281 Care Comm. v. Arneson

• Decision Date: 28 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–1558.,10–1558.
• Citation: 638 F.3d 621
• Parties: 281 CARE COMMITTEE; Ron Stoffel W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee; Victor E. Niska; Citizens for Quality Education; Joel Brude, Plaintiffs/Appellants,v.Ron ARNESON, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Blue Earth County, Minnesota, or his successor; Mike Freeman, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Hennepin County, Minnesota, or his successor; Michael Junge, in his official capacity as County Attorney for McCleod County, Minnesota, or his successor; Tom N. Kelly, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Wright County, Minnesota, or his successor; Lori Swanson, in her official capacity as the Minnesota Attorney General or her successor, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

638 F.3d 621

281 CARE COMMITTEE; Ron Stoffel W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee; Victor E. Niska; Citizens for Quality Education; Joel Brude, Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.Ron ARNESON, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Blue Earth County, Minnesota, or his successor; Mike Freeman, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Hennepin County, Minnesota, or his successor; Michael Junge, in his official capacity as County Attorney for McCleod County, Minnesota, or his successor; Tom N. Kelly, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Wright County, Minnesota, or his successor; Lori Swanson, in her official capacity as the Minnesota Attorney General or her successor, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 10–1558.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 17, 2010.Filed: April 28, 2011.

Erick G. Kaardal, argued, William F. Mohrman, on the brief, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Jean Burdorf, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.John Steven Garry, AAG, argued, St. Paul, MN, for Minnesota Attorney General.Before SMITH, BEAM and BENTON, Circuit Judges.BEAM, Circuit Judge.

In this First Amendment challenge to a Minnesota law that makes it a crime to knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth make a false statement about a proposed ballot initiative, plaintiffs appeal: (1) the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) the district court's alternate holding that it would dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and (3) the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. We reverse the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are three Minnesota-based grass-roots-advocacy organizations along with their corresponding leaders. Each organization was founded to oppose school-funding ballot initiatives, which Minnesota law authorizes individual school boards to propose. These ballot initiatives ask county taxpayers to approve bond hikes or tax levies designed to increase funding to the local school districts. Plaintiffs claim that a provision of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) inhibits plaintiffs' ability to speak freely against these ballot initiatives and, thereby, violates plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Defendants are four Minnesota county attorneys and the Minnesota attorney general, all sued in their official capacities.

In relevant part, the challenged provision of the FCPA provides:

A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who intentionally participates in the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid political advertising or campaign material ... with respect to the effect of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to ... promote or defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false.

Minn.Stat. § 211B.06, subd. 1 (2008). Minnesota has a long history of regulating knowingly false speech about political candidates; it has criminalized defamatory campaign speech since 1893. However, the FCPA's regulation of issue-related political speech is a comparatively recent innovation. Minnesota did not begin regulating knowingly false speech about ballot initiatives until 1988. Between 1988 and 2004, the FCPA's regulation of speech regarding ballot initiatives allowed for only one enforcement mechanism: mandatory criminal prosecution of alleged violators by county attorneys. In 2004, the Minnesota legislature amended the FCPA to provide that alleged violations of section 211B.06 initially be dealt with through civil complaints filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The revised version of section 211B.06 authorizes any person, organization or agency to file a complaint with the OAH, and gives county attorneys discretion to determine whether to bring criminal charges after civil proceedings are complete.

In 2006, the B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Committee—a citizen group that campaigned in support of a school-funding ballot initiative in Howard Lake, Waverly–Winsted Independent School District—filed an OAH complaint against plaintiffs W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee and its Chairperson Victor Niska. The complaint alleged that W.I.S.E. and Niska prepared and distributed, in violation of section 211B.06, campaign materials containing statements of fact that W.I.S.E. and Niska knew to be false. After reviewing the complaint, an OAH judge found that the complainants had established a prima facie case against W.I.S.E. and Niska and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing several months later, an OAH panel dismissed the complaint. W.I.S.E. and Niska spent over $1,900 in legal fees defending against the complaint.

In the fall of 2007, plaintiff 281 Care Committee and its leader plaintiff Ron Stoffel campaigned against a school-funding ballot initiative proposed by the Robbinsdale Public School District. After a vigorous campaign, the ballot initiative was rejected. On November 8, 2007, the Superintendent of the Robbinsdale Public School District told statewide media that the district was investigating 281 Care Committee and exploring ways to deal with the “false” information it spread about the initiative. Plaintiff Stoffel alleges that he interpreted these statements, which were published in the Minnesota Star Tribune and played on Minnesota Public Radio, as a warning that litigation would follow if 281 Care Committee continued using the same tactics to oppose ballot initiatives.

All plaintiffs allege that, given the above-described occurrences, plaintiffs have been chilled from, and continue to be chilled from, vigorously participating in the debate surrounding school-funding ballot initiatives in Minnesota. In particular, plaintiffs allege they declined to participate in a 2008 campaign regarding a school-funding ballot initiative for the Orono School District because they feared repercussions arising from section 211B.06.

In the wake of these events, plaintiffs filed a suit in federal district court, alleging that section 211B.06 violates the First Amendment. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The district court granted defendants' motion, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claim was not ripe. The district court also held that, even if it had subject-matter jurisdiction, it would dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding it was moot in light of the court's ruling. Plaintiffs appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

This case involves a fundamental question about the ability of a state, under the First Amendment, to enact a statute restricting a category of political speech—namely, knowingly or recklessly false speech about a ballot initiative—without demonstrating that the enacted statute is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. The court below held that plaintiffs' challenge to section 211B.06 was not justiciable because plaintiffs lacked standing and their claim was not ripe. The district court also held, in the alternative, that if plaintiffs did have standing, their complaint failed to state a claim because section 211B.06 fell outside the protection of the First Amendment. We reject each of these holdings.

A. Justiciability

Those who invoke federal subject-matter jurisdiction must “demonstrate an actual, ongoing case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.” Republican Party of Minn. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 789–90 (8th Cir.2004) (internal quotations omitted). We review de novo the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Hansen v. United States, 248 F.3d 761, 763 (8th Cir.2001).

Here, the district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because (1) plaintiffs lack Article III standing, and (2) plaintiffs' claim is not ripe. On appeal, defendant Lori Swanson, the Minnesota Attorney General, additionally argues, as she did below, that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim against her because she is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. We reject these arguments and conclude that plaintiffs' claims are justiciable and that subject-matter jurisdiction is proper in federal court.

a. Article III Standing

Standing is always a “threshold question” in determining whether a federal court may hear a case. Eckles v. City of Corydon, 341 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir.2003). A party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that he has the right to assert his claim in federal court. Schanou v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 160, 62 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir.1995). This requires establishing three elements: (1) that he suffered concrete, particularized injury in fact; (2) that this injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of defendants; and (3) that it is likely that this injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The court below concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish that they had suffered an injury in fact. On appeal, defendants also argue that plaintiffs lack standing because plaintiffs have not established that any injury they did suffer is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. We reject these arguments.

To establish injury in fact for a First Amendment challenge to a state statute, a plaintiff need not have been actually prosecuted or threatened with prosecution. St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481, 487 (8th Cir.2006). Rather, the plaintiff needs only to establish that he would like to engage in arguably...