Emilee Carpenter, LLC v. James
| Decision Date | 13 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case # 21-CV-6303-FPG |
| Citation | 575 F.Supp.3d 353 |
| Parties | EMILEE CARPENTER, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Letitia JAMES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Raymond J. Dague, Dague & Martin, P.C., Syracuse, NY, Bryan D. Neihart, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan A. Scruggs, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ, for Plaintiffs.
Heather Lynn McKay, New York State Attorney General's Office Department of Law, Rochester, NY, Richard W. Sawyer, Sandra Elizabeth Pullman, New York Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendant Leticia James.
Heather Lynn McKay, New York State Attorney General's Office Department of Law, Rochester, NY, Richard W. Sawyer, New York Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendant Johnathan J. Smith.
Mohammad Hyder Hussain, Chemung County Law Department, Elmira, NY, for Defendant Weedon Wetmore.
DECISION & ORDER
Our nation was founded on a principle of "inherent equality"—that it is not merely true, but "self-evident," that "all men are created equal" and "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," including "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena , 515 U.S. 200, 240, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Historically, it is an aspiration that has been subject to a variety of caveats, restrictions, and provisos when applied to certain groups, persons, and classes. But it is also an aspiration that "could not forever tolerate" such limitations. City of Mobile v. Bolden , 446 U.S. 55, 104, 100 S.Ct. 1519, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (Marshall, J, dissenting). Throughout our history, Americans have struggled and suffered in order to extend that principle of equality to the excluded, armed with the belief that our society should fully reflect our most cherished values. The Supreme Court's landmark decisions memorialize the necessary, but oftentimes painful, process of reconciling our values and our practices. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan. , 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) ; Loving v. Virginia , 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) ; J.E.B. v. Alabama , 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) ; Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) ; Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). It is a necessary process, one which is contemplated by our Constitution. Obergefell , 576 U.S. at 664, 135 S.Ct. 2584 ().
As it has elsewhere, this process has unfolded in the arena of the public marketplace. Since the end of the Civil War, states and localities have enacted and expanded legislation to ensure that historically underserved, disfavored, or disadvantaged classes of persons have the same access to the American marketplace's great bounty as that afforded to the public at large. Without such access, private discrimination in the marketplace could "perpetuate a caste system in the United States," Bell v. Maryland , 378 U.S. 226, 288, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring), preventing certain groups from "achieving prosperity, health, development or happiness." Gibbs v. Arras Bros. , 222 N.Y. 332, 336, 118 N.E. 857 (1918). The Supreme Court has repeatedly and unequivocally found that such legislative efforts serve valid, and indeed compelling, interests, including in the context of sexual orientation discrimination. At bottom, these laws simply seek to guarantee that businesses purporting to serve the public truly do serve the public. "[G]ay persons and gay couples" are a part of that public. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rts. Comm'n , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727, 201 L.Ed.2d 35 (2018). Therefore they, like all other members of the public in the marketplace, are entitled to be treated in a manner consistent with their inherent equality, "dignity[,] and worth." Id. With all this in mind, the Court turns to the present dispute.
Plaintiffs are Emilee Carpenter and the entity through which she operates her for-profit wedding-photography business, "Emilee Carpenter, LLC."1 Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that, as applied to her business, New York's public-accommodations laws compel her to "violate her conscience by professing the state's [favorable] view about [same-sex] marriage." ECF No. 1 at 3. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants Letitia James (in her official capacity as the Attorney General of New York), Jonathan J. Smith (in his official capacity as Interim Commissioner of the N.Y.S. Division of Human Rights ("DHR")),2 and Weedon Wetmore (in his official capacity as District Attorney of Chemung County, New York). Currently before the Court are three motions: (1) Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 3), (2) Wetmore's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) (ECF No. 24), and (3) the State's motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 27). The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court has also received amicus briefs from dozens of entities and organizations.3 The Court thanks all involved for their thorough submissions. The magnitude of these briefs, coupled with the passion with which their positions are articulated, demonstrate the importance of the issues under discussion.
For the reasons that follow, Wetmore's motion is DENIED; the State's motion is GRANTED insofar as all claims are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; the Court sua sponte dismisses with prejudice the claims against Wetmore for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED AS MOOT.
The following facts are taken from the complaint, unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff describes herself as a "photographer, natural people person, [ ] storyteller," and "Christian." ECF No. 1 at 3. Based in Chemung County, Plaintiff has been a for-profit wedding photographer since 2012, and has operated her business through "Emilee Carpenter, LLC" since 2019. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. In addition to wedding photography,4 Plaintiff provides "branding-photography" services, which "depict and promote businesses and their services" for marketing purposes. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37.
Living by the biblical admonition that one should "do it all for the glory of God," Plaintiff's religious beliefs "shape every aspect of her life," including her photography. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21. In order to "honor God's glory in His creation and display God's beauty, artistry, and truth," she only accepts projects in which she can "portray the subject(s) or content of the photograph in a positive, appealing, and uplifting manner." Id. ¶¶ 41, 42. Similarly, to convey her beliefs that "marriage is a gift from God that should be treasured and celebrated," Plaintiff "seeks to create photographs that evoke joyful emotions and ... positively portray the couple, their wedding (or engagement), and God's design for marriage." Id. ¶¶ 48, 55.
Plaintiff also uses her photography services to celebrate and promote her view of marriage. On her business's website, Plaintiff maintains a blog. Plaintiff provides a "complimentary blog post for the client[s]" of each wedding she photographs, in which she posts pictures of the wedding, "encourage[s] the couple, and communicate[s] her views on marriage to the couple and to the general public." ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 35, 89. Plaintiff believes her blog is "an integral part of her business" that allows her to "publicly associate herself" with her photography and promote "her business, artistic style, and approach to photography." Id. ¶¶ 91, 92.
In providing her wedding photography services, Plaintiff demands "full artistic license and total editorial discretion" from her clients and uses that discretion to "create her desired image[s] consistent with her artistic style and religious beliefs." Id. ¶¶ 53, 77. To that end, Plaintiff would not accept any projects that required her to portray "the couple, their marriage, or their wedding in a negative way," id. ¶ 103, use certain aesthetic styles inconsistent with her "artistic judgment," id. ¶ 111, or take photographs celebrating "anything immoral" or "dishonorable to God." Id. ¶ 113. As is relevant here, Plaintiff will decline projects that promote or celebrate same-sex marriage, whether that be a request from a same-sex couple looking for a wedding photographer, or a "staged wedding shoot" for an advertisement that depicts a same-sex wedding. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 117, 138. She believes that accepting such assignments would, in effect, "promote activities contrary to her beliefs [and] express messages contradicting her beliefs." Id. ¶ 118. Plaintiff maintains that the issue is not the people involved in the project, but the topic of same-sex marriage itself. She claims that she has no qualms with photographing "LGBT individuals" or working with them as clients in other contexts; her concern is that she does not wish to "participate in a ceremony or express a message [through her photography] that violates her religious beliefs." Id. ¶¶ 130, 136.
Plaintiff initiated the present suit after learning about New York's public accommodation laws. She believes that those laws "threaten[ ] her ability to operate her business according to her faith" and "restrict[ ] what she could post on her studio's website and social media sites and what she could say to prospective clients." Id. ¶ 144. There are four provisions in dispute; three contained...
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