner as appears to it advantageous to the public interest. Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 71, 701. The company has, by virtue of the contract between it and the legislature, the right to lay and maintain its tracks on the public levee at any point between the former terminus of the Minnesota Central Railroad and Dayton's Bluff. Nash v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 261, 33 N.W. 787; Hovelman v. Kansas City H. R. Co., 79 Mo. 632; City of St. Louis v. Western U. Tel. Co., 63 F. 68, 70, and cases cited. The act did not contemplate condemnation by the company of the public easement. Moreover the company already possessed the right to make such condemnation by general law. G. S. 1866, c. 34, tit. 1, § 29; G. S. 1878, c. 34, tit. 1, § 47. Defendant is entitled by contract with plaintiff by virtue of the city ordinance to maintain its upper freight house and the tracks leading thereto where they now are. The ordinance constituted an offer, which after acceptance is binding. G. S. 1878, c. 34, §§ 47, 48. There was formed thereby an irrevocable contract. Nash v. Lowry, supra; Hovelman v. Kansas City H. R. Co., supra; City of St. Louis v. Western U. Tel. Co., supra; State v. Town of Lime, 23 Minn. 521; County of Cass v. Gillett, 100 U.S. 585, 593, 594.
Edward J. Darragh, Hermon W. Phillips, and Henry J. Horn, for respondent.
The first trial of this case resulted in a decision in favor of the defendant, which was affirmed on appeal to this court. 45 Minn. 387, 48 N.W. 17. A second trial, to which the plaintiff was entitled under the statute (49 Minn. 88, 51 N.W. 662), resulted in a decision in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial the defendant appeals.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion on the first appeal, and need not be repeated. Suffice it to say that the premises in dispute are a part of what has been called "Island 11," another portion of which was the subject of litigation in Schurmeier v. St. Paul & P. R. Co., 10 Minn. 59 (82), and Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. 272, 7 Wall. 272, 19 L.Ed. 74. The city of St. Paul claims the premises as a public levee, under a dedication in 1854 by one Hopkins, the grantee of Louis Roberts. On the other hand, the defendant railway company contends (1) that Hopkins never owned the land, but that its predecessors and grantors acquired title to the whole of "Island 11" as part of the federal railroad land grant of March 3, 1857 (11 Stat. 195); (2) that, even if Hopkins owned it, he never dedicated it to the public; (3) that, even if he owned and dedicated the land, yet it has since acquired title to it by 20 years' adverse possession by itself and its grantors; and (4) that, even if the public has an easement in the land for levee purposes, yet defendant has a right to maintain certain tracks and structures upon it under the legislative act of February 28, 1872 (Sp. Laws 1872, c. 93), and also under Ordinance No. 286 of the plaintiff city, passed April 21, 1882.
The Schurmeier Case is decisive that Louis Roberts, Hopkins' grantor, acquired title to the land in question under patent from the United States; and the evidence is plenary that Hopkins dedicated it to the public for levee purposes. This disposes of defendant's first and second contentions. Therefore, aside from defendant's claim to the limited right of use of the premises under the legislative act and the city ordinance referred to, the case comes down to the single question whether the defendant had, before the commencement of this action, acquired title by 20 years' adverse possession.
Upon the last trial, as upon the first, the greater part of the evidence and of the arguments of counsel was directed to this issue. The possession of those under whom defendant claims commenced not earlier than the winter of 1862-63. It may be assumed for present purposes that up to September, 1879, this possession was hostile, exclusive, notorious, and continuous; so that, if not thereafter interrupted, it would have ripened into title in the winter of 1882-83. The main and pivotal question in the case is whether the evidence justified the trial court in finding, as we must presume it did, that the continuity of this adverse possession was interrupted, before the statute of limitations had run, by a recognition by the occupant (either the defendant itself or its grantor, the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company) of the title and right of the public and the plaintiff city. The evidence tending to prove such recognition was in several respects stronger than on the first trial, and, in our opinion, was amply sufficient to justify the finding of the court.
It is familiar law that, in order that adverse possession may ripen into title, there must be continuity of adverse possession for the statutory period. Hence a recognition by the occupant of the title of the owner will break the continuity of claim, as well as the continuity of possession, although the occupant continues in possession of the premises; and in such case he must begin de novo if he would claim the benefit of the statute of limitations. If he continues in possession of the premises after such break in the continuity of claim, the benefit which he might have obtained from his prior adverse possession is, nevertheless, determined, and if, after such break, the occupant should again attempt to hold adversely to the title of the real owner, such adverse possession will be held to commence from that time, and the occupant will not be permitted to tack his former possession.
One alleged act of recognition of the public right in the land in controversy by the then occupant, the Manitoba Company, is the petition, presented to the city council September 16 1879, asking for the vacation of parts of certain designated streets and a part of this same public levee, in...
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