The EState Donjuall Gilliam v. City of Prattville

• Decision Date: 26 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–10670.,10–10670.
• Citation: 639 F.3d 1041
• Parties: The ESTATE OF Eugene Donjuall GILLIAM, by and through his Personal Representative, Cynthia Harmon WALDROUP, Administratrix, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.CITY OF PRATTVILLE, et al., Defendants,Camille Emmanuel, individually, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

639 F.3d 1041

22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2003

The ESTATE OF Eugene Donjuall GILLIAM, by and through his Personal Representative, Cynthia Harmon WALDROUP, Administratrix, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.CITY OF PRATTVILLE, et al., Defendants,Camille Emmanuel, individually, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 10–10670.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 26, 2011.

Donald Gordon Madison; Elizabeth Peyton Faulk, Joseph Brady Lewis, Lewis, Bush & Faulk, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.Rick A. Howard, Steven Anthony Higgins, April W. McKay, Brandy F. Price, Holtsford, Gilliland, Higgins, Hitson & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Defendant–Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.Before MARTIN, COX and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

COX, Circuit Judge:

No language in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for the survival of a civil rights action in favor of another upon the death of the injured party. Because the statute is silent or “deficient” in this respect, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) requires application of state survivorship law, provided that law is “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Under the Alabama survivorship statute, Ala.Code § 6–5–462, unfiled personal injury claims do not survive the death of the injured party. Finding this statute “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,” the district court declined to apply it in this case, and instead fashioned a federal common law rule of survivorship. The case was tried to a jury, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the decedent's estate. Because we conclude that Ala.Code § 6–5–462 is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

One evening in April 2007, two City of Prattville, Alabama police officers—Brian Gentry and Camille Emmanuel—stopped Eugene Gilliam's vehicle for violating the speed limit. During the course of the stop, the officers found marijuana in Gilliam's pocket and attempted to arrest him. In the process, both officers tasered Gilliam multiple times. At trial, the facts about the amount of resistance the police officers encountered in trying to subdue Gilliam were disputed. Gilliam's estate presented evidence that Gilliam did not struggle or resist at all. The officers testified that he forcibly resisted arrest and attempted to flee.

After the officers restrained Gilliam by using tasers, he complained of chest pains and breathing difficulties. The paramedics, who were called almost immediately, arrived within minutes and took Gilliam to the hospital. About seven hours later, Gilliam died. The state medical examiner performed an autopsy and listed “hypertensive cardiovascular disease consistent with dysrhythmia” as the final pathological diagnosis. He listed the cause of death as “hypertensive cardiovascular disease” and the manner of death as “natural.” Using blood drawn from Gilliam an hour or so after the incident, a toxicology screen flagged his blood as positive for marijuana and cocaine.

About a year after Gilliam's death, Cynthia Waldroup, Gilliam's mother and personal representative of his estate, sued officers Gentry and Emmanuel. ¹ The Estate alleged: (1) state law wrongful death claims against both officers; (2) § 1983 excessive force claims against both officers that specifically alleged death resulted from the use of force; and (3) § 1983 excessive force claims against both officers that did not allege death was the result of the use of force.

The two officers filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion in limine. Through both of these motions, the officers generally challenged the Estate's evidence as to whether the officers' firing of the taser was the proximate cause of Gilliam's death. Through their motion in limine, the officers sought to exclude the death causation testimony and reports of the Estate's two medical experts.

The district court granted the motion in limine, and excluded the death causation testimony and reports of the Estate's expert witnesses. Because the Estate had no other expert medical testimony to establish causation, the district court granted the officers' motion for summary judgment on the state law wrongful death claims and the § 1983 excessive force claims that alleged death resulted from the use of force. The court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 excessive force claims that did not allege death was the result of the use of force.

The case went to trial against both officer Gentry and officer Emmanuel on the non-death § 1983 excessive force claims. At the close of the Estate's case and again at the close of the officers' case, counsel for the officers moved to dismiss the excessive force claims. They argued that Gilliam died prior to the filing of this lawsuit and thus the § 1983 excessive force claims had abated under Alabama law as provided by Ala.Code § 6–5–462.² The district court denied both motions, concluding that Alabama survivorship law should not be applied to this case because it would be “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”³ The case was then presented to the jury.

The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of officer Gentry, but returned a verdict against officer Emmanuel in the amount of $30,000. The district court entered final judgment against Emmanuel. She now appeals that judgment, arguing that the district court erred in denying her pre-verdict motions because the § 1983 excessive force claims did not under Alabama law survive Gilliam's death.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir.2010); Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir.2003).

III. DISCUSSION

The issue in this case is whether a § 1983 excessive force claim survives in Alabama if the injured party dies before the lawsuit is filed, or abates pursuant to Ala.Code § 6–5–462. We stress at the outset that this case, in its present procedural posture, does not involve a claim that the officers' unconstitutional conduct caused the decedent's death. The state law wrongful death claims under Ala.Code § 6–5–410, and the § 1983 excessive force claims alleging that death was the result of the use of force, were both dismissed at the summary judgment stage because the Estate produced no admissible evidence that the officers' use of force caused the decedent's death.⁴ Therefore, the only issue we address is whether a § 1983 excessive force claim that did not result in the decedent's death survives in Alabama or abates under Ala.Code § 6–5–462.

By its terms, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for the survival of civil rights actions. Due to this “deficiency” in the statute, the survivorship of civil rights actions is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588–89, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 1994, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978). That statute generally directs that, where federal law is “deficient,” the state law of the forum applies as long as it is “not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).⁵

The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1988(a) as requiring a “three-step process” to determine the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47–48, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2928, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984); Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir.2001). Courts must first look to federal law “so far as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Second, if federal law is “not adapted to the object” or is “deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses,” courts must apply the law of the forum state. Id. Third, if application of state law is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,” courts must not apply state law. Id.

There is no dispute in this case regarding the first two steps of the analysis: The parties agree, as do we, that the failure of § 1983 to include a survivorship provision is not “suitable to carry [that statute] into effect” and is “deficient” in providing suitable remedies for civil rights violations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has definitively held that § 1983 is deficient in not providing for survivorship. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588, 98 S.Ct. at 1994; see also Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 407–08 (5th Cir.1961) (holding that § 1983 is deficient in not providing for survivorship and looking to Georgia's survivorship and wrongful death statutes to see if civil rights claim survives) .⁶ The dispute in this case concerns the third step: whether application of Alabama survivorship law is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

The applicable Alabama survivorship law is Ala.Code § 6–5–462. Under that provision, “a deceased's unfiled tort claims do not survive the death of the putative plaintiff.” Bassie v. Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs. of Northwest Ala., P.C., 828 So.2d 280, 282 (Ala.2002); see also Cont'l Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So.2d 1033, 1037 (Ala.2005) (“As a general rule, causes of action in tort do not survive in favor of the personal representative of the deceased.”); Malcolm v. King, 686 So.2d 231, 236 (Ala.1996) (“The general rule is that under Ala.Code 1975, § 6–5–462, an unfiled tort claim does not survive the death of the person with the claim.”).⁷ It is clear that if this Alabama survivorship statute applies, then Gilliam's § 1983 excessive force claim against Emmanuel cannot survive his death.

The Estate contends that Ala.Code § 6–5–462 is inconsistent with federal civil rights laws and thus the district...