State v. Osborn

• Decision Date: 09 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 13400,13400
• Citation: 102 Idaho 405,631 P.2d 187
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David Allen OSBORN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 187

631 P.2d 187

102 Idaho 405

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David Allen OSBORN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13400.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 9, 1981.

Gaylen L. Box of McDermott & McDermott, Pocatello, for defendant-appellant.

David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

McFADDEN, Justice.

I Procedural background

The appellant, David Allen Osborn, was arrested and charged with the October 31, 1978, murder of Charlotte Christine Carl. Appellant was arraigned before the magistrate division of the Sixth Judicial District on November 29, 1978 on the charge of first degree murder and a public defender was appointed. On December 7, a preliminary hearing was held and appellant was bound over for trial. Before Sixth District Judge Arthur Oliver on December 11, appellant pled not guilty and filed a notice of intent to rely upon mental disease or defect as an affirmative defense. An examining psychiatrist was appointed by the court at this time. I.C. § 18-211.

Following discovery and argument on various motions not in issue here, appellant, on May 21, 1979, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of first degree murder. The court, after assuring the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea, ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled an aggravation-mitigation hearing. I.C. § 19-2515. This hearing was held on June 21, 1979, and the matter of sentencing was taken under advisement. On June 29, a memorandum decision, findings of fact, and conclusions of law were issued by the court, and appellant was sentenced to death.

Appellant filed motions for correction or reduction of sentence, which were denied by the district court. Appellant also filed a petition for review of the sentence and a notice of appeal to this court. The matter is before us on a dual basis: under the mandatory review procedure set forth in I.C. § 19-2827 and under the appeal brought by appellant.

II Factual background

No trial having taken place, the following facts are established by and taken from the record of the preliminary hearing.

Appellant and the murder victim were both employed at a Pocatello cafe, worked together, and appeared to get along well. They were seen together in a room at the Pocatello Holiday Inn on October 30, 1978 by an employee of the hotel who delivered a room service order. This employee testified that appellant instructed the victim to sign his name to the tab and spelled out "Osborn" for her.

The next evening, October 31, appellant was stopped by a Pocatello police officer for driving in an inattentive manner. The officer felt that appellant was not sufficiently intoxicated to be arrested, but he did ask the female passenger in the vehicle, whom appellant called Chris, to drive. Later that night, Christine Carl's partially clothed body was found along a road on the outskirts of Pocatello. She had been shot three times in the head, once in the shoulder, and once in the abdomen. Her face showed extensive bruising on the left side, and her nose was fractured. The pathologist who performed the autopsy believed the bullet wound behind the victim's ear was a close contact wound while the other head wounds were probably distance wounds although he stated it was possible that they could have been incurred within eighteen inches of the firearm. The pathologist stated that the large amount of blood loss would indicate that the victim's nose had been broken prior to her being shot. He also stated his opinion that the beating could have occurred prior to the shooting, but noted that this was conjectural as the same bruising could have occurred had the beating occurred simultaneously with the shooting.

About 10:30 that same evening, appellant, driving Christine Carl's car, arrived at the home of an acquaintance. Witnesses at that home testified that Osborn had a pistol in his possession and blood on his vest, chest and boots; that appellant appeared to be acting "weird," though the people in the house could not tell if he was drunk or under the influence of drugs; that appellant stated that he had shot "Chris," and within an hour's time stated that he had buried her in the mountains and that he had placed her body on some railroad tracks; that appellant also stated that the victim had threatened to call the police and turn him in for robbery and that was why he shot her. Two occupants of the house were requested by appellant to hide the car, and in doing so they observed a large amount of blood on the front seat and passenger door of the car.

Police officers later searched the premises and found a dismantled .22 caliber nine-shot revolver. This revolver was at the F.B.I. laboratory in Washington at the time of the preliminary hearing, so only a photograph of it was introduced into evidence. An F.B.I. report stated that due to similarity of rifling marks, the gun in its possession could have been the murder weapon. The report also stated that absent some of the missing parts, the cylinder of the gun had to be manually rotated before the following round could be fired. A Mr. Sullinger testified that in October, 1978, he sold appellant a revolver of the type discovered. He noted that it was then missing a part and that the cylinder had to be revolved by hand between shots before a live round would be positioned.

The psychiatrist who was appointed following appellant's earlier notice of intent to rely upon a defense of mental disease or defect under I.C. § 18-211 reported to the court that appellant had a history of anti-social behavior and alcohol/polydrug abuse. He also noted that appellant claimed to have been on drugs and alcohol at the time of the crime. As to appellant's claim that he remembered nothing of the events of that evening, the psychiatrist stated that in his opinion the claim of amnesia was not genuine, although he noted that it was impossible to be sure. It was also mentioned that appellant had several episodes of amnesia associated with intoxication and violent behavior.

III District court proceedings

After submission of a presentence report, an aggravation-mitigation hearing was held. I.C. § 19-2515. At that hearing, neither prosecution nor defense called any witnesses. The state advised the court that "because I think we do have a a good record of what transpired in the preliminary hearing instead of calling witnesses today, (I choose) to rely on the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing ...." Similarly, appellant's counsel relied upon the facts brought forth in the preliminary hearing and in the reports to the court, and called no additional witnesses, although the appellant did address the court in his own behalf.

The trial court therefore had for sentencing purposes the arguments of counsel and the oral statement of appellant, the presentence investigation report, the transcript and exhibits from the preliminary hearing, and the § 18-211 examining psychiatrist's report.

The court found the following two aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) "that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity," I.C. § 19-2515(f)(5), and (2) "that by the murder and the circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life," I.C. § 19-2515(f)(6). The court also found, but only by a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating circumstance that appellant, "by prior conduct and his conduct in the commission of the murder, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder and will probably constitute a continuing threat to society." I.C. § 19-2515(f) (8).

In regard to mitigating factors, the court stated:

"This Court, because of the extreme burden imposed upon the sentencing judge by the statute and the offense itself, has consciously searched all the information before it hoping sincerely to find circumstances in mitigation which would overcome the circumstances of aggravation however, such mitigating circumstances do not exist."

and:

"The Court further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances which outweigh the gravity of aggravating circumstances and which would make imposition of the death penalty unjust."

The court then concluded that, under I.C. § 19-2515, "the statutory aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances" and sentenced appellant to death.

IV Legal background

Prior to 1977, ¹ I.C. § 18-4004 made the death penalty mandatory for those defendants convicted of first degree murder. However, in light of the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), which held unconstitutional a mandatory death penalty statute virtually identical to Idaho's, the legislature in 1977 amended I.C. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2515 and added § 19-2827 in an attempt to meet the Supreme Court's objections to such statutes. 1977 Sess.Laws Ch. 154, p. 390. The basic premise of Woodson and its companion cases, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976), is that the sentencing authority must be given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty in order to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. To meet this mandate the Idaho legislature enacted an amended version of I.C. § 19-2515 providing for a sentencing hearing at which all relevant information could be presented to the sentencing court; listing the aggravating circumstances which must be found in order to impose the sentence of death; providing that at least one such aggravating circumstance be found to exist beyond a...