Bennett v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 14855

• Citation: 230 Conn. 795,646 A.2d 806
• Decision Date: 16 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 14855,14855
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: John BENNETT et al. v. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD.

Page 806

646 A.2d 806

230 Conn. 795

John BENNETT et al. v. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD.

No. 14855.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 31, 1994.

Decided Aug. 16, 1994.

Peter T. Fay, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

David N. Rosen, with whom was Barbara Goren, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff Lori Misura).

Before CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PALMER, Justice.

This certified appeal requires us to decide whether the Appellate Court properly reversed the judgment of the trial court ordering a remittitur. ¹ We granted the petition of the defendant, Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, ² and now reverse.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. The plaintiffs, Lori Misura and John Bennett, ³ were injured in an automobile accident with an unidentified hit-and-run driver while they were traveling in Misura's automobile in New Haven. ⁴ They brought this action against the defendant to collect uninsured motorist benefits under Misura's insurance policy with the defendant. Under the terms of the policy, the defendant was obligated to pay damages for bodily injuries sustained by the occupants of Misura's vehicle that they would have been legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. ⁵ The policy expressly limited the defendant's liability, however, to $100,000 for any one accident, regardless of the number of covered persons injured. ⁶

The complaint originally filed by the plaintiffs made specific reference to the insurance policy and its limit of $100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. The defendant filed a request to revise the complaint to delete any reference to the limit of $100,000 uninsured motorist coverage of the policy on the grounds that it was irrelevant to any jury issue and that its disclosure would unduly prejudice the defendant. The plaintiffs did not object to the defendant's request to revise and, accordingly, filed an amended complaint that contained no reference to the policy's limits of uninsured motorist coverage.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The trial court granted the motion, without opposition. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and Bennett agreed to a settlement of his claim against the defendant for $37,115, and Bennett thereupon withdrew his action.

The defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Misura from introducing any evidence at trial of the policy limits or the amount of insurance coverage available under the policy. The motion, unopposed by Misura, was granted by the trial court. Misura's action against the defendant then proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. On May 6, 1992, the jury returned a verdict for her in the amount $92,000, and the trial court accepted the verdict and rendered judgment in accordance therewith.

On May 28, 1992, the defendant filed a motion to open the judgment and for a remittitur pursuant to Practice Book §§ 325 and 326 ⁷ and General Statutes § 52-228. ⁸ The defendant claimed that the undisputed terms of the policy and General Statutes § 38a-336(b) ⁹ required a reduction of the judgment obtained against it by Misura so that the defendant's total payments to the plaintiffs under the policy did not exceed $100,000.

After a hearing on the motion on July 7, 1992, the trial court concluded that the defendant's total liability to the plaintiffs under the terms of the policy was $100,000. The court further concluded that because the defendant's prior payments to the plaintiffs ¹⁰ totaled $38,598.89, ¹¹ only $61,401.11 remained available. Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to open the judgment and for a remittitur ¹² in the amount of $30,598.89, and rendered a corrected judgment for the plaintiff of $61,401.11, plus interest.

Misura appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to that court with direction to reinstate the verdict in full, subject only to a reduction for collateral source payments made to or on behalf of Misura. On appeal to this court, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court was incorrect when it directed the trial court to reinstate the jury's verdict. We agree with the defendant.

We begin our analysis of the defendant's claim ¹³ with a review of § 38a-336(b). Section 38a-336(b) requires that an insurer pay its insured up to the limits of the policy's uninsured motorist coverage after the liability limits of all other applicable insurance policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. This statutory subsection, together with the other provisions of the uninsured motorist statute, § 38a-336, reflects the public policy of this state to afford a personal injury claimant access to insurance protection to compensate for the damages that would have been recoverable if the uninsured motorist had maintained an adequate policy of liability insurance. Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 225 Conn. 566, 573, 624 A.2d 892 (1993); Harvey v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 188 Conn. 245, 249, 449 A.2d 157 (1982). Section 38a-336(b) also provides, however, that "in no event shall the total amount of recovery from all policies, including any amount recovered under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage, exceed the limits of the insured's uninsured motorist coverage." This limitation on an insured's recovery to the maximum amount allowed under the policy's uninsured motorist provisions serves to avoid the anomaly of a greater recovery under those policy provisions than would have been available from a tortfeasor carrying liability insurance equal to the coverage of the insured. See Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, supra, 225 Conn. at 573, 624 A.2d 892; see also Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 391-92, 392-93 n. 6, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982).

Misura acknowledges the general statutory prohibition against a recovery by an insured in excess of the limits of the policy's uninsured motorist coverage. Moreover, she does not dispute the fact that her insurance policy expressly limited recovery for any one accident to a total of $100,000. She contends, however, that the defendant was required to have pleaded as a special defense ¹⁴ the policy's $100,000 limit and its settlement of Bennett's claim in order to have limited the plaintiffs' combined recovery to $100,000. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not agree.

As a general rule, facts must be pleaded as a special defense when they are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Practice Book § 164; Grant v. Bassman, 221 Conn. 465, 472-73, 604 A.2d 814 (1992). The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway. Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 1, 6, 327 A.2d 583 (1973); DuBose v. Carabetta, 161 Conn. 254, 261, 287 A.2d 357 (1971). Whether facts must be specially pleaded depends on the nature of those facts in relation to the contested issues. See Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 165 Conn. at 6-7, 327 A.2d 583; DuBose v. Carabetta, supra, 161 Conn. at 259-61, 287 A.2d 357.

In the circumstances presented here, the defendant's failure to have pleaded the $100,000 policy limit as a special defense did not deprive it of the benefit of that provision. The complaint originally filed by the plaintiffs expressly alleged uninsured motorist coverage "up to a policy limit of $100,000 per accident," an allegation that the plaintiffs agreed to delete because, as the defendant claimed, the parties had agreed that (1) the policy limit was $100,000, (2) the policy limit did not raise a jury issue, ¹⁵ and (3) its introduction had the potential to unduly prejudice the jury. Because the plaintiffs had already acknowledged the $100,000 policy limit in their complaint, the defendant's failure to plead that policy provision as a special defense did not preclude the trial court from reducing the jury award in accordance with § 38a-336(b). See Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 244, 492 A.2d 164 (1985) ("statements in withdrawn or superseded pleadings, including complaints, may be considered as evidential admissions by the party making them").

Furthermore, the defendant had repeatedly expressed its understanding, both in its written submissions and in oral argument to the trial court, that in the event the jury returned a verdict for Misura which, together with its obligations under the settlement agreement with Bennett, exceeded $100,000, the verdict would be reduced accordingly by the court. Prior to the verdict, Misura had not contested the propriety of that procedure and, indeed, had indicated that it would be the appropriate one to follow if such a reduction of the verdict were necessary. ¹⁶ Misura had ample notice, therefore, that the defendant was relying on the undisputed terms of the policy to limit its liability to the plaintiffs. Thus, because there was no dispute that the plaintiffs' recovery was limited by the express and unambiguous terms of the policy and Misura was on notice that the defendant intended to seek a reduction, by posttrial motion, of any verdict in excess of the policy limit, the trial court properly reduced the award notwithstanding the defendant's failure to plead the $100,000 limitation as a special defense. ¹⁷

We also agree with the defendant that its failure to raise as a special defense the settlement agreement that it had entered into with Bennett did not preclude the trial court from granting the defendant's request for a remittitur. General Statutes § 52-216a ¹⁸ expressly prohibits the introduction of evidence concerning settlement agreements or releases in jury...